Cultural influences on neural substrates of attentional control

Behavioral research has shown that people from Western cultural contexts perform better on tasks emphasizing independent (absolute) dimensions than on tasks emphasizing interdependent (relative) dimensions, whereas the reverse is true for people from East Asian contexts. We assessed functional magnetic resonance imaging responses during performance of simple visuospatial tasks in which participants made absolute judgments (ignoring visual context) or relative judgments (taking visual context into account). In each group, activation in frontal and parietal brain regions known to be associated with attentional control was greater during culturally nonpreferred judgments than during culturally preferred judgments. Also, within each group, activation differences in these regions correlated strongly with scores on questionnaires measuring individual differences in culture-typical identity. Thus, the cultural background of an individual and the degree to which the individual endorses cultural values moderate activation in brain networks engaged during even simple visual and attentional tasks.     

Expertise-based differences in search and option-generation strategies

The current work builds on option-generation research using experts of various skill levels in a realistic task. We extend previous findings that relate an athlete's performance strategy to generated options and subsequent choices in handball. In a 2-year longitudinal study, we present eye-tracking data to independently verify decision strategies previously inferred from patterns of generated options. A verbal protocol identified the option-generation process for each individual prior to an allocation decision. Although athletes of varying expertise generated the same number of options on average, these options differed in quality between expert, near-expert, and nonexpert athletes for both their initial and final choices. These and other key results are formalized to elaborate a model of option generation, deliberation, and selection.     

Top-down influences on attentional capture by color changes

Previous studies have shown that a change in an existing object is not as effective in capturing attention as the appearance of a new object. This view was recently challenged by Lu and Zhou (Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 12:567–572, 2005), who found strong capture effects for an object changing its color. We suspected that this finding critically depends on a procedural particularity in Lu and Zhou’s study, namely that the color of the unique item and the color of the no-unique items randomly switched between trials. In the current study we replicate Lu and Zhou’s capture effect (Experiment 1) and show that no capture occurs when the color-to-stimuli assignment is fixed (Experiment 2). Two further experiments suggest that the capture effect in Experiment 1 is not because the unique item switched color (Experiment 3), but because all the no-unique items switched color (Experiment 4). The results are discussed considering top-down modulation and inter-trial priming effects.

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Storage and non-storage components of working memory predicting reasoning: A simultaneous examination of a wide range of ability factors

The current study examined basic cognitive abilities that are related to or included in the concept of working memory (WM): different WM components, three executive functions, simple short-term storage (STM), and sustained attention. Tasks were selected from well-established models and balanced in terms of content. The predictive power of storage and non-storage components of WM was examined. The same analyses were conducted with mental speed as an additional predictor of reasoning. Finally, we investigated whether the identified predictors of reasoning remain relevant when a general factor is considered in the analysis. The analyses revealed that short-term memory accounted for the relationship between complex span measures of WM and reasoning but not for the relationship between coordination and reasoning. These findings remained stable in the context of a mental speed and a general factor. The mental speed factor did not add an incremental contribution to the prediction of reasoning above and beyond short-term memory and coordination. The general factor was mainly built by mental speed tasks and acted as an additional predictor of reasoning besides STM and coordination. Thus, we concluded that reasoning ability can be explained by coordination, STM, and mental speed.     

Interactive effect of long-term mental stress and cardiac stress reactivity on carotid intima-media thickness: the Cardiovascular Risk in Young Finns study

The present study examined the interaction between vital exhaustion and cardiac reactivity and recovery on preclinical atherosclerosis assessed by carotid intima-media thickness (IMT) in young men and women. We measured heart rate (HR), respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), and pre-ejection period (PEP) in response to mental arithmetic and speech tasks. Vital exhaustion and carotid IMT were also measured. Significant associations were observed for men aged 28-37 years, but not for men aged 22-25 years, nor for women in these age groups. It was shown that, among highly exhausted men in the older age group, lower HR reactivity was related to greater IMT. Our results also imply that, among non-exhausted men in this age group, slow HR and RSA recovery after acute stress predicted higher IMT. These results suggest that long-term stress as assessed by vital exhaustion is a risk only if it has resulted in ineffective cardiac stress reactivity. Autonomic imbalance resulting from chronic stress may be the common mechanism linking vital exhaustion and cardiac responsiveness to an increased risk of atherosclerosis.     

On the expression and experience of surprise: no evidence for facial feedback, but evidence for a reverse self-inference effect

Three studies examined the effects of experimentally manipulated surprise expressions on the experience of surprise. Surprise was induced by a sudden, unannounced change of the stimulus presentation during a computerized task. Facial expression was manipulated by leading participants to adopt an expression akin to surprise, or by forcing them to look up steeply to a monitor. The expression manipulations had no intensifying effect on the experience of surprise, whereas manipulations of unexpectedness and mental load had strong effects. In addition, mental load was found to affect beliefs about facial expression, suggesting that the participants used their feelings of surprise to infer their probable facial displays. Path analyses supported this reverse self-inference hypothesis.     

Processing of Syllables in Production and Recognition Tasks

Empirical evidence for a functional role of syllables in visual word processing is abundant, however it remains rather heterogeneous. The present study aims to further specify the role of syllables and the cognitive accessibility of syllabic information in word processing. The first experiment compared performance across naming and lexical decision tasks by manipulating the number of syllables in words and non-words. Results showed a syllable number effect in both the naming task and the lexical decision task. The second experiment introduced a stimulus set consisting of isolated syllabic and non-syllabic trigrams. Syllable frequency was manipulated in a naming and in a decision task requiring participants to decide on the syllabic status of letter strings. Results showed faster responses for syllables than for non-syllables in both tasks. Syllable frequency effects were observed in the decision task. In summary, the results from these manipulations of different types of syllable information confirm an important role of syllabic units in both recognition and production.     

Erkenntnistheorie der Zahldefinition und philosophische Grundlegung der Arithmetik unter Bezugnahme auf einen Vergleich von Gottlob Freges Logizismus und platonischer Philosophie (Syrian, Theon von Smyrna u.a.)

The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate ‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary, is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.