Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

SARA: A cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

Perceptual Judgments of Sports Officials are Influenced by their Motor and Visual Experience

We examined the relation between previous motor and visual experience and current officiating experience of expert judges and referees and their judgments from an embodied cognition viewpoint. A total of 370 sports officials from soccer, handball, ice hockey, and trampoline took part in the study. Analyses revealed that cognitive judgments are related to motor, visual, and officiating experience to different degrees in the analyzed sports. Our findings indicate that, depending on the sport, sports officials should either specialize early in officiating, or gather visuo-motor experience as an athlete or spectator first, and then switch roles to become a sports official.     

A goal model of catharsis

Although research in social psychology has repeatedly refuted the idea that aggression reduces subsequent aggression (e.g., Bushman, 2002), we suggest a more fine-grained analysis of catharsis. We will present and discuss a social-cognitive goal model of cathartic effects in aggression that predicts under which conditions aggression increases or reduces subsequent aggression. The model assumes that the accessibility of aggression-related constructs is a function of goal fulfilment: Prior to goal fulfilment constructs related to the goal are highly accessible in order to facilitate goal fulfilment. However, after goal fulfilment this heightened accessibility loses its functionality and aggressive constructs are consequently inhibited. In the present article we will review empirical work testing this model. Moreover, we will extend this model to the effects of violent computer games. Finally we will discuss theoretical challenges and applied relevance of our model for intervention strategies aimed at reducing aggression.     

Feeling close and doing well: The prevalence and motivational effects of interpersonally engaging emotions in Mexican and European American cultural contexts

Two studies investigate whether interpersonally engaging emotions—those that bring the self closer to others (e.g., affection, shame)—are central to the model of self and relationships prevalent in Mexican cultural contexts. Study 1 demonstrated that compared to people in European American contexts, people in Mexican contexts were more likely to report experiencing interpersonally engaging emotions and less likely to report experiencing interpersonally disengaging emotions. Study 2 found that interpersonally engaging emotions had a substantial influence on performance motivation in Mexican contexts—Mexican participants solved more word search puzzles after recalling instances in which they experienced positive interpersonally engaging emotions, and fewer after recalling negative interpersonally disengaging emotions; in contrast, there were no differences by condition for European Americans. These findings significantly extend previous research by documenting the implications of relational concerns (e.g., simpatia, personalismo) for emotion and motivation in Mexican contexts, and are the first to demonstrate the motivational effects of interpersonally engaging emotions.     

A Short Measure of the Need for Affect

Summary

Widespread divergencies of opinion exist over the usefulness, the nature, the purpose, and the scientific status of clinical psychological testing. This paper seeks to order these problems in historical and philosophical perspective. Largely different values and orientations have been contributed by traditional American academic psychology, by clinical psychology, and by psychiatry. Academic psychologists advocate a rigorous scientific basis (logical positivism) for testing, which the clinician tends to find overly confining and antagonistic to his humanistic, individual centered, service orientation; while psychiatrists tend to differ greatly among themselves in their understanding of psychological testing and hence exert no uniform influence on the practice. The current trend emphasizes greater sophistication in the academic approach to testing, with advances in empiricism and computer-aided manipulation of data, while the more clinically oriented psychologists seek to strengthen their theoretical position and to demonstrate the effectiveness of their methods through studies of clinical judgment. At the same time basic methodological research to support the “clinical position” is yet too sparse. It is proposed that both academic and clinical approaches have a significant contribution to make to clinical psychological testing. Ultimately the design of psychological tests and the evaluation of their usefulness rests upon what we conceive psychological science to be, and we need to remind ourselves, in this regard, that the conception of science is subject to change.     

Pacifiers Disrupt Adults’ Responses to Infants’ Emotions

Research shows that pacifiers disrupt infants' mimicry of facial expressions. This experiment examines whether pacifiers interfere with caretakers' ability to mimic infants' emotions. Adults saw photographs of infants with or without a pacifier. When infants had pacifiers, perceivers showed reduced EMG activity to infants' smiles. Smiles of infants using a pacifier were also rated as less happy than smiles depicted without a pacifier. The same pattern was observed for expressions of distress: adults rated infants presented with pacifiers as less sad than infants without pacifiers. We discuss deleterious effects of pacifier use for the perceiver's resonance with a child's emotions.     

Culture,Emotion, and Well-being: Good Feelings in Japan and the United States

We tested the hypothesis that “good feelings”—the central element of subjective well-being—are associated with interdependence and interpersonal engagement of the self in Japan, but with independence and interpersonal disengagement of the self in the United States. Japanese and American college students (total N = 913) reported how frequently they experienced various emotional states in daily life. In support of the hypothesis, the reported frequency of general positive emotions (e.g. calm, elated) was most closely associated with the reported frequency of interpersonally engaged positive emotions (e.g. friendly feelings) in Japan, but with the reported frequency of interpersonally disengaged positive emotions (e.g. pride) in the United States. Further, for Americans the reported frequency of experience was considerably higher for positive emotions than for negative emotions, but for Japanese it was higher for engaged emotions than for disengaged emotions. Implications for cultural constructions of emotion in general and subjective well-being in particular are discussed.     

Reflective measurement models,behavior domains,and common causes

Causal theories of measurement view test items as effects of a common cause. Behavior domain theories view test item responses as behaviors sampled from a common domain. A domain score is a composite score over this domain. The question arises whether latent variables can simultaneously constitute domain scores and common causes of item scores. One argument to the contrary holds that behavior domain theory offers more effective guidance for item construction than a causal theory of measurement. A second argument appeals to the apparent circularity of taking a domain score, which is defined in terms of a domain of behaviors, as a cause of those behaviors. Both arguments require qualification and behavior domain theory seems to rely on implicit causal relationships in two respects. Three strategies permit reconciliation of the two theories: One can take a causal structure as providing the basis for a homogeneous domain. One can construct a homogeneous domain and then investigate whether a causal structure explains the homogeneity. Or, one can take the domain score as linked to an existing attribute constrained by indirect measurement.     

True Overconfidence in Interval Estimates: Evidence Based on a New Measure of Miscalibration

Overconfidence is often regarded as one of the most prevalent judgment biases. Several studies show that overconfidence can lead to suboptimal decisions of investors, managers, or politicians. Recent research, however, questions whether overconfidence should be regarded as a bias and shows that standard “overconfidence” findings can easily be explained by different degrees of knowledge of agents plus a random error in predictions. We contribute to the current literature and ongoing research by extensively analyzing interval estimates for knowledge questions, for real financial time series, and for artificially generated charts. We thereby suggest a new method to measure overconfidence in interval estimates, which is based on the implied probability mass behind a stated prediction interval. We document overconfidence patterns, which are difficult to reconcile with rationality of agents and which cannot be explained by differences in knowledge as differences in knowledge do not exist in our task. Furthermore, we show that overconfidence measures are reliable in the sense that there exist stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence in interval estimates, thereby testing an important assumption of behavioral economics and behavioral finance models: stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence across people. We do this in a “field experiment,” for different levels of expertise of subjects (students on the one hand and professional traders and investment bankers on the other hand), over time, by using different miscalibration metrics, and for tasks that avoid common weaknesses such as a non‐representative selection of trick questions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.