Interobject spacing explains the attentional bias toward interacting objects

Spatio-temporal interactions between simple geometrical shapes typically elicit strong impressions of intentionality. Recent research has started to explore the link between attentional processes and the detection of interacting objects. Here, we asked whether visual attention is biased toward such interactions. We investigated probe discrimination performance in algorithmically generated animations that involved two chasing objects and two randomly moving objects. In Experiment 1, we observed a pronounced attention capture effect for chasing objects. Because reduced interobject spacing is an inherent feature of interacting objects, in Experiment 2 we designed randomly moving objects that were matched to the chasing objects with respect to interobject spacing at probe onset. In this experiment, the capture effect attenuated completely. Therefore, we argue that reduced interobject spacing reflects an efficient cue to guide visual attention toward objects that interact intentionally.     

An empirically feasible approach to the epistemology of arithmetic

Recent years have seen an explosion of empirical data concerning arithmetical cognition. In this paper that data is taken to be philosophically important and an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. The epistemological theory is based on the empirically well-supported hypothesis that our arithmetical ability is built on a protoarithmetical ability to categorize observations in terms of quantities that we have already as infants and share with many nonhuman animals. It is argued here that arithmetical knowledge developed in such a way cannot be totally conceptual in the sense relevant to the philosophy of arithmetic, but neither can arithmetic understood to be empirical. Rather, we need to develop a contextual a priori notion of arithmetical knowledge that preserves the special mathematical characteristics without ignoring the roots of arithmetical cognition. Such a contextual a priori theory is shown not to require any ontologically problematic assumptions, in addition to fitting well within a standard framework of general epistemology.