Mental imagery, reasoning, and blindness

Although reasoning seems to be inextricably linked to seeing in the “mind's eye”, the evidence is equivocal. In three experiments, sighted, blindfolded sighted, and congenitally totally blind persons solved deductive inferences based on three sorts of relation: (a) visuo-spatial relations that are easy to envisage either visually or spatially, (b) visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but hard to envisage spatially, and (c) control relations that are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. In absolute terms, congenitally totally blind persons performed less accurately and more slowly than the sighted on all such tasks. In relative terms, however, the visual relations in comparison with control relations impeded the reasoning of sighted and blindfolded participants, whereas congenitally totally blind participants performed the same with the different sorts of relation. We conclude that mental images containing visual details that are irrelevant to an inference can even impede the process of reasoning. Persons who are blind from birth—and who thus do not tend to construct visual mental images—are immune to this visual-impedance effect.     

Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

Perceptual Judgments of Sports Officials are Influenced by their Motor and Visual Experience

We examined the relation between previous motor and visual experience and current officiating experience of expert judges and referees and their judgments from an embodied cognition viewpoint. A total of 370 sports officials from soccer, handball, ice hockey, and trampoline took part in the study. Analyses revealed that cognitive judgments are related to motor, visual, and officiating experience to different degrees in the analyzed sports. Our findings indicate that, depending on the sport, sports officials should either specialize early in officiating, or gather visuo-motor experience as an athlete or spectator first, and then switch roles to become a sports official.     

A goal model of catharsis

Although research in social psychology has repeatedly refuted the idea that aggression reduces subsequent aggression (e.g., Bushman, 2002), we suggest a more fine-grained analysis of catharsis. We will present and discuss a social-cognitive goal model of cathartic effects in aggression that predicts under which conditions aggression increases or reduces subsequent aggression. The model assumes that the accessibility of aggression-related constructs is a function of goal fulfilment: Prior to goal fulfilment constructs related to the goal are highly accessible in order to facilitate goal fulfilment. However, after goal fulfilment this heightened accessibility loses its functionality and aggressive constructs are consequently inhibited. In the present article we will review empirical work testing this model. Moreover, we will extend this model to the effects of violent computer games. Finally we will discuss theoretical challenges and applied relevance of our model for intervention strategies aimed at reducing aggression.     

A Short Measure of the Need for Affect

Summary

Widespread divergencies of opinion exist over the usefulness, the nature, the purpose, and the scientific status of clinical psychological testing. This paper seeks to order these problems in historical and philosophical perspective. Largely different values and orientations have been contributed by traditional American academic psychology, by clinical psychology, and by psychiatry. Academic psychologists advocate a rigorous scientific basis (logical positivism) for testing, which the clinician tends to find overly confining and antagonistic to his humanistic, individual centered, service orientation; while psychiatrists tend to differ greatly among themselves in their understanding of psychological testing and hence exert no uniform influence on the practice. The current trend emphasizes greater sophistication in the academic approach to testing, with advances in empiricism and computer-aided manipulation of data, while the more clinically oriented psychologists seek to strengthen their theoretical position and to demonstrate the effectiveness of their methods through studies of clinical judgment. At the same time basic methodological research to support the “clinical position” is yet too sparse. It is proposed that both academic and clinical approaches have a significant contribution to make to clinical psychological testing. Ultimately the design of psychological tests and the evaluation of their usefulness rests upon what we conceive psychological science to be, and we need to remind ourselves, in this regard, that the conception of science is subject to change.     

Pacifiers Disrupt Adults’ Responses to Infants’ Emotions

Research shows that pacifiers disrupt infants' mimicry of facial expressions. This experiment examines whether pacifiers interfere with caretakers' ability to mimic infants' emotions. Adults saw photographs of infants with or without a pacifier. When infants had pacifiers, perceivers showed reduced EMG activity to infants' smiles. Smiles of infants using a pacifier were also rated as less happy than smiles depicted without a pacifier. The same pattern was observed for expressions of distress: adults rated infants presented with pacifiers as less sad than infants without pacifiers. We discuss deleterious effects of pacifier use for the perceiver's resonance with a child's emotions.     

True Overconfidence in Interval Estimates: Evidence Based on a New Measure of Miscalibration

Overconfidence is often regarded as one of the most prevalent judgment biases. Several studies show that overconfidence can lead to suboptimal decisions of investors, managers, or politicians. Recent research, however, questions whether overconfidence should be regarded as a bias and shows that standard “overconfidence” findings can easily be explained by different degrees of knowledge of agents plus a random error in predictions. We contribute to the current literature and ongoing research by extensively analyzing interval estimates for knowledge questions, for real financial time series, and for artificially generated charts. We thereby suggest a new method to measure overconfidence in interval estimates, which is based on the implied probability mass behind a stated prediction interval. We document overconfidence patterns, which are difficult to reconcile with rationality of agents and which cannot be explained by differences in knowledge as differences in knowledge do not exist in our task. Furthermore, we show that overconfidence measures are reliable in the sense that there exist stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence in interval estimates, thereby testing an important assumption of behavioral economics and behavioral finance models: stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence across people. We do this in a “field experiment,” for different levels of expertise of subjects (students on the one hand and professional traders and investment bankers on the other hand), over time, by using different miscalibration metrics, and for tasks that avoid common weaknesses such as a non‐representative selection of trick questions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Comparison of Modalities in Modeling

Organizational display rules (e.g., “service with a smile”) have had mixed relationships with employee emotional labor—either in the form of “bad faith” surface acting (suppressing or faking expressions) or “good faith” deep acting (modifying inner feelings). We draw on the motivational perspective of emotional labor to argue that individual differences in customer orientation will directly and indirectly relate to these acting strategies in response to display rules. With a survey of more than 500 working adults in customer contact positions, and controlling for affective disposition, we find that customer orientation directly increases “good faith” acting while it moderates the relationship of display rules with “bad faith” acting.