Neural Network Models and Mechanisms of Strategy Development

The focus of this paper is mechanisms that may be responsible for intellectual and developmental differences in the cognitive strategies of typical and atypical children, including those with mental retardation. The discussion of these mechanisms is based on behavioral experiments on external memory strategies and on a set of neural network models designed for these tasks. Following the review of the external memory research, the rationale for using neural network models, how they have been used in other research, and their specific application to intellectual and developmental differences in external memory, including the results of several simulations, are reviewed. This is followed by a discussion of the mechanisms of intellectual differences and developmental change included in the models and some challenges for this type of modeling. Neural network modeling is discussed as an asset to research on cognitive development.     

Deterrence, Opportunity, and Choice

Traditional studies of deterrence have focused on punishment with less regard for the rewards of both crime and noncrime. Influenced by work in economics and behavioral psychology, more recent studies have departed from tradition by incorporating rewards for crime. To this extent, they should be regarded as advances over the more traditional approaches. Notwithstanding these advances, variations in both the probability and magnitude of reward for noncrime have not been systematically included in these more recent theories of choice. In an attempt to determine whether opportunities for noncrime are either central or trivial to the criminal decision-making process, the present study fitted two alternative models to experimental data involving risk-taking: (a) the economic utility model employed by Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, and Matsueda (1986) in their study of criminal choice; and (b) the satisfaction balance model developed by Gray and Tallman (1984). Results showed that while both models explained significant amounts of variation in the dependent variable, the Gray-Tallman model provided a substantially better fit of the data. Despite limitations inherent in experimental studies as, for example, limitations surrounding the issue of external validity, the findings strongly suggest that opportunities for noncrime are as important as rewards and costs for crime in the process by which criminal decisions are made.     

The Heritability of Characteristics Associated with Dispositional Empathy

ABSTRACT This investigation used data from Loehlin and Nichols's (1976) study of over 800 sets of twins to examine evidence for the heritability of three facets of empathy: empathic concern, personal distress, and perspective taking. Expert judges first identified sets of adjectives, included within Loehlin and Nichols's original data, which reflected each empathy construct; these items were then validated in an independent sample. Comparisons of the responses given to these items by identical and fraternal twins in the Loehlin and Nichols investigation revealed evidence of significant heritability for characteristics associated with the two affective facets of empathy—empathic concern and personal distress—but not for the nonaffective construct of perspective taking. This pattern is consistent with the view that temperamental emotionality may underlie the heritability of affective empathy.     

A platonist epistemology

A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical objects by simply explaininghow they can do this. My argument is based upon the adoption of a particular version of platonism — full-blooded platonism — which asserts that any mathematical object which possiblycould exist actuallydoes exist.I would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper: Arnold Koslow, Hartry Field, Jerrold Katz, Michael Resnik, Elliott Mendelson, Charles Landesman, Stephen Schiffer, Adam Vinueza, David Pitt, Jody Azzouni, David MacCallum, Colin McLarty, Tom Slaughter, Henry Mendell, Penelope Maddy, Michael Liston, Ricardo Gomez, Seth Crook, Stuart Cornwell, and various people at the University of Colorado, Boulder, where I read this paper in February, 1994. Much of the research for this paper was carried out under a City University of New York Dissertation Fellowship; I am grateful for this.     

College Counseling: Union and Intersection

College counseling can best be understood as the intersection of a professional activity and an environment. The specialty has developed from the merging of several movements: vocational guidance, mental health, and student personnel work. These elements are reflected in the diversity of backgrounds and perspectives represented by college counselors and in differing models of counseling services. College counseling will be affected by trends including health care reform, scarcity of resources in higher education, changing student demographics, and complex societal issues.     

Frame multiplicity and policy fiascoes: Limits to explanation

The dynamics of intractability, frame multiplicity and intense controversy not only characterize policy formation struggles, as described by Schön and Rein, but also affect the evaluation of policies and government action. Policy analysts play an important part in the politics of policy evaluation. This article demonstrates that they tend to produce very different explanations for controversial, failing policies. Such differing explanations imply different causal attributions, different allocations of blame, and different lessons for future policy-making. Such differences are not random occurrences; they are embedded in the analytical frames that evaluators use to reconstruct policy processes and to explain their outcomes. It is shown that at least three deep-rooted frames can be reconstructed: fiascoes as failures of public problem solving, fiascoes as institutional imbalances, and fiascoes as system artefacts. One of the great epistemological challenges is how to deal with multiple analytical frames. The final part of the article discusses various strategies.