Gricean Communication and Transmission of Thoughts

Gricean communication is communication between utterers and their audiences, where the utterer means something and the audience understands what is meant. The weak transmission idea is that, whenever such communication takes place, there is something which is transmitted from utterer to audience; the strong transmission idea adds that what is transmitted is nothing else than what is communicated. We try to salvage these ideas from a seemingly forceful attack by Wayne Davis. Davis attaches too much significance to the surface structure of sentences of the type ‘S communicates the belief (desire …) that p to A’ by assuming that the communicated entity is denoted by the grammatical object following ‘communicates’. On our proposal, what is communicated in all Gricean cases is a thought. And since S communicates the thought that p to A only if S means that p and A understands what S means, the thought that p will be transmitted from S to A.     

Social Ontology as Convention

I will argue that social ontology is constituted as hierarchical and interlocking conventions of multifarious kinds. Convention, in turn, is modeled in a manner derived from that of David K. Lewis. Convention is usually held to be inadequate for models of social ontologies, with one primary reason being that there seems to be no place for normativity. I argue that two related changes are required in the basic modeling framework in order to address this (and other) issue(s): (1) a shift to an intentional model—among other reasons, in order to account for normativity—and (2) moving away from the belief-desire, propositional attitude, framework for understanding the intentional realm toward an interactive, pragmatic model of intentionality. These shifts provide natural approaches to: (1) understanding the normativities of social realities; (2) the sense in which social ontology is often constituted in implicit relations among the participants rather than elaborated and iterated explicit beliefs and desires; (3) and language.     

The association of parenting style and child age with parental limit setting and adolescent MySpace behavior

Parent and teen MySpace user pairs completed online surveys administered in June (N = 266) and September 2006 (N = 341) to assess relationships between parenting styles and limit setting and monitoring of online behaviors, the prevalence of Internet dangers and pre-teen and teen MySpace behaviors. Cross-comparison measures of MySpace usage, parenting style, limit setting/monitoring, MySpace problems, and media perceptions were used. Parenting styles were strongly related to adolescent MySpace experiences, behaviors, and attitudes, with some age differences. Parents with older children were more likely to have Neglectful or Indulgent parenting styles and less likely to set limits on online behavior. The extent of sexual solicitation, pornography, and cyberbullying was relatively low as compared with studies asserting a high incidence of Internet-related problems. Parents' high estimates of online dangers were not matched by their low rates of setting limits and monitoring teens. Theoretical and practical perspectives of the results are offered to enhance social networking experiences for parents and their children.     

Emotional competence in children with autism: Diagnostic criteria and empirical evidence

The diagnostic criteria of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) include emotional impairments. However, scientific evidence for these impairments is varied and subtle. In this contribution, recent empirical studies that examined the emotional competence in children and adolescents with ASD are reviewed. Four aspects of emotional competence that are important to children’s daily social functioning (expression, perception, responding, and understanding) are discussed, differentiating between mentally retarded and normally intelligent children and adolescents with and without ASD in natural and structured contexts. On various accounts, the emotional impairments of children with ASD that are found in scientific studies provide a more differentiated view on the impairments suggested by the diagnostic literature. Consistent empirical findings and gaps in the field are discussed. Theoretical and clinical recommendations for assessment procedures are suggested.     

Reducing contrast makes speeds in a video-based driving simulator harder to discriminate as well as making them appear slower

We investigated the effect of reducing image contrast on speed perception using a video-based driving simulator in which participants viewed pairs of scenes and were asked to judge whether the second scene was faster or slower than the first scene. We predicted two outcomes: (i) that vehicle speeds would become harder to discriminate, and (ii) that vehicle speeds would appear slower. There is previous evidence confirming the latter prediction in a less realistic computer-based driving simulation, but none demonstrating the former. Our results supported both predictions, each of which may have traffic-safety implications when reduced-contrast conditions are experienced in real life, such as with fog or when the driver has cataracts.     

What is the reference in reference repulsion?

Reference repulsion is a mechanism posited to explain systematic biases of direction judgment of single drifting dot displays (Rauber and Treue, 1998 Perception 27 393-402). Rauber and Treue obtained systematic but, surprisingly, very different effects depending upon whether standard and comparison stimuli were presented simultaneously or successively. Successive effects were described as exhibiting repulsion from both vertical and horizontal cardinal axes, whereas simultaneous effects showed repulsion from horizontal only. We contend that the proposed mechanism makes no testable predictions because the so-called reference can only be specified a posteriori, a fact acknowledged by Rauber and Treue. We attempted to replicate Rauber and Treue's experiments, but we obtained no systematic biases of direction judgment. Comparisons across several studies suggest that errors in direction judgments of single drifting dot patterns vary widely in magnitude and direction, as might be expected with what are essentially baseline or pretest measures. In our view, reference repulsion describes neither a real perceptual mechanism nor a predictable pattern of direction misjudgments.     

The effect of comparative context upon stereotype content: children's judgments of ingroup behavior

This study addresses self-categorization theory's contention that stereotype content varies as a function of the comparative context within which a given group is considered. A sample of 5-, 7- and 10-year-old children (n = 192) made judgments about gender ingroup behavior in one of two comparative contexts: either adults of the same sex as self or children of the opposite sex. Specifically, judgments were either of the perceived stereotypicality or central tendency of 12 types of behavior. Both types of judgment were found to differ as a function of comparative context in ways predicted by self-categorization theory. However, contrary to prediction, there was no effect of age on the extent of stereotype variability.     

SAMPLES AS SYMBOLS

Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z. Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of. The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called ‘exemplification’ (Goodman, Elgin) or ‘exemplarisation’ (Lehrer). Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, Goodman's account of exemplification has several flaws. In this paper I will offer an alternative account of exemplification that is inspired by Grice's idea that one can communicate something by providing one's audience with intention‐independent evidence and letting them draw the obvious conclusion for themselves. This explication of exemplification will solve the problems that arose for Goodman's theory in the spirit of his approach. 1     

Cosmic inflation and the past hypothesis

The past hypothesis is that the entropy of the universe was very low in the distant past. It is put forward to explain the entropic arrow of time but it has been suggested (e.g. [Penrose, R. (1989a). The emperor’s new mind. London:Vintage Books; Penrose, R. (1989b). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 571, 249–264; Price, H. (1995). In S. F. Savitt (Ed.), Times’s arrows today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Price, H. (1996). Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Price, H. (2004). In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Oxford: Blackwell]) that it is itself in need of explanation. It has also been suggested that cosmic inflation could provide the explanation, but Price (2004) raises a serious objection to this suggestion, which has otherwise received very little attention in the philosophical literature. Price points out that the standard inflationary explanation involves a double standard: although the evolution of the universe described by the inflationary model seems natural from the standard temporal perspective it looks highly unnatural from the reversed temporal perspective. The main purpose of this paper is to propose a novel form of the inflationary explanation that avoids this objection. It is argued that the inflationary model would not involve a double standard (but would still explain the past hypothesis) if we construct the model with a global “boundary” condition instead of a conventional boundary condition: if we assume that the universe is as generic as possible overall, rather than as generic as possible at some given point (e.g. the Big Bang) as is assumed in the standard inflationary model. This novel form of the inflationary explanation is then compared with Price’s 1996 preferred explanation, a version of the so-called “Weyl hypothesis”.     

Our Relations with the Past

The approach that philosophers have taken to history has too often been one-dimensional. It is my aim in this paper to map out a future multi-dimensional philosophy of history, by invoking the notion of a relation with the past, and by arguing for the philosophical relevance of multiple such relations.