Hippocampal lesions in pigeons (Columba livia) disrupt reinforced preexposure but not overshadowing or blocking

Three experiments examined the effects of hippocampal lesions in pigeons on overshadowing, blocking, and a latent inhibition treatment (non-differential reinforced preexposure) using a simultaneous visual discrimination paradigm. The results showed that hippocampal damage did not influence overshadowing (Experiment 1) or blocking (Experiment 2) but did attenuate the retardation in conditioning associated with non-differential reinforced preexposure to to-be-discriminated stimuli (Experiment 3). Hippocampal birds also displayed impaired autoshaping (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). The correspondence between the behavioural effects of avian and mammalian hippocampal lesions is discussed, and the implications of the present pattern of results for avian hippocampal function are considered.     

The avian hippocampus and short-term memory for spatial and non-spatial information

Three experiments investigated the role of the pigeon hippocampal formation (the hippocampus and area-parahippocampalis) in short-term memory for non-spatial and spatial information. The acquisition of delayed matching-to-sample and the short-term retention of non-spatial visual information, using a small set of sample stimuli, were unaffected by aspiration lesions of the hippocampus or the neostriatum (Experiment 1). Similarly, acquisition and short-term retention of non-spatial information using a successive, trial-unique, delayed non-matching-to-sample procedure were unaffected by hippocampal damage; the same birds had, however, displayed a profound autoshaping impairment (Experiment 2). Acquisition of a spatial delayed matching-to-sample task was unimpaired by hippocampal damage. However, lesioned animals were impaired following the introduction of retention intervals on this procedure (Experiment 3). The correspondence between the behavioural effects of hippocampal lesions in birds and mammals on short-term memory is discussed, and the implications of these results for avian hippocampal function are considered.     

Constraints on Analogical Mapping: A Comparison of Three Models

Three theories of analogy have been proposed that are supported by computational models and data from experiments on human analogical abilities. In this article we show how these theories can be unified within a common metatheoretical framework that distinguishes among levels of informational, behavioral, and hardware constraints. This framework clarifies the distinctions among three computational models in the literature: the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME), the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME), and the Incremental Analogy Machine (IAM). We then go on to develop a methodology for the comparative testing of these models. In two different manipulations of an analogical mapping task we compare the results of computational experiments with these models against the results of psychological experiments. In the first experiment we show that increasing the number of similar elements in two analogical domains decreases the response time taken to reach the correct mapping for an analogy problem. In the second psychological experiment we find that the order in which the elements of the two domains are presented has significant facilitative effects on the ease of analogical mapping. Of the three models, only IAM embodies behavioral constraints and predicts both of these results. Finally, the immediate implications of these results for analogy research are discussed, along with the wider implications the research has for cognitive science methodology.     

Short-term memory processes in counting

Four experiments examined the memory processes used to maintain location in a counting sequence. In Experiment 1, subjects who rapidly counted forward omitted many repeated-digit numbers (e.g., 77), as found previously with backward counting. Subjects in Experiment 2 counted backward with normal auditory feedback or with headphones through which white noise was channeled. In both cases, repeated-digit errors predominated, suggesting that the contents of short-term memory, rather than auditory sensory memory, are checked during counting. In Experiment 3, subjects silently wrote counting responses, and the omission errors resembled those in vocal counting. Repetition errors were also found and attributed to phonological recoding failures. Articulatory suppression in Experiment 4 greatly increased the number of repetition errors in the written counting task. A model of the counting process was proposed according to which subjects keep track of their location in the counting sequence by monitoring phonologically coded short-term memory representations of the numbers.     

Short-Term Forgetting of Order Under Conditions of Reduced Interference

Three experiments examined the short-term retention of order in a modified Brown-Peterson task. Our intent was to examine the loss of order memory, unconfounded by item memory, under conditions in which interference from prior trials is kept low. In previous work on the short-term forgetting of order, experimenters have tended to repeat the same items across trials or to draw from a restricted set; in our experiments, we changed the to-be-recalled items from trial to trial and used reconstruction as the retention measure. In all three experiments, very little forgetting was obtained across retention intervals that have traditionally produced dramatic and systematic loss. Our results are reminiscent of those obtained in the BrownPeterson task when performance is assessed after only the first experimental trial.