Children's subjective identification with social groups: a self-stereotyping approach

We contend that previous work on children's identification with social groups has looked at the mere categorization of the self in group terms and not subjective identification properly conceived. Drawing upon self-categorization theory, the present research operationalizes identification as self-stereotyping (i.e. the ability to conceive of the self in group-relevant terms). Children's self-stereotyping was explored in two studies using gender as the relevant ingroup. Study 1 required 5-, 7- and 10-year-old children, on two separate occasions, to rate their similarity to, and difference from, same-sex peers. Relative to the control condition, when gender had been made salient, children perceived significantly greater similarity, and smaller difference, between themselves and same-sex peers, thus providing evidence of a capacity for self-stereotyping and, hence, for subjective identification with a social category. Similarly, Study 2 sought trait ratings of the self both when gender had been made salient and when it had not. Boys of all ages (though not girls) rated ingroup-stereotypical traits (such as bravery and strength) to be more characteristic of the self when gender was salient than when it was not. Together, these findings suggest that the capacity for subjective identification with social groups is present at least by the age of 5 years. Moreover, they demonstrate that children's self-conceptions are contextually variable.     

Feedback and driver situation awareness (SA): A comparison of SA measures and contexts

The dominant technological trajectory in vehicle design brings with it similarly dominant driver performance issues in regard to vehicle feedback and driver situational awareness (SA). Three experiments are reported in this paper that describe not only the effects on driver SA of manipulations of vehicle feedback but also illuminate issues concerned with SA measurement methods and contexts. The findings suggest that current trends in vehicle design may contribute little towards a driver’s SA and, in fact, may actually show a generalized trend towards decreasing it. The efficacy of verbal protocol and probe recall SA measurement techniques is noted in terms of observing this effect. On the other hand, a concerning dissociation occurred with findings from a self-report measure of SA. Drivers appear to show a concerning lack of self-awareness of their SA and, indeed, any shortfall in it.     

Ontological issues in distance perception: cue use under full cue conditions cannot be inferred from use under controlled conditions

Phosphorescent square tiles (arranged to yield a single image size) were viewed in the dark by 56 monocular observers who utilized a chinrest. The targets were placed at one of three horizontal distances and at one of three eye heights, allowing us to study the relative effect of height in the visual field (HVF) and sagittal distance on observers' verbal reports of the horizontal distance at which the object lay (near, middle, or far). In Experiment 1, we found that reports covaried primarily with HVF and, as predicted, they exhibited a weak paradoxical inverse relation with horizontal distance. In a second and third experiment, a visible surface was placed under the targets at the three eye heights in both dark and fully lighted conditions. In this situation, the inverse distance relation disappeared, and HVF no longer influenced the judgments of most observers. The results show that information projected from relevant support surfaces is essential for veridical information about object distance. These results raise fundamental issues for perceptual researchers regarding how to decide when a cue has been properly delineated, given the assumption that the relation between a cue and what it specifies is probabilistic.     

Stimulus frequency influences spontaneous perceptual reversals in ambiguous apparent motion

The temporal integration of continuous sensory information into a temporally extended percept becomes evident in spontaneous reversals of ambiguous apparent motion. To study the temporal relation of spontaneous percept reversals and temporal stimulus properties, we systematically varied presentation frequency in an ambiguous-apparent-motion paradigm. Moreover, we triggered percept reversals in a manner that was not consciously perceived by manipulating the duration of single frames. We found that the reversal rate depended on the stimulus frequency (with higher frequencies resulting in faster percept reversals) and that we could externally trigger perceptual reversals. Our findings support the idea that spontaneous reversals of ambiguous apparent motion are influenced by bottom-up effects at early processing levels. The paradigm allows for specific contrasts of spontaneous and externally triggered (but otherwise identical) perceptual reversals and, by this means, for further study of the underlying mechanisms.     

Microswitch-based programs for persons with multiple disabilities: an overview of some recent developments

Persons with multiple disabilities are often unable to interact with their environment due to their limited response repertoire. Microswitch programs are designed to help them control environmental events, generally preferred stimulation, through simple (feasible) responses. To make microswitch programs a more widely usable and relevant resource for intervention with these persons, a number of new developments were pursued in recent years. This paper examines three of those developments as specifically addressed in our research activity, namely, (a) assessment of new, nontypical responses and matching microswitches, (b) fostering of multiple responses and exercise of choice, and (c) targeting of habilitative and clinical (therapeutic) objectives. The encouraging outcomes of these developments are reviewed in relation to their potentially wide implications for daily practice and the need of additional developments in the area.     

The ontology of meanings

In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of mental events.

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

The Donkey Problem

The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore encourage 4Dists to become even more radical—embrace the Donkey Problem’s conventionalism and deflate the debate between 3Dists and 4Dists.

Weak and global supervenience are strong

Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers.

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.