Training Mental Health Professionals to Assess and Manage Suicidal Behavior: Can Provider Confidence and Practice Behaviors be Altered?

Remarkably little systematic research has studied the effects of clinical suicidology training on changing practitioner attitudes and behaviors. In the current study we investigated whether training in an empirically‐based assessment and treatment approach to suicidal patients administered through a continuing education workshop could meaningfully impact professional practices, clinic policy, clinician confidence, and beliefs posttraining and 6 months later. At the 6 month follow‐up we found that 44% of practitioners reported increased confidence in assessing suicide risk, 54% reported increased confidence in managing suicidal patients, 83% reported changing suicide care practices, and 66% reported changing clinic policy. These results suggest that a brief and carefully developed workshop training experience can potentially change provider perceptions and behaviors with a possible impact on clinical care therein.     

How do young children deal with hybrids of living and non‐living things: The case of humanoid robots

In this experiment, we tested children's intuitions about entities that bridge the contrast between living and non‐living things. Three‐ and four‐year‐olds were asked to attribute a range of properties associated with living things and machines to novel category‐defying complex artifacts (humanoid robots), a familiar living thing (a girl), and a familiar complex artifact (a camera). Results demonstrated that 4‐year‐olds tended to treat the category‐defying entities like members of the inanimate group, while 3‐year‐olds showed more variability in their responding. This finding suggests that preschoolers' ability to classify complex artifacts that cross the living–non‐living divide becomes more stable between the ages of 3 and 4 and that children at both ages draw on a range of properties when classifying such entities.     

Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority?

It is sometimes argued that mathematical knowledge must be a priori, since mathematical truths are necessary, and experience tells us only what is true, not what must be true. This argument can be undermined either by showing that experience can yield knowledge of the necessity of some truths, or by arguing that mathematical theorems are contingent. Recent work by Albert Casullo and Timothy Williamson argues (or can be used to argue) the first of these lines; W. V. Quine and Hartry Field take the latter line. I defend a version of the argument against these, and other objections.