The Moral Philosophy of Raimond Gaitaand Some Questions of Methodin the Philosophy of Religion

Raimond Gaita's moral philosophy is distinguished by, among other things, its attention to the role of embodied, enacted witness in disclosing certain moral values, and its understanding of the emotions as forms of thought. In this paper, I consider how Gaita's insights on these matters may be applied to certain questions in the philosophy of religion, paying particular attention to the nature of religious experience and 'the problem of evil'. I suggest that Gaita's discussion of how we come to recognise moral values or 'meanings' can be extended to the question of how we might recognise religious meanings. On this view, religious experience may take the form of an appreciation of the meaning borne by a material context (rather than, for example, some supra-sensory encounter with a supernatural agent), and our sense of the goodness or otherwise of the world may be answerable to the authoritative example of particular lives.     

The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and,More Generally,of Conceptual Analysis)

It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision‐making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual‐analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings.     

Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.     

Errors, efficiency, and the interplay between attention and category learning

Learning to identify objects as members of categories is an essential cognitive skill and learning to deploy attention effectively is a core component of that process. The present study investigated an assumption imbedded in formal models of categorization: error is necessary for attentional learning. Eye-trackers were used to record participants’ allocation of attention to task relevant and irrelevant features while learning a complex categorization task. It was found that participants optimized their fixation patterns in the absence of both performance errors and corrective external feedback. Optimization began immediately after each category was mastered and continued for many trials. These results demonstrate that error is neither necessary nor sufficient for all forms of attentional learning.     

Moral antitheodicy: prospects and problems

Proponents of the view which I call ‘moral antitheodicy’ call for the theistic discourse of theodicy to be abandoned, because, they claim, all theodicies involve some form of moral impropriety. Three arguments in support of this view are examined: the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences. After discussing the merits of each argument individually, I attempt to show that they all must presuppose what they are intended to establish, namely, that the set of premises advanced in any given theodicy will be untenable. I conclude by discussing what uses there might be for the moral critique of theodicy, if it cannot be used to ground a global rejection of theodical practice.     

Managing terror when self-worth and worldviews collide: Evidence that mortality salience increases reluctance to self-enhance beyond authorities

Terror management theory posits that one’s self-esteem and worldview operate jointly to manage mortality concerns. Accordingly, past research shows that mortality salience (MS) increases self-enhancement and worldview defense. The current research is the first to examine MS effects when self-enhancement threatens to undermine aspects of the worldview, in this case the credibility and status of worldview-representative authorities. MS led to reluctance to self-enhance following positive personality test feedback when the test was judged negatively by institutional authorities (Study 1a), as well as unwillingness to contradict self-esteem threatening feedback sanctioned by authorities (Study 1b). Mortality salient participants also rated themselves higher on valued dimensions unless it meant viewing themselves more positively than their parents (Study 2) and admired political icons (Study 3). Taken together, these results show that MS increases self-enhancement unless doing so challenges important representatives of the worldview. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Sensitivity Theory and the Individuation of Belief-Formation Methods

In this paper it is argued that sensitivity theory suffers from a fatal defect. Sensitivity theory is often glossed as: (1) S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. As Nozick showed in his pioneering work on sensitivity theory, this formulation needs to be supplemented by a further counterfactual condition: (2) S knows that p only if S would believe p if p were true. Nozick further showed that the theory needs a qualification on the method used to form the belief. However, when these complications are spelled out in detail, it becomes clear that the two counterfactuals are in irresolvable tension. To jibe with the externalist intuitions that motivate sensitivity theory in the first place, (1) needs a fine-grained grouping of belief-formation methods, but (2) needs coarse-grained grouping. It is therefore suggested that sensitivity theory is in dire straits: either its proponents need to provide a workable principle of method individuation or they must retrench and give up their claims to providing sufficient conditions for knowledge.

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Testing the latent factor structure and construct validity of the Ten-Item Personality Inventory

Recent efforts have aimed to develop relatively short measures of the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality, particularly for when time and/or space is limited. We evaluate the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), a non-proprietary FFM measure with two items per dimension. We use a latent variable methodology to examine the TIPI’s factor structure and convergent validity with the 50-item International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) FFM measure. We provide correlations between the scale scores and latent factors, and compare each measure’s pattern of correlations with measures of other individual difference constructs. Results were favorable in terms of the factor structure and convergent validity of the TIPI, particularly regarding the correlations between the respective latent factors of the TIPI and the IPIP–FFM measures.     

Brain correlates of aesthetic expertise: a parametric fMRI study

Several studies have demonstrated that acquired expertise influences aesthetic judgments. In this paradigm we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study aesthetic judgments of visually presented architectural stimuli and control-stimuli (faces) for a group of architects and a group of non-architects. This design allowed us to test whether level of expertise modulates neural activity in brain areas associated with either perceptual processing, memory, or reward processing. We show that experts and non-experts recruit bilateral medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and subcallosal cingulate gyrus differentially during aesthetic judgment, even in the absence of behavioural aesthetic rating differences between experts and non-experts. By contrast, activity in nucleus accumbens (NAcc) exhibits a differential response profile compared to OFC and subcallosal cingulate gyrus, suggesting a dissociable role between these regions in the reward processing of expertise. Finally, categorical responses (irrespective of aesthetic ratings) resulted in expertise effects in memory-related areas such as hippocampus and precuneus. These results highlight the fact that expertise not only modulates cognitive processing, but also modulates the response in reward related brain areas.     

Functional Consequences of HIV-Associated Neuropsychological Impairment

This review focuses on the “real world” implications of infection with HIV/AIDS from a neuropsychological perspective. Relevant literature is reviewed which examines the relationships between HIV-associated neuropsychological impairment and employment, driving, medication adherence, mood, fatigue, and interpersonal functioning. Specifically, the relative contributions of medical, cognitive, psychosocial, and psychiatric issues on whether someone with HIV/AIDS will be able to return to work, adhere to a complicated medication regimen, or safely drive a vehicle will be discussed. Methodological issues that arise in the context of measuring medication adherence or driving capacity are also explored. Finally, the impact of HIV/AIDS on mood state, fatigue, and interpersonal relationships are addressed, with particular emphasis on how these variables interact with cognition and independent functioning. The purpose of this review is to integrate neuropsychological findings with their real world correlates of functional behavior in the HIV/AIDS population.