Student ethics in an era of personal entitlement

397 students arriving to take an exam in a junior level Principles of Management course were clearly warned on several occasions to keep cell phones outside the testing area or receive a failing test grade if the policy was violated. Just before the examination was administered, with all students sitting in their assigned seats, the professor made a final announcement that anyone still in possession of a cell phone would have one last opportunity to come forward and place it in a box at the front of the testing room. After eight students accepted this final "opportunity," the professor produced a hand-held metal detector, demonstrated how it could detect cell phones placed inside clothing, and informed the class that random screening of students would be conducted as they handed in their examinations. He then added that, as a special favor, he would allow a two-minute amnesty period during which any student could bring a cell phone to the front of the room for storage during the test. 38 students responded by turning in cell phones they had retained in direct violation of course policy. Implications of this cell phone dishonesty for creating viable business ethics and the role of perceived entitlement in shaping the behavior of these future business leaders were discussed.     

Development of a work addiction scale

Andreassen, C. S., Griffiths, M. D., Hetland, J. & Pallesen, S. (2012). Development of a work addiction scale. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 265–272. Research into excessive work has gained increasing attention over the last 20 years. Terms such as “workaholism,”“work addiction” and “excessive work” have been used interchangeably. Given the increase in empirical research, this study presents the development of the Bergen Work Addiction Scale (BWAS), a new psychometrically validated scale for the assessment of work addiction. A pool of 14 items, with two reflecting each of seven core elements of addiction (i.e., salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, conflict, relapse, and problems) was initially constructed. The items were then administered to two samples, one recruited by a web survey following a television broadcast about workaholism (n = 11,769) and one comprising participants in the second wave of a longitudinal internet‐based survey about working life (n = 368). The items with the highest corrected item‐total correlation from within each of the seven addiction elements were retained in the final scale. The assumed one‐factor solution of the refined seven‐item scale was acceptable (root mean square error of approximation = 0.077, Comparative Fit Index = 0.96, Tucker‐Lewis Index = 0.95) and the internal reliability of the two samples were 0.84 and 0.80, respectively. The scores of the BWAS converged with scores on other workaholism scales, except for a Work Enjoyment subscale. A suggested cut‐off for categorization of workaholics showed good discriminative ability in terms of working hours, leadership position, and subjective health complaints. It is concluded that the BWAS has good psychometric properties.     

A functional account of degrees of minimal chemical life

This paper describes and defends the view that minimal chemical life essentially involves the chemical integration of three chemical functionalities: containment, metabolism, and program (Rasmussen et al. in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living matter, 2009a). This view is illustrated and explained with the help of CMP and Rasmussen diagrams (Rasmussen et al. In: Rasmussen et al. (eds.) in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living matter, 71–100, 2009b), both of which represent the key chemical functional dependencies among containment, metabolism, and program. The CMP model of minimal chemical life gains some support from the broad view of life as open-ended evolution, which I have defended elsewhere (Bedau in The philosophy of artificial life, 1996; Bedau in Artificial Life, 4:125–140, 1998). Further support comes from the natural way the CMP model resolves the puzzle about whether life is a matter of degree.     

Habermas, Pupil Voice, Rationalism, and Their Meeting with Lacan’s Objet Petit A

‘Pupil voice’ is a movement within state education in England that is associated with democracy, change, participation and the raising of educational standards. While receiving much attention from educators and policy makers, less attention has been paid to the theory behind the concept of pupil voice. An obvious point of theoretical departure is the work of Jürgen Habermas, who over a number of decades has endeavoured to develop a theory of democracy that places strong significance on language, communication and discourse. This paper is an attempt to gauge the usefulness of Habermas’ approach to understanding the theory of pupil voice, in particular how his theory of universal pragmatics lends itself to a ‘philosophy of between’, a philosophy that finds echoes in the conflicted nature of schooling that ‘pupil voice’ is supposed to rectify to some extent. The paper also explores the drawbacks of a Habermasian approach, in particular his overreliance on rationality as a way of understanding communication. Lacan’s concept of the objet petit a is introduced as an alternative way of understanding pupil voice.     

Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility

Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more satisfying response to scepticism, we need also to consider the standing of background beliefs. This is required since the recognitional abilities that enable us to have perceptual knowledge are informed by, or presuppose, a picture or conception of the world the correctness of which we have not ascertained. The question is how, in the face of this, to make sense of responsible belief-formation. In addressing this problem I make a suggestion about the standing of certain crucial beliefs linking appearances with membership of kinds.     

Propositions and same-saying: introduction

Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ??propositions??. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions??or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19?C21 2010?at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop.     

Rationality and indeterminate probabilities

We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required. Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our describing a world that plausibly has indeterminate chances. Rationality requires a certain alignment of your credences with corresponding hypotheses about the chances. Thus, if you hypothesize the chances to be indeterminate, your will inherit their indeterminacy in your corresponding credences. Our third argument is motivated by a dilemma. Epistemic rationality requires you to stay open-minded about contingent matters about which your evidence has not definitively legislated. Practical rationality requires you to be able to act decisively at least sometimes. These requirements can conflict with each other-for thanks to your open-mindedness, some of your options may have undefined expected utility, and if you are choosing among them, decision theory has no advice to give you. Such an option is playing Nover and Hájek??s Pasadena Game, and indeed any option for which there is a positive probability of playing the Pasadena Game. You can serve both masters, epistemic rationality and practical rationality, with an indeterminate credence to the prospect of playing the Pasadena game. You serve epistemic rationality by making your upper probability positive-it ensures that you are open-minded. You serve practical rationality by making your lower probability 0-it provides guidance to your decision-making. No sharp credence could do both.     

Cognitions, metacognitions, and chronic pain

Purpose: Although the content of thoughts has received a considerable amount of attention in pain research, the importance of thought processes (metacognitions) has received less attention. Method: One hundred twenty-nine individuals with muscular dystrophy and chronic pain completed measures assessing metacognitions and frequency of both catastrophizing and pain control beliefs. Results: Greater use of reappraisal and distraction metacognitions were associated with more perceived control over pain, whereas greater use of worry and punishment metacognitions were associated with more catastrophizing. Conclusions/Implications: The current findings indicate that metacognitions are associated with both pain control beliefs and catastrophizing and therefore may play an important role in the development or maintenance of pain-related cognitive content thought to influence patient functioning. Research is needed to determine whether treatments that encourage changes in both metacognitions and cognitive content are more effective than treatments that focus on cognitive content alone. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The “pure-study” learning curve: The learning curve without cumulative testing

The customary assumption in the study of human learning using alternating study and test trials is that learning occurs during study trials and that test trials are useful only to measure learning. In fact, tests seem to play little role in the development of learning, because the learning curve is similar even when the number of test trials varies widely (Tulving, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 6:175-184, 1967). However, this outcome seems odd, because other research has shown that testing fosters greater long-term learning than does studying. We report three experiments addressing whether tests affect the shape of the learning curve. In two of the experiments, we examined this issue by varying the number of spaced study trials in a sequence and examining performance on only a single test trial at the end of the series (a "pure-study" learning curve). We compared these pure-study learning curves to standard learning curves and found that the standard curves increase more rapidly and reach a higher level in both free recall (Exp. 1) and paired-associate learning (Exp. 2). In Experiment 3, we provided additional study trials in the "pure-study" condition to determine whether the standard (study-test) condition would prove superior to a study-study condition. The standard condition still produced better retention on both immediate and delayed tests. Our experiments show that test trials play an important role in the development of learning using both free-recall (Exps. 1 and 3) and paired-associate (Exp. 2) procedures. Theories of learning have emphasized processes that occur during study, but our results show that processes engaged during tests are also critical.