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951.
Clare Batty 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):161-174
Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In this paper, I consider the question: does human olfactory experience represents objects as thus and so? If we take visual experience as the paradigm of how experience can achieve object representation, we might think that the answer to this question is no. I argue that olfactory experience does indeed represent objects—just not in a way that is easily read from the dominant visual case. 相似文献
952.
Karl Schafer 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(1):1-15
In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil
Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given
in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance
of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results
he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion
of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions. 相似文献
953.
What is the best question to ask an omniscient being? The question is intriguing; is it also paradoxical? We discuss several versions of what Ned Markosian calls “the paradox of the question” and suggest solutions to each of those puzzles. We then offer some practical advice about what do if you ever have the opportunity to query an omniscient being. 相似文献
954.
Patrick Rysiew 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(1):111-120
955.
Luke Robinson 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):289-309
What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena “falling within their scope,” support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary connections” between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral laws, or “lawlike” moral generalizations. 相似文献
956.
David Blumenfeld 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(3):311-319
This essay critically examines Alfred R. Mele’s attempt to solve a problem for libertarianism that he calls the problem of
present luck. Many have thought that the traditional libertarian belief in basically free acts (where the latter are any free
A-ings that occur at times at which the past up to that time and the laws of nature are consistent with the agent’s not A-ing
at that time) entail that the acts are due to luck at the time of the act (present luck) rather than to the kind of agent control required for genuinely free, morally responsible
action. While libertarians frequently have tried to rebut the claim that basically free acts are due to present luck, Mele
argues for the daring thesis that they should embrace present luck rather than try to explain it away. His strategy is to
argue that the assumption of present luck in the decisions of very young children (or “little agents”) does not preclude us
from attributing to them a small amount of moral responsibility and that this makes it possible to conceive of moral development
as a gradual process in which as the frequency of the indeterministically caused free actions increases, the agents take on
greater and greater moral responsibility. In this paper I give several possible reconstructions of Mele’s argument and analyze
in detail why none of them succeeds. 相似文献
957.
Bradford Skow 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):325-344
In this paper I distinguish interpretations of the question ``How fast does time pass?’’ that are important for the debate over the reality of objective becoming from interpretations that are not. Then I discuss how one theory that incorporates objective becoming—the moving spotlight theory of time—answers this question. It turns out that there are several ways to formulate the moving spotlight theory of time. One formulation says that time passes but it makes no sense to ask how fast; another formulation says that time passes at one second per supersecond; and a third says that time passes at one second per second. I defend the intelligibility of this final version of the theory. 相似文献
958.
959.
960.
Michael Anthony IstvanJr 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):399-420
Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility
of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an
agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred
Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor
contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal
libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue
that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of
bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action. 相似文献