Color-based inhibition of return

The inhibition of return of visual attention based on stimulus color was examined in three experiments. In the first experiment, a discrete trial paradigm showed that subjects were slower to detect a color patch if the color matched that of a patch presented earlier in the same location. Experiment 2 showed that the inhibition only occurs if a neutral, nontarget distractor color is presented between presentation of the initial color cue and the subsequent target patch—explaining the previous failures to detect the phenomenon. Experiment 3 extended the results to a different combination of colors. Taken together, the results have important implications for the processing of stimulus attributes such as spatial location and color, and for the conditions necessary for producing inhibition of return.     

Individual differences in preschoolers' physiological and verbal responses to videotaped angry interactions

Individual differences in selection of intensity of angry interactions and physiological and self-reported responses to interadult anger were examined in preschoolers (N=34). Children watched two videotaped angry interactions between adults, while their heart rates and skin conductance responses and levels were monitored; then they were interviewed. Before the second argument, children were given the perceived choice of watching an intense or mild angry exchange. Individual differences in responding to the angry interactions were found. Both (a) children with relatively higher externalizing behavior problems and (b) boys who chose to watch intense anger had lower tonic heart rates; 80% of boys with externalizing problems chose to watch intense anger. Further, children who chose to watch intense anger (a) exhibited lower declines in heart rates upon the presentation of the argument, (b) perceived the actors as more angry, and (c) reported lower amounts of distress during the argument than those who chose mild anger.     

CONSTRUCT ACCESSIBILITY AND THE MISATTRIBUTION OF AROUSAL:

Abstract— Schachter and Singer (1962) showed that people search the immediate environment for emotionally relevant cues to label and interpret unexplained physiological arousal We investigated how unobtrusively activated cognitions and physiological arousal interact to produce emotional experience when the immediate environment is devoid of relevant cues Subjects were primed with positive, negative, or neutral concepts They then either exercised or sat still and, either immediately or after a delay, rated their emotional state Consistent with what Schachter and Singer found, subjects in the exercise, delayed-rating condition, who lacked an obvious explanation for their arousal, made the most extreme affective self-ratings, which were consistent with the valence of the primed concepts These subjects apparently interpreted their residual arousal in terms of the primed concepts Subjects in the exercise, immediate-rating condition, who had an explanation for their arousal (i e, the exercise), were not influenced by the primes Subjects in the no-exercise condition showed typical priming effects, with prime-consistent self-ratings that decayed over time Implications for emotion formation, misattnbution of arousal, and cognition are discussed     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Bearing bad news: Dealing with the mimics of denial

Denial is a common label for certain reactions to bad news. However, true denial is rare, and most cases actually represent a variety of responses with very different causes and needs. Three of these, disbelief, deferral, and dismissal, are characterized according to origins and needs. Failure to differentiate between these seemingly similar behaviors can result in inappropriate counseling, and interfere with attempts to convey information and provide support during a time of crisis.     

“I’ve said I’m sorry,haven’t I?” A study of the identity implications and constraints that apologies create for their recipients

In contrast to previous research on apologies, which has examined their role in enhancing impressions of those issuing them (e.g., Darby and Schlenker, 1989), the research reported here draws upon Goffman’s (1955) analysis of the “corrective cycle” and is concerned with constraints associated with the receipt of apologies. Study 1 examines the implications for the actor of accepting, not accepting, or rejecting apologies. It is demonstrated that across a variety of judgments, most positive views of the actor result when apologies are accepted; least positive views are associated with their rejection. A follow-up study sought to establish whether this effect would occur under circumstances in which unconvincing apologies are rejected. Results indicate that the apology’s status (convincing versus unconvincing) has no bearing on perceptions of actors. Based on a hypothetical role-play format, Study 2 addresses the matter of whether actors experience a subjective sense of constraint upon receipt of unsatisfactory apologies. The data suggest that there exists a pronounced tendency to accept such apologies, though typically with conditions that would be specified to the offender. More general implications of the data are discussed.     

The effect of gap depth on the perception of whether a gap is crossable

Four experiments were performed in order to examine the effect of gap depth on human observers’ perception of whether or not a gap is crossable. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that as the gap’s depth increased, observers tended to increasingly underestimate the maximum width of a gap they could step across. Experiments 3 and 4 clarified this finding: The observed covariation of perceived gap crossability and gap depth depended on the observer’s direction of gaze, rather than on the physical depth of the gap. The optical relations to which observers might be attending are discussed, as well as the possibility that cognitive-affective processes might have contributed to observers’ underestimation of their actual capabilities.