Does response variability predict distractibility among adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder?

Increased intraindividual variability in response time (RTSD) has been observed reliably in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and has often been used as a measure of inattention. RTSD is assumed to reflect attentional lapses and distractibility, though evidence for the validity of this connection is lacking. We assessed whether RTSD is an indicator of inattention by comparing RTSD on the stop-signal task (SST) with performance on the delayed oculomotor response (DOR) task, a measure of distractibility. Participants included 30 adults with ADHD and 28 controls. Participants completed the SST and the DOR task, which measured subjects' ability to maintain attention and avoid distraction by inhibiting reflexive saccades toward distractors. On the SST, the ADHD group was slower to inhibit than were controls, indicating poorer inhibitory control in ADHD. The ADHD group also displayed slower reaction times (RTs), greater RTSD, and more omission errors. On the DOR task, the ADHD group displayed more premature saccades (i.e., greater distractibility) than did controls. Greater variability in RT was associated with increased distraction on the DOR task, but only in ADHD participants. Results suggest that RTSD is linked to distractibility among adults with ADHD and support the use of RTSD as a valid measure of inattention in ADHD.     

Moral Mistakes

Is it possible to show that a moral claim is mistaken without taking a moral stand with regard to it? A striking number of contemporary metaethicists suppose that it is. In this paper, I argue against a prominent line of support for this supposition. My goal is to cast suspicion on a general tendency to think that the epistemic standing of moral claims is something that can be assessed from outside the practices of making and critically evaluating moral judgements. I do this by focusing on a widely accepted criterion of competence with regard to the use of moral concepts, the moral supervenience criterion (MSC). This criterion holds that someone who judges two acts or events to be morally different without thinking that he has to identify some non‐particular non‐moral difference between them simply doesn't understand what it is to make a moral judgement. I focus on a paradigmatic example of the sort of mistake in moral judgement that is supposed to support the MSC and argue that it provides no support whatsoever. I then offer my own alternative explanation of this sort of mistake in moral judgement. I conclude with a discussion of why advocates of the MSC are inclined to suppose that it is possible to assess the epistemic standing of a moral claim without oneself taking a moral stand with regard to it.     

Differentially tuned responses to restricted versus prolonged awareness of threat: a preliminary fMRI investigation

Responses to threat occur via two known independent processing routes. We propose that early, reflexive processing is predominantly tuned to the detection of congruent combinations of facial cues that signal threat, whereas later, reflective processing is predominantly tuned to incongruent combinations of threat. To test this prediction, we examined responses to threat-gaze expression pairs (anger versus fear expression by direct versus averted gaze). We report on two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, one employing prolonged presentations (2 s) of threat-gaze pairs to allow for reflective processing (Study 1), and one employing severely restricted (33 ms), backward masked presentations of threat-gaze pairs to isolate reflexive neural responding (Study 2). Our findings offer initial support for the conclusion that early, reflexive responses to threat are predominantly tuned to congruent threat-gaze pairings, whereas later reflective responses are predominantly tuned to ambiguous threat-gaze pairings. These findings highlight a distinct dual function in threat perception.     

Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be “soft” on sin, that she has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the “real hard work” it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well.     

Husker du?

Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.     

Different components of working memory have different relationships with different mathematical skills

A comprehensive working memory battery and tests of mathematical skills were administered to 90 children-41 in Year 1 (5-6 years of age) and 49 in Year 3 (7-8 years of age). Working memory could explain statistically significant variance in number writing, magnitude judgment, and single-digit arithmetic, but the different components of working memory had different relationships with the different skills. Visual-spatial sketchpad (VSSP) functioning predicted unique variance in magnitude judgments and number writing. Central executive functioning explained unique variance in the addition accuracy of Year 1 children. The unique variance explained in Year 3 multiplication explained by phonological loop functioning just missed conventional levels of significance (p=.06). The results are consistent with the VSSP having a role in the development of number writing and magnitude judgments but a lesser role in early arithmetic.     

Liking and response latency in teammate identification: processing delays below conscious awareness?

Success in fast-ball sports relies on many factors which interact at both movement and cognitive levels. Players must recognize their teammates and decide whether to pass the ball to create or take advantage of scoring affordances. Previous research has shown athletes can identify teammates from brief visual displays during fast-ball sports and this is related to the amount of time individuals train together. However, it is likely other factors also affect recognition and, consequently, decision making related to ball passing. The present study extended the Teammate Identification (TM-ID) paradigm to examine magnitude of liking of one's teammates in relation to response time components of TM-ID. An increase in movement time was found for identifying a swimmer who was the observer's "least liked" teammate, which suggests that processes below conscious awareness may influence the time taken for sport actions directed toward specific teammates, such as ball passing.     

Obsessive beliefs predict cognitive behavior therapy outcome for obsessive compulsive disorder

Cognitive accounts of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) assert that core beliefs are crucial to the development, maintenance, and treatment of the disorder. There are a number of obsessive beliefs that are considered fundamental to OCD, including personal responsibility, threat estimation, perfectionism, need for certainty, importance of thoughts, and thought control. The present study investigated if pretreatment severity of obsessive beliefs, as well as the change in obsessive beliefs following treatment, predicted intensive, residential cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) treatment outcome. A series of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to investigate the relations between obsessive beliefs and treatment outcome. Results indicated that inflated pretreatment responsibility/threat estimation beliefs were significantly related to less overall obsessive compulsive (OC) symptom reduction at discharge, explaining 2% of the overall variance. Changes in obsessive beliefs broadly, and importance/control of thoughts specifically, were positively related to overall OC symptom reduction at discharge, respectively explaining 18% and 3.6% variance. Results are modestly consistent with a number of theoretical models, which argue that inflated responsibility, threat estimation, and thought control are important to the maintenance and treatment of OCD.     

The Functional Forecast Model of Emotion Expression Processing

Fleeting nonverbal emotion expressions trigger a variety of spontaneous responses in human observers. To account for these effects, we introduce a functional forecast model (FFM) of emotion expression processing. The FFM assumes that emotion expressions provide timely forecasts of impending events. Responses to these forecasts are adaptive and may be learned or innately prepared, but in either case, observers need not infer mental states to exhibit immediate responses to emotion expressions. We postulate a diffuse route that operates pre‐attentively and activates appetitive and defensive motivational systems in response to gross affective meaning relevant to imminent environmental threats and available or scarce survival resources. We postulate a focal route that requires attention to efficiently and spontaneously activate specific, though tacit behavioral expectations. We explain how the FFM accounts for a variety of responses to emotion expressions, including physiological responses, affective responses, behavioral responses, trait attributions, and emotion recognition. Lastly, we describe how the FFM relates to other models of emotion, and describe future directions based on the model.