Impact of a preventive social problem solving intervention on children's coping with middle-school stressors

Children receiving 1 year or 1/2 year of a preventive social problem solving program in elementary school were compared with each other and with a no-treatment group upon entry into middle school. One year of training was significantly related to reductions in the severity of a variety of middle-school stressors. Most importantly, a clear mediating role for social problem solving (SPS) skills was found. Children lacking in SPS skills were more likely to experience intense stressors; however, possessing the skills was not necessarily predictive of adjustment to stressors. The results are discussed in terms of the implications of this asymmetry and the strong support given to the value of social problem solving as a preventive intervention for children.     

Assessing depression in community samples of children using self-report inventories: Ethical considerations

Although the methodological problems associated with the use of children's self-report depression inventories have previously been discussed in detail, the ethical problems related to the use of these instruments have been largely ignored. The primary purpose of this survey study was to determine how childhood depression researchers have prepared for and responded to children from community (i.e., nonclinic) samples whose nonanonymous scores on self-report depression inventories have indicated that they might be severely depressed or suicidal. Several recommendations, based upon (a) the results of this survey study, (b) the existing literature relevant to the ethical responsibilities of investigators who conduct research with children, and (c) our own experiences with these instruments and populations, are made to assist researchers in their attempts to use these inventories in an ethical manner.The authors would like to thank those childhood depression researchers who were kind enough to return completed surveys.     

Effects of treatments and their outcomes on peer perceptions of a hyperactive child

In an exploration of the social impacts of treatments for hyperactivity, two age groups (kindergarteners and first-graders vs. fourth- and fifth-graders) heard about a hyperactive child whose problem was treated either by an internal and controllable means (effort) or by an external and uncontrollable means (medication) and whose behavior either did or did not improve. The attributions and affective responses of both age groups were influenced by both the nature and the effectiveness of treatment, and there was only weak support for the hypothesis that younger children are more influenced by treatment outcome than older children are. However, older children, conforming to attribution theory predictions, held target children more accountabe for the success or failure of their own efforts than for the outcomes of medication, particularly valuing the child whose own efforts succeeded. By contrast, young children judged the child whose efforts failed as more worthy of pride and more likable than the child whose medication failed. Implications for peer acceptance of hyperactive children over the childhood years are discussed.Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association, Atlanta, March 1985. Thanks are extended to the staff and students of the Model Laboratory School.     

Health as a value: methodological and theoretical considerations

The concept of value placed on health is very important in several different theoretical approaches to the study of health behavior. In practice, however, health value is generally assumed to be universally high rather than being directly measured. If this assumption is incorrect, then theories that include health value have rarely been adequately tested. This paper presents a short 4-item Likert scale designed to measure the value placed on health. Norms from the utilization of this scale in five different samples are presented. Health value is found to increase with age among girls, but the increase apparently stops by late adolescence, before full adult levels of health value are achieved. Middle-aged women place a higher value on health than do middle-aged men, although no comparable sex difference appears in a sample of undergraduates. Consistent with theoretical predictions, both health locus of control beliefs and beliefs in the efficacy of certain preventive health behaviors correlate more highly with the performance of those same behaviors 5 to 9 months later among respondents who place a high value of health relative to those who do not value health so highly. However, this interaction is found only when it can be safely assumed that health is the primary value underlying the behavior. The importance of considering a variety of values in addition to health as possible motivators of preventive health behavior is stressed.     

Foundations of a new system of probability theory

The aim of my book is to explain the content of the different notions of probability.Based on a concept of logical probability, which is modified as compared with Carnap, we succeed by means of the mathematical results of de Finetti in defining the concept of statistical probability.The starting point is the fundamental concept that certain phenomena are of the same kind, that certain occurrences can be repeated, that certain experiments are identical. We introduce for this idea the notion: concept K of similarity. From concept K of similarity we derive logically some probability-theoretic conclusions:If the events E() are similar —of the same kind - on the basis of such a concept K, it holds good that intersections of n of these events are equiprobable on the basis of K; in formulae: E(₁)...E( _{n K} E('₁)...E(' _n , _{i j} ,' _j ' _j for ij On the basis of some further axioms a partial comparative probability structure results from K, which forms the starting point of our further investigations and which we call logical probability on the basis of K.We investigate a metrisation of this partial comparative structure, i.e. normed -additive functions m _K, which are compatible with this structure; we call these functions m _K measure-functions in relation to K.The measure-functions may be interpreted as subjective probabilities of individuals, who accept the concept K.Now it holds good: For each measure-function there exists with measure one the limit of relative frequencies in a sequence of the E().In such an event, where all measure-functions coincide, we speak of a quantitative logical probability, which is the common measure of this event. In formulae we have: l _K (h _n lim h _n )=1 in words: There is the quantitative logical probability one that the limit of the relative frequencies exists. Another way of saying this is that the event ^* (h_n lim h _n) is a maximal element in the comparative structure resulting from K.Therefore we are entitled to introduce this limit and call it statistical probability P.With the aid of the measure-functions it is possible to calculate the velocity of this convergence. The analog of the Bernoulli inequation holds true: m _K (¦h _n –P¦)1–1/4n².It is further possible in the work to obtain relationships for the concept of statistical independence which are expressed in terms of the comparative probability.The theory has a special significance for quantum mechanics: The similarity of the phenomena in the domain of quantum mechanics explains the statistical behaviour of the phenomena.The usual mathematical statistics are explained in my book. But it seems more expedient on the basis of this new theory to use besides the notion of statistical probability also the notion of logical probability; the notion of subjective probability has only a heuristic function in my system.The following dualism is to be noted: The statistical behaviour of similar phenomena may be described on the one hand according to the model of the classical probability theory by means of a figure called statistical probability, on the other hand we may express all formulae by means of a function, called statistical probability function. This function is defined as the limit of the relative frequencies depending on the respective state of the universe. The statistical probability function is the primary notion, the notion of statistical probability is derived from it; it is defined as the value of the statistical probability function for the true unknown state of the universe.As far as the Hume problem, the problem of inductive inference, is concerned, the book seems to give an example of how to solve it.The developed notions such as concept, measure-function, logical probability, etc. seem to be important beyond the concept of similarity.The present work represents a summary of my book Grundzüge zu einem neuen Aufbau der Wahrscheinlich-keitstheorie [5], For this reason, I have frequently dispensed with providing proof and in this connection refer the interested reader to my book.     

Occupational and life stress and the family: conceptual frameworks and research findings

This article has two objectives: (1) to put research on work and family into a context or setting; and (2) to present recent findings from an ongoing research programme we began several years ago into the ways in which work experiences, and more general life experiences, influence individual well-being and family functioning.     

The relationship between eye movements and spatial attention

Most previous studies of the attentional consequences of making saccadic eye movements have used peripheral stimuli to elicit eye movements. It is argued that in the light of evidence showing automatic “capture” of attention by peripheral stimuli, these experiments do not distinguish between attentional effects due to peripheral stimuli and those due to eye movements. In the present study, spatial attention was manipulated by varying the probability that peripheral probe stimuli would appear in different positions, while saccades were directed by a central arrow, enabling the effects of attention and eye movements to be separated. The results showed that the time to react to a peripheral stimulus could be shortened both by advance knowledge of its likely position and, separately, by preparing to make a saccade to that position. When the saccade was directed away from the most likely position of the probe, the targets for attention and eye movements were on opposite sides of the display. In this condition, the effects of preparing to make a saccade proved to be stronger than the effects of attentional allocation until well after the saccade had finished, suggesting that making a saccade necessarily involves the allocation of attention to the target position. The effects of probe stimuli on saccade latencies were also examined: probe stimuli that appeared before the saccade shortened saccade latencies if they appeared at the saccade target, and lengthened saccade latencies if they appeared on the opposite side of fixation. These facilitatory and inhibitory effects were shown to occur at different stages of saccade preparation and suggest that attention plays an important role in the generation of voluntary eye movements. The results of this study indicate that while it is possible to make attention movements without making corresponding eye movements, it is not possible to make an eye movement (in the absence of peripheral stimulation) without making a corresponding shift in the focus of attention.     

A comparison of three predictors of an individual's memory performance: the individual's feeling of knowing versus the normative feeling of knowing versus base-rate item difficulty

Distinctions are drawn between different predictors of an individual's memory performance, with emphasis on the notion of privileged access to idiosyncratic knowledge. Research is reported in which undergraduates attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions, then made feeling-of-knowing judgments on nonrecalled items, and subsequently had a criterion test (relearning, perceptual identification, or one of two versions of recognition). For predicting an individual's criterion performance, the individual's own feeling-of-knowing predictions were intermediate between two kinds of normative predictions: The individual's feeling-of-knowing predictions were more accurate than predictions derived from normative feeling-of-knowing ratings but were less accurate than predictions derived from base-rate item difficulty (normative probabilities of correct recall). Subsidiary analyses showed that factors other than unreliability are responsible for the partial inaccuracy of the individual's feeling of knowing. Ramifications are discussed for possible ways to improve the accuracy of an individual's feeling-of-knowing predictions.     

Cue depreciation: when word fragment completion is undermined by prior exposure to lesser fragments

The ability to think of a previously studied item has often been shown to be impaired when, in one way or another, the extraitem context is changed from study to test. In a series of five experiments, such impairment is induced in a somewhat different way. A fragment (e.g. r-i--rop) of a just-studied word (raindrop) is shown to be less readily completed if it is presented bit by bit (r------p, r----r-p, r-i--r-p, r-i--rop) rather than all at once (Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 5). No such effect is found if the word has not been studied beforehand (Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 5). This pattern of results occurs even when fragments of studied and nonstudied words occur in the same test and under conditions in which subjects cannot tell whether a given fragment is of a studied or nonstudied word (Experiments 4 and 5). In addition, for words that have been studied beforehand, the impairment is shown to increase systematically with the number of steps involved in the presentation of the word fragment (Experiment 3) and also to persist when the time allowed for completion of the final version of the fragment is increased from 4 s to a full minute (Experiment 5).     

An assessment of decision-making as a possible factor in the age-related loss of contrast sensitivity

The possibility that changes in decision-making may contribute to the age-related decline in contrast sensitivity has been investigated in nineteen young subjects (ages 21-38 years) and twenty-seven old subjects (ages 55-92 years). A signal detection paradigm was employed in which the detection of stationary sinusoidal grating patterns was measured at 3 and 15 cycles deg-1 for a range of contrasts which were psychophysically equivalent for each subject. A decline in contrast sensitivity with age at the spatial frequencies studied was confirmed for contrast thresholds obtained both by the ascending method and from the 50% hit rate for detection of the grating pattern. The criterion adopted for decision-making, expressed as both beta and percentage bias, did not change significantly between young and old subjects at 15 cycles deg-1. At 3 cycles deg-1, criterion beta did not change significantly at X0.8, X1.0, or X1.2 contrast threshold, but at contrast giving 50% hit rate there was a significant increase with age. The percentage bias increased significantly at contrast threshold but not at 50% hit rate. It is inferred from the results that the loss of contrast sensitivity was not accountable in terms of the adoption of a more conservative criterion by older subjects. Hence visual loss in ageing is attributed to changes within the visual pathway rather than within higher decision-making centres.