Current versus past ambiguity in intertrial priming

Visual search is speeded when the target is repeated from trial to trial compared to when it changes, suggesting that selective attention learns from previous events. Such intertrial effects are stronger when there is more competition for selection, for example in ambiguous displays where the target is accompanied by a salient distractor. Here we investigate whether this is because the competition strengthens the learning itself, or because it allows for a learned representation to exert a greater effect. The results point to the latter. Observers looked for a colour-defined target that could repeat or change from trial to trial. A salient distractor could be present on the current trial, the previous trial, both, or neither. Intertrial effects were greater when a distractor was present on the current trial, suggesting that a primed target representation is more beneficial under conditions of competition. In contrast, distractor presence on the previous trial had no effects whatsoever, indicating that the learning process itself is not affected by competition. This suggests that the source of the learning resides at postselection stages, whereas the effects may occur at the perceptual level.     

Choice by value encoding and value construction: processes of loss aversion

Loss aversion and reference dependence are 2 keystones of behavioral theories of choice, but little is known about their underlying cognitive processes. We suggest an additional account for loss aversion that supplements the current account of the value encoding of attributes as gains or losses relative to a reference point, introducing a value construction account. Value construction suggests that loss aversion results from biased evaluations during information search and comparison processes. We develop hypotheses that identify the influence of both accounts and examine process-tracing data for evidence. Our data suggest that loss aversion is the result of the initial direct encoding of losses that leads to the subsequent process of directional comparisons distorting attribute valuations and the final choice.     

Fighting self-control failure: Overcoming ego depletion by increasing self-awareness

According to the limited strength model (Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998), exerting self-control causes ego depletion: a depletion of cognitive resources resulting in poorer performance on later self-control tasks. Previous studies have demonstrated a positive effect of self-awareness on self-control performance. The present study examined whether the occurrence of ego depletion can be circumvented by increasing self-awareness. Initially depleted participants who received a neutral prime exhibited the classic ego depletion pattern: their performance on a subsequent physical self-control task decreased significantly. In contrast, no decrease in performance was observed for depleted participants who were exposed to a self-awareness prime. The latter group performed equally well compared to low depleted participants.     

Attracting Applicants on the Web: PO fit,industry culture stereotypes,and website design

This study tested the extent to which industry culture stereotypes influence job‐seekers' Person–Organization fit when job‐seekers inspect organizations' websites. We proposed that PO fit would relate to Person–Industry (PI) fit, which is the fit between personal values and industry culture stereotypes. Furthermore, a good website design should negatively relate to the use of industry culture stereotypes for assessing actual organizations, yet this relationship should be moderated by job‐seekers' PI fit. Our hypotheses were confirmed. An organization's website design affects the use of industry culture stereotypes, but this depends on an individual's PI fit. Individuals use industry culture stereotypes when inspecting organizations' websites particularly if they find the website less attractive and if PI fit is low.     

Analysis of sensitive questions across cultures: An application of multigroup item randomized response theory to sexual attitudes and behavior

Answers to sensitive questions are prone to social desirability bias. If not properly addressed, the validity of the research can be suspect. This article presents multigroup item randomized response theory (MIRRT) to measure self-reported sensitive topics across cultures. The method was specifically developed to reduce social desirability bias by making an a priori change in the design of the survey. The change involves the use of a randomization device (e.g., a die) that preserves participants' privacy at the item level. In cases where multiple items measure a higher level theoretical construct, the researcher could still make inferences at the individual level. The method can correct for under- and overreporting, even if both occur in a sample of individuals or across nations. We present and illustrate MIRRT in a nontechnical manner, provide WinBugs software code so that researchers can directly implement it, and present 2 cross-national studies in which it was applied. The first study compared nonstudent samples from 2 countries (total n = 927) on permissive sexual attitudes and risky sexual behavior and related these to individual-level characteristics such as the Big Five personality traits. The second study compared nonstudent samples from 17 countries (total n = 6,195) on risky sexual behavior and related these to individual-level characteristics, such as gender and age, and to country-level characteristics, such as sex ratio. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The Aim of a Theory of Justice

Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification of ‘perfect’ justice is neither necessary nor sufficient. He replaces ‘perfect’ justice with comparative justice. Comparative justice limits itself to comparing social states with respect to degrees of justice. Sen’s central thesis is that identifying ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states are ‘analytically disjoined’. This essay refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make adequate comparisons we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This is precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s theory): identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. The same integrated criteria that determine ‘perfect’ justice are needed to be able to adequately compare imperfect social states. Sen’s alternative approach, which is based on social choice theory, is incapable of avoiding contrary, indeterminate or incoherent directives where plural principles of justice conflict.     

Evaluative language,cognitive effort and attitude change

The present article deals with the effects of the use of evaluatively biased language on attitudes, and with the role of cognitive effort. We tested whether active information processing — formulating arguments on the basis of evaluatively biased language — was a necessary condition for attitude change. Results of the present study support the prediction that using evaluative language can infuence attitudes, but that these effects depend on the amount of cognitive effort.     

Negative-based prominence: the role of negative features in matching and choice

Previous research related to the prominence effect (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) has mainly focused on the causes and boundary conditions of the effect. This article investigates the determinants of prominence and explores a negative-based prominence effect in which the negative attribute becomes the prominent one. Using a matching-choice procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 show that the negative dimension became the prominent one under two different cover stories, suggesting that the negative feature looms larger in choice than in matching. The robustness of negative-based prominence was further demonstrated in a direct choice task without matching (Experiment 3) and was shown to be resistant to the impact of added positive features (Experiment 4). Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 distinguish between two determinants of prominence: intrinsic prominence caused by attribute importance and negative-based prominence caused by negative attribute values. By lowering the values on the positive dimension and enhancing the values on the negative dimension, one can reverse the prominence effect. The results suggest that, compared to a matching task, choice leads to enhanced sensitivity to negative features. The relations between negative characteristics of an attribute and other factors that determine prominence are discussed in the final section.     

To err is human: How regulatory focus and action orientation predict performance following errors

In the current study, we hypothesize that post-error performance is influenced by individual differences in action orientation and situationally induced regulatory focus. Two experiments employing a time-pressured flanker-like task, measured participants’ dispositional action orientation and manipulated regulatory focus. As expected, accuracy of the responses following errors was reduced for all participants except for action-oriented participants in a promotion focus. The latter participants are assumed to down-regulate error-related negative affect, thereby saving resources for subsequent performance. A promotion focus is assumed to facilitate the optimal use of these resources.     

Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice

This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ and ‘equally good as’. It follows, she argues, that many choice situations in which rationally justified choice seems precluded are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason. This article has three aims: (1) it challenges Chang’s argument for the possibility of parity; (2) it demonstrates that, even if parity would exist, its problematic implications for practical reason would not differ from those of Raz’s incomparability; (3) it discusses the underlying cause of hard cases of comparison: the fact that none of the three standard value relations applies (‘3NT’). It will be shown that the problematic implications for the rational justification of the choice are due to 3NT itself, irrespective of whether 3NT is explained as incomparability or parity.