Interpersonal conflict in group therapy: An object relations perspective

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how object relations theory can be used to understand and regulate interpersonal conflict in group psychotherapy. Such concepts as projective identification, intersubjectivity and the analytic third are used to describe how conflict emerges in group psychotherapy and how it can be worked through. Case material is also provided to illustrate concepts and techniques in promoting a group's transition from a paranoid/schizoid to a depressive position. Positive aspects of the concept of projective identification are discussed including its use as a form of communication, a method of reducing anxiety and reintegrating previously dangerous and threatening aspects of the self.The paper was funded by Evan F. Lilly Memorial Trust Grant PV 13,067.     

Selective deficit of conceptual structures in aphasia: Class versus thematic relations

Conceptual structures in aphasia were investigated by means of a nonverbal test. The understanding of class and thematic relationships was demonstrated to be selectively impaired according to varieties of aphasic deficit. Broca's aphasics showed difficulty evaluating a thematic relationship and did not differ from normal controls as far as class relationships were concerned. The opposite happened for Wernicke's aphasics whose defect seems to be selectively restricted to class relationships.     

Psychosis,symbol, affectivity 1: etiopathogenesis and treatment through analytical psychology

This is the first of two papers concerning our study into an integrated approach to psychotic disorders, conducted at the University of Palermo’s Psychiatry Unit Polyclinic over approximately 15 years. Here we will explore and reflect upon the acute psychotic condition mainly from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, while in the second paper we will explore the clinical perspective. From the point of view of psychopathology, and in the light of C.G. Jung’s conceptualization of analytical psychology, as well as calling on contributions from other authors from the systemic-relational and post-psychoanalytic field, we will clarify the ideas developed over these last few years by our team. From a more speculative perspective we will advance new interpretive hypotheses in an attempt to thoroughly understand the nature of the psychotic condition, both on a psychodynamic relational and a neuroscientific level. The paper describes how we revised our understanding of psychosis from a brain disease to a process aimed at the rearrangement of psychic functioning, as anticipated by John Weir Perry nearly 40 years ago.     

Laterality effects in the spinning dancer illusion: The viewing‐from‐above bias is only part of the story

The ‘silhouette illusion’, representing the silhouette of a female dancer pirouetting about her vertical axis, is a bistable stimulus created by Japanese web designer Nobuyuki Kayahara. Although the dancer can be perceived as spinning either clockwise or counterclockwise, the clockwise rotation is usually preferred. Troje and McAdam (i‐Perception, 2010, 1, 143) showed that this clockwise bias can be attributed to the tendency to assume a viewpoint from above rather than from below, given that the dancer is portrayed from a vantage point that is not perpendicular to the axis of rotation. Here, we tested whether another possible factor contributing to the observers’ interpretation of this bistable stimulus might be the tendency to perceive movements of the right rather than the left foot. We confirmed both the viewing‐from‐above bias and our hypothesis. The bias to perceive movements of the right leg might be a generalization to lower limbs of a perceptual frequency effect already observed for upper limbs. Such a perceptual and attentional bias towards the right hand/foot could account for the greater ability to predict the outcome of sport actions when observing right‐ rather than left‐limbed movements, and thus the left‐handers' and left‐footers' advantage observed in a variety of interactive sports.     

Additional weight influences the reaching behavior of low-risk preterm infants

The authors investigated the influence of additional weight in the reaching behavior of preterm infants. Nine low-risk preterm and 10 full-term infants age 5-7 months participated. A toy was presented in two procedures: (a) baseline and (b) additional weight (bracelet with weight of 20% of the infant's upper limb mass). The additional weight reduced the straightness index at 5 months, increased the mean velocity and decreased the movement units at all months, and increased unsuccessful grasps at 5 and 7 months in preterm infants. Preterm infants showed less movement units at all months and less unsuccessful grasps at 6 months compared with full-term infants. Weight disturbance seems to change the intrinsic dynamics involved in reaching movements of 5-7-month-old preterm infants.     

Could direct and generative retrieval be two flips of the same coin? A dual-task paradigm study

Cognitive Processing - Autobiographical memories are thought to be retrieved using two possible ways: a generative one, which is effortful and follows a general-to-specific pathway, and a direct...     

Scepticism,defeasible evidence and entitlement

The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of defeasible justification, justification based on evidence which does not entail the (allegedly) justified proposition or belief. I then discuss the relation between the consequence fallacy, or some similar enough reasoning, and that form of argument. I argue that one can resist that form of sceptical argument if one gives up the idea that a belief cannot be justified unless it is supported by the totality of the evidence available to the subject—a principle entailed by many prominent epistemological views, most clearly by epistemological evidentialism. The justification, in the relevant cases, should instead derive solely from the prior probability of the proposition. A justification of this sort, that does not rely on evidence, would amount to a form of entitlement, in (something like) Crispin Wright’s sense. I conclude with some discussion of how to understand prior probabilities, and how to develop the notion of entitlement in an externalist epistemological framework.     

Exploring social and personal relationships: The issue of measurement invariance of non‐independent observations

In social psychology, some research questions address a comparison of individuals belonging to different social or relational contexts. As measurement invariance literature has indicated, before comparing two or more groups (gender, cultures, and relationship types), the question of whether a measurement of the construct used for the comparison is invariant must be verified. Measurement invariance helps to assure the validity of the measurement and the construct equivalence across groups. However, when non‐independent data are used for comparison (the same individual provides data for his or her different relationship types), the standard multigroup analyses for testing measurement invariance are not accurate. The current study presents a modified correlated uniqueness model that may be applied in these specific cases. As an example, we analyzed the invariance of the Intimate Disclosure scale and the Conflict scale in mother–child, father–child, and romantic relationships of young adults. Results indicate a partial invariance: only configural invariance, factor loading invariance, and factor covariance invariance were found. The consequences for validity of the measurement are then discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.