Associative memory or algorithmic search: a comparative study on learning strategies of bats and shrews

Two common strategies for successful foraging are learning to associate specific sensory cues with patches of prey ("associative learning") and using set decision-making rules to systematically scan for prey ("algorithmic search"). We investigated whether an animal's life history affects which of these two foraging strategies it is likely to use. Natterer's bats (Myotis nattereri) have slow life-history traits and we predicted they would be more likely to use associative learning. Common shrews (Sorex araneus) have fast life-history traits and we predicted that they would rely more heavily on routine-based search. Apart from their marked differences in life-history traits, these two mammals are similar in body size, brain weight, habitat, and diet. We assessed foraging strategy, associative learning ability, and retention time with a four-arm maze; one arm contained a food reward and was marked with four sensory stimuli. Bats and shrews differed significantly in their foraging strategies. Most bats learned to associate the sensory stimuli with the reward and remembered this association over time. Most shrews searched the maze using consistent decision-making rules, but did not learn or remember the association. We discuss these results in terms of life-history traits and other key differences between these species. Our results suggest a link between an animal's life-history strategy and its use of associative learning.     

Contemplative/emotion training reduces negative emotional behavior and promotes prosocial responses

Contemplative practices are believed to alleviate psychological problems, cultivate prosocial behavior and promote self-awareness. In addition, psychological science has developed tools and models for understanding the mind and promoting well-being. Additional effort is needed to combine frameworks and techniques from these traditions to improve emotional experience and socioemotional behavior. An 8-week intensive (42 hr) meditation/emotion regulation training intervention was designed by experts in contemplative traditions and emotion science to reduce "destructive enactment of emotions" and enhance prosocial responses. Participants were 82 healthy female schoolteachers who were randomly assigned to a training group or a wait-list control group, and assessed preassessment, postassessment, and 5 months after training completion. Assessments included self-reports and experimental tasks to capture changes in emotional behavior. The training group reported reduced trait negative affect, rumination, depression, and anxiety, and increased trait positive affect and mindfulness compared to the control group. On a series of behavioral tasks, the training increased recognition of emotions in others (Micro-Expression Training Tool), protected trainees from some of the psychophysiological effects of an experimental threat to self (Trier Social Stress Test; TSST), appeared to activate cognitive networks associated with compassion (lexical decision procedure), and affected hostile behavior in the Marital Interaction Task. Most effects at postassessment that were examined at follow-up were maintained (excluding positive affect, TSST rumination, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia recovery). Findings suggest that increased awareness of mental processes can influence emotional behavior, and they support the benefit of integrating contemplative theories/practices with psychological models and methods of emotion regulation.     

Friend influence over adolescent problem behaviors as a function of relative peer acceptance: to be liked is to be emulated

Friend influence over alcohol intoxication and delinquent behavior was examined as a function of relative peer acceptance in a 3-year study of Swedish youth (N = 184 girls, 145 boys). Participants were in the first year of secondary school (7th grade, M = 11.7 years old) or the first year of high school (10th grade, M = 15.3 years old) at the outset. Friends resembled one another before the friendship; resemblances were even greater after the friendship began. Resemblances continued to grow among those who remained friends one year later, but declined among those whose friendships dissolved. Partners were not equally responsible for increases in similarity. In stable friendships, the more accepted partner exerted greater influence over the less accepted partner, such that the greatest increases in problem behaviors were found among less accepted youth whose friends had higher initial levels of delinquency and alcohol intoxication. Unstable friends resembled random pairs of youth in that more- and less-accepted partners were comparably uninfluential.     

Fairness at the collective level: a meta-analytic examination of the consequences and boundary conditions of organizational justice climate

This article uses meta-analytic methods (k = 38) to examine the relationship between organizational justice climate and unit-level effectiveness. Overall, our results suggest that the relationship between justice and effectiveness is significant (ρ = .40) when both constructs are construed at the collective level. Our results also indicate that distributive justice climate was most strongly linked with unit-level performance (e.g., productivity, customer satisfaction), whereas interactional justice was most strongly related to unit-level processes (e.g., organizational citizenship behavior, cohesion). We also show that a number of factors moderate this relationship, including justice climate strength, the level of referent in the justice measure, the hierarchical level of the unit, and how criteria are classified. We elaborate on these findings and attempt to provide a clearer direction for future research in this area.     

Two experimental tests of trust in in‐group strangers: The moderating role of common knowledge of group membership

The role that shared group membership plays in decisions to trust others is now well established within social psychology. A close reading of this literature, however, shows that this process is often moderated by other variables. Currently, we examined one potential moderator of this process. In particular, we evaluated the role that common knowledge of a shared social group membership between self and a to‐be‐trusted stranger provides as a basis for trusting this stranger. This common knowledge emerges when the truster knows the group membership of the to‐be‐trusted other, and believes that this other also knows the group membership of the truster. In two experiments, using pre‐existing and minimal groups, we show that people are more likely to trust an in‐group member over an out‐group member under conditions of common group‐membership knowledge rather than private group‐membership knowledge (i.e. other does not know truster's group), even when they could choose not to trust anyone. The manner in which these data add to current understandings of group‐based trust in strangers is discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Clinical Psychology Students’ Experiences of a Pilot Objective Structured Clinical Examination

There is a need to improve methods used to assess students’ clinical skills in postgraduate clinical psychology training, but research into the use of new competency‐based assessments are sparse. The current study examines the potential application of the objective structured clinical examination (OSCE) to clinical psychology training. Commonly used in medical training, the OSCE requires students to demonstrate clinical skills across a number of standardised stations with trained actors playing the part of patients. A pilot OSCE was conducted with nine students from a psychology doctoral program. Participants completed a brief student feedback questionnaire and attended a focus group after the OSCE. They also completed the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory before and after the OSCE. The results showed that students viewed the OSCE as a valid, realistic, and fair assessment method. They reported high levels of anxiety during the OSCE but noted that the OSCE was a positive learning experience. These results suggest that OSCEs should be considered in clinical psychology training programs for the assessment of clinical competence. Further evaluations of the validity and reliability of the clinical psychology OSCE using a larger sample size are required. Other limitations and implications of the study are discussed.     

Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality

Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread. To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. We extend relational models theory (Fiske, 1991) to identify 4 fundamental and distinct moral motives. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The 4 moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in where they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), relationship regulation theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed. This approach facilitates clearer understanding of moral perspectives we disagree with and provides a template for how to influence moral motives and practices in the world.     

Self-reflection and feelings of self-worth: When Rosenberg meets Heisenberg

The more people think about their attitude toward some issue, the stronger their attitude becomes. The present research examined whether this strengthening effect also applies to self-evaluative attitudes. In four studies, we had some participants complete a self-evaluation measure before rating their momentary feelings of self-worth (Studies 1, 2, and 4) or implicit self-feelings (Study 3). In all four studies, evaluative self-reflection led low self-esteem participants to feel worse about themselves and high self-esteem participants to feel better about themselves. We did not find this self-esteem polarization effect when more general emotions of happiness and sadness were measured (Study 2) or when participants reflected on non-evaluative aspects of themselves (Study 4). These findings suggest that evaluative self-reflection has different consequences for low self-esteem people than for high self-esteem people, and that order effects in personality research may represent actual changes in self-feelings rather than methodological confounds.