The effective time course of preparation

In reaction time (RT) research on nonspecific preparation, the preparation period is often identified with the foreperiod (FP), the interval between the offset of a neutral warning stimulus (S1) and the onset of the reaction stimulus (S2). However, the “effective preparation period” may be longer than FP: nonspecific preparation may start prior to FP (e.g., at the onset of S1) and/or continue after it (i.e., in parallel with the reaction process). In four experiments, we factorially varied FP and an additional factor (S1-duration; S2-luminance; stimulus–response compatibility) that probed the effective preparation period outside the bounds of FP. By examining how equivalent RT–FP functions obtain at the different levels of the additional factor, we showed that nonspecific preparation (1) starts at the onset of S1 for brief FPs but at its offset for longer FPs and (2) continues in parallel with S2-encoding but stops prior to response selection.     

Taxometric analyses of borderline personality features in a large-scale male and female offender sample

Few studies to date have examined the extent to which borderline personality features are best construed as representing an underlying dimension or a discrete class or taxon. The authors conducted taxometric analyses using a large-scale sample of male (n=787) and female (n=368) prison inmates who had completed the Personality Assessment Inventory (L. C. Morey, 2007). Analyses based on the 4 subscales of the Borderline Features Scale offered compelling support for a dimensional structure in both the full sample and the female subsample--even after controlling for the potentially confounding effects of negative response distortion. Theoretical and pragmatic implications of these findings are reviewed.     

Human faces capture attention and attract first saccades without longer fixation

Human faces attract attention, evidenced by reaction time (RT) advantages over non-face stimuli in visual search tasks. In the current study, participants’ eye movements were tracked during a search task to test how the attentional capture of faces is related to looking behaviour. On each trial, participants were cued with a category name (automobiles, birds, chairs, dogs, faces, bodies, or plants). An array of images, one exemplar from each category, was then presented until participants indicated whether the target matched the cue. Results showed that faces as targets resulted in faster search times and were more likely to capture first fixations. Fixations on faces were also shorter compared to other categories. Faces captured attention, attracting first fixations, and participants appeared to be more fluent at processing faces, resulting in shorter fixations. Reaction time advantages for faces could be due to both attention capture and ultra-rapid processing.     

Interpersonal feedback: a social relations perspective

The social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994) is a statistical model for studying interpersonal perception and behavior that can be meaningfully applied to the group therapy situation. It consists of four primary components that correspond to (a) the general emotional or attitudinal climate of the group, (b) the perspective of the perceiver providing the feedback, (c) the group's consensual view of the target who receives the feedback, and (d) the unique relationship between the perceiver and the target. Because of its rigor and specificity, the components of the SRM may serve as a heuristic for thinking about interpersonal feedback in group therapy. A case example is used to demonstrate how an SRM perspective could guide therapists' ways of conceptualizing feedback.     

Naturalism and the Space of Reasons in Mind and World

Abstract

This paper aims to show that many criticisms of McDowell’s naturalism of second nature are based on what I call ‘the orthodox interpretation’ of McDowell’s naturalism. The orthodox interpretation is, however, a misinterpretation, which results from the fact that the phrase ‘the space of reasons’ is used equivocally by McDowell in Mind and World. Failing to distinguish two senses of ‘the space of reasons’, I argue that the orthodox interpretation renders McDowell’s naturalism inconsistent with McDowell’s Hegelian thesis that the conceptual is unbounded. My interpretation saves McDowell from being inconsistent. However, the upshot of my interpretation is that what is really at work in McDowell’s diagnosis of the dualism between nature and reason is the Hegelian thesis, not the naturalism of second nature.     

Diagrams: Socrates and Meno's slave

Abstract

When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer ‐just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non‐transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. They must allow in consequence either for joint ownership of one and the same mental item, or for incompatible simultaneous decisions by one and the same person, or for new forms of death. This makes them disquieting. Another rival invokes a transitive and symmetrical relation defined in terms of co‐consciousness. Even that allows for incongruous simultaneities. The volitional theory is free from such disadvantages.     

Bias and learning in temporal binding: Intervals between actions and outcomes are compressed by prior bias

It has consistently been shown that agents judge the intervals between their actions and outcomes as compressed in time, an effect named intentional binding. In the present work, we investigated whether this effect is result of prior bias volunteers have about the timing of the consequences of their actions, or if it is due to learning that occurs during the experimental session. Volunteers made temporal estimates of the interval between their action and target onset (Action conditions), or between two events (No-Action conditions). Our results show that temporal estimates become shorter throughout each experimental block in both conditions. Moreover, we found that observers judged intervals between action and outcomes as shorter even in very early trials of each block. To quantify the decrease of temporal judgments in experimental blocks, exponential functions were fitted to participants’ temporal judgments. The fitted parameters suggest that observers had different prior biases as to intervals between events in which action was involved. These findings suggest that prior bias might play a more important role in this effect than calibration-type learning processes.     

Atypical categorization in children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder

Children with autism spectrum disorder process many perceptual and social events differently from typically developing children, suggesting that they may also form and recognize categories differently. We used a dot pattern categorization task and prototype comparison modeling to compare categorical processing in children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder and matched typical controls. We were interested in whether there were differences in how children with autism use average similarity information about a category to make decisions. During testing, the group with autism spectrum disorder endorsed prototypes less and was seemingly less sensitive to differences between to-be-categorized items and the prototype. The findings suggest that individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder are less likely to use overall average similarity when forming categories or making categorical decisions. Such differences in category formation and use may negatively impact processing of socially relevant information, such as facial expressions. A supplemental appendix for this article may be downloaded from http://pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Working in the borderland: early relational trauma and Fordham's analysis of ‘K’

This paper outlines a view of early relational trauma as underlying borderline states of mind, and argues that Knox's 1999 paper on internal working models and the complex provides a basis for understanding such states of mind. The author argues that in addition to internal working models, the complex also embodies and contains primitive defences of the core self. He outlines how these apply on the objective, subjective, transference and archetypal levels, and in direct and reversed forms and applies this to the account of Fordham's analysis of his patient ‘K’, which ended in impasse. The paper explores the dynamic that emerged in that analysis and suggests that it could be helpfully accounted for in terms of the co‐construction and re‐construction of early relational trauma in the analytic relationship.