The rubber hand illusion in a mirror

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI) one’s hand is hidden, and a fake hand is visible. We explored the situation in which visual information was available indirectly in a mirror. In the mirror condition, compared to the standard condition (fake hand visible directly), we found no reduction of the RHI following synchronised stimulation, as measured by crossmanual pointing and by a questionnaire. We replicated the finding with a smaller mirror that prevented visibility of the face. The RHI was eliminated when a wooden block replaced the fake hand, or when the hand belonged to another person or mannequin. We conclude that awareness of the reflection is the critical variable, despite the distant visual localisation of the hand in a mirror and the third-person perspective. Stimuli seen in a mirror activate the same response as stimuli seen in peripersonal space, through knowledge that they are near one’s body.     

Some Notes on the Census of Religious Bodies, 1926

In line with previous results that challenge the traditional primacy of warmth over competence in outgroup perception, we propose to bridge elements from stereotype content model and social identity theory: Perceivers will use the competence and warmth dimensions differentially when interpreting higher or lower status outgroup members' behavior. We test the hypothesis that the dimension that is less favorable for the outgroup and more favorable for the ingroup will be used. In particular, we investigate whether the warmth dimension would better predict the interpretation of higher status outgroup members' behavior than the competence dimension, whereas the competence dimension would better predict the interpretation of lower status outgroup members' behavior than the warmth dimension. Two studies separately test these effects. Results suggest the existence of a motivated bias in interpreting outgroup members' behavior, especially when there is ingroup identification.     

The Tower of London Test: different scoring criteria for diagnosing Alzheimer's disease and mild cognitive impairment

The Tower of London (TOL) is used for evaluating planning skills, which is a component of the executive functions. Different versions and scoring criteria were developed for this task, and some of them present with different psychometrical properties. This study aimed to evaluate two specific scoring methods of the TOL in diagnosing Mild Cognitive Impairment and probable Alzheimer's disease. The TOL total scores from 60 patients of each diagnosis were compared with the performance of 60 healthy-aged controls using receiver operating characteristics analysis and multinomial logistic regression. Krikorian method better diagnosed Alzheimer's disease, while Portellas's was better at discriminating healthy controls from Mild Cognitive Impairment, but were not efficient at comparing this last group with Alzheimer's patients. Regression analysis indicates that in addition to screening tests, TOL improves the classification of the three groups. The results suggest the two scoring methods used for this task may be useful for different diagnostic purposes.     

Logic for physical space

Since the early days of physics, space has called for means to represent, experiment, and reason about it. Apart from physicists, the concept of space has intrigued also philosophers, mathematicians and, more recently, computer scientists. This longstanding interest has left us with a plethora of mathematical tools developed to represent and work with space. Here we take a special look at this evolution by considering the perspective of Logic. From the initial axiomatic efforts of Euclid, we revisit the major milestones in the logical representation of space and investigate current trends. In doing so, we do not only consider classical logic, but we indulge ourselves with modal logics. These present themselves naturally by providing simple axiomatizations of different geometries, topologies, space-time causality, and vector spaces.     

The twofold role of diagrams in Euclid’s plane geometry

Proposition I.1 is, by far, the most popular example used to justify the thesis that many of Euclid??s geometric arguments are diagram-based. Many scholars have recently articulated this thesis in different ways and argued for it. My purpose is to reformulate it in a quite general way, by describing what I take to be the twofold role that diagrams play in Euclid??s plane geometry (EPG). Euclid??s arguments are object-dependent. They are about geometric objects. Hence, they cannot be diagram-based unless diagrams are supposed to have an appropriate relation with these objects. I take this relation to be a quite peculiar sort of representation. Its peculiarity depends on the two following claims that I shall argue for: (i) The identity conditions of EPG objects are provided by the identity conditions of the diagrams that represent them; (ii) EPG objects inherit some properties and relations from these diagrams.