A Computational and Empirical Investigation of Graphemes in Reading

It is often assumed that graphemes are a crucial level of orthographic representation above letters. Current connectionist models of reading, however, do not address how the mapping from letters to graphemes is learned. One major challenge for computational modeling is therefore developing a model that learns this mapping and can assign the graphemes to linguistically meaningful categories such as the onset, vowel, and coda of a syllable. Here, we present a model that learns to do this in English for strings of any letter length and any number of syllables. The model is evaluated on error rates and further validated on the results of a behavioral experiment designed to examine ambiguities in the processing of graphemes. The results show that the model (a) chooses graphemes from letter strings with a high level of accuracy, even when trained on only a small portion of the English lexicon; (b) chooses a similar set of graphemes as people do in situations where different graphemes can potentially be selected; (c) predicts orthographic effects on segmentation which are found in human data; and (d) can be readily integrated into a full‐blown model of multi‐syllabic reading aloud such as CDP++ (Perry, Ziegler, & Zorzi, 2010). Altogether, these results suggest that the model provides a plausible hypothesis for the kind of computations that underlie the use of graphemes in skilled reading.     

The missing link between faces and names: Evidence from Alzheimer's disease patients

Retrieval of proper names is a cause of concern and complaint among elderly adults and it is an early symptom of patients suffering from neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's disease (AD). While it is well established that AD patients have deficits of proper name retrieval, the nature of such impairment is not yet fully understood. Specifically, it is unknown whether this deficit is due to a degradation of the links between faces and proper names, or due to deficits in intentionally accessing and retrieving proper names from faces. Here, we aim to investigate the integrity of the links between famous faces and proper names in AD while minimizing the impact of the explicit retrieval. We compare the performances of AD patients and elderly controls in a face-name priming task. We assess the integrity of the link between faces and names at two different levels: identity level - the name and face belong to the same person; and semantic level - the name and face belong to the same category (e.g., politicians). Our results reveal that AD patients compared with controls show intact semantic priming but reduced priming for person identity. This suggests that the deficits in intentionally retrieving proper names in AD are the result of a partial disruption of the network at the identity level, i.e., the links between known faces and proper names.     

What the Solitaire illusion tells us about perception of numerosity

In four experiments we investigated the Solitaire illusion. In this illusion, most observers see as more numerous a set of dots that forms a single central group, compared to dots on the outside of that group. We confirmed and extended the effect to configurations with much higher numerosity than the original and of various colours. Contrary to prediction, separating the two groups, so that they are presented side by side, reduced but did not abolish or reverse the illusion. In this illusion, therefore, neither total size of the region (area), not average distance of the elements has the expected effect. In Experiments 3 and 4 we eliminated the regularity of the pattern, by sampling 50% (Exp 3) or only a 10% (Exp 4) of the elements. These produces quasi-random configurations. For these configurations the bias for the inner groups was still present, and it was only eliminated when the groups were shown as separate. However, the effect never reversed (no bias for the outer group, despite its larger area). We conclude that the Solitaire illusion is evidence of a strong bias in favour of centrally located elements, a bias that can overcome other factors.     

Grey wolves (Canis lupus) discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar human voices

Animal Cognition - The ability to discriminate between different individuals based on identity cues, which is important to support the social behaviour of many animal species, has mostly been...     

Intra-couple similarity in dyadic coping and partners’ adjustment to the birth of a child

Unlike individual perceptions of a couple's functioning, couple-level protective factors against poor adjustment to the birth of a child have rarely been studied. This study examined similarity or reciprocal exchanges in dyadic coping (DC) during pregnancy (T1) and at 6 weeks postpartum (T2) and its associations with both partners’ adjustment at 6–9 months postpartum (T3). Ninety-two Portuguese couples provided data on DC, internalizing symptoms, dyadic adjustment and parenting stress. An individual's perceived similarity at T1 positively predicted his or her own internalizing symptoms at T3. One partner's perceived similarity at T2 negatively predicted the other partner's internalizing symptoms and parenting stress at T3. These associations controlled for stereotype effects (i.e., similarity due to shared cultural norms and values). Both partners’ adjustment seems to benefit from unique similarity within the couple after childbirth, while complementarity in DC during pregnancy appears to be more beneficial in the long term. Our findings suggest important refinements to DC-based interventions already aimed to promote similarity in DC.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.