Mechanisms,Experiments, and Theory-Ladenness: A Realist–Perspectivalist View

The terms “perspectivism” and “perspectivalism” have been the focus of an intense philosophical discussion with important repercussions for the debate about the role of mechanisms in scientific explanations. However, leading exponents of the new mechanistic philosophy have conceded more than was necessary to the radically subjectivistic perspectivalism, and fell into the opposite error, by retaining not negligible residues of objectivistic views about mechanisms. In order to remove this vacillation between the subjective-cultural and the objective-natural sides of mechanisms, we shall raise the question about theory-ladenness over again and interpret it in its connection with the technical–experimental nature of scientific knowledge, as affirming the perspectival character of scientific knowledge: It is because of the character at once theory-laden and practice-laden, i.e. technique-laden, of our putting questions to nature that empirical reality must be investigated from particular perspectives: nature can be known scientifically only from a potentially infinite (not determinable a priori) number of perspectives or theoretical points of view, concretely exemplified by mechanisms or experimental ‘machines’ that allow specific access to specific aspects of sensible reality.     

The riddle of Siegfried: exploring methods and psychological perspectives in analytical psychology

Jung's dream of the killing of Siegfried poses a riddle: why did the unconscious choose precisely Siegfried as the hero to be murdered? Jung himself declares that he does not know. This paper attempts to decipher this riddle using three distinct methodological approaches accepted by Jung, two of them in fact grounded in his theories of dream interpretation. Besides presenting some possible answers to the riddle of Siegfried, this interpretative reflection brings to light the discrepancy of the psychological perspectives created by the heterogeneity of methods within analytical psychology.     

What Can We Know of Computational Information? Measuring,Quantity, and Quality at Work in Programmable Artifacts

This paper explores the problem of knowledge in computational informational organisms, i.e. organisms that include a computing machinery at the artifact side. Although information can be understood in many ways, from the second half of the past century information is getting more and more digitised, von Neumann machines becoming dominant. Computational information is a challenge for the act of measuring, as neither purely quantitative nor totally qualitative approaches satisfy the need to explain the interplay among the agents producing and managing computational information. In this paper, Floridi’s method of levels of abstraction is applied to the analysis of computational information, with a chief interest in the concepts of information measure, quantification and quality.     

Motivation modulates the effect of approach on implicit preferences

With three studies, we investigated whether motivational states can modulate the formation of implicit preferences. In Study 1, participants played a video game in which they repeatedly approached one of two similar beverages, while disregarding the other. A subsequent implicit preference for the target beverage emerged, which increased with participants’ thirst. In Study 2, participants approached one brand of potato chips while avoiding the other: Conceptually replicating the moderation observed in Study 1, the implicit preference for the approached brand increased with the number of hours from last food intake. In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated hunger, and the moderation effect emerged again, with hungry participants displaying a higher implicit preference for the approached brand, as compared to satiated participants. In the three studies, the moderation effect was not paralleled in explicit preferences although the latter were affected by the preference inducing manipulation. Theoretical implications and open questions are discussed.     

Learning Orthographic Structure With Sequential Generative Neural Networks

Learning the structure of event sequences is a ubiquitous problem in cognition and particularly in language. One possible solution is to learn a probabilistic generative model of sequences that allows making predictions about upcoming events. Though appealing from a neurobiological standpoint, this approach is typically not pursued in connectionist modeling. Here, we investigated a sequential version of the restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM), a stochastic recurrent neural network that extracts high‐order structure from sensory data through unsupervised generative learning and can encode contextual information in the form of internal, distributed representations. We assessed whether this type of network can extract the orthographic structure of English monosyllables by learning a generative model of the letter sequences forming a word training corpus. We show that the network learned an accurate probabilistic model of English graphotactics, which can be used to make predictions about the letter following a given context as well as to autonomously generate high‐quality pseudowords. The model was compared to an extended version of simple recurrent networks, augmented with a stochastic process that allows autonomous generation of sequences, and to non‐connectionist probabilistic models (n‐grams and hidden Markov models). We conclude that sequential RBMs and stochastic simple recurrent networks are promising candidates for modeling cognition in the temporal domain.     

The Revelation Argument. A 'Communicational Fallacy'

In this paper it is argued that much can be gained for the analysis and evaluation of arguing when fallacies are not, or not only, conceived of as flawed premise–conclusion complexes but rather as argumentative moves which distort harmfully an interaction aiming at resolving communication problems argumentatively. Starting from Normative Pragmatics and the pragma-dialectical concept of fallacy, a case study is presented to illustrate a fallacy which is termed the 'revelation argument' because it is characterized by an interactor's revealing her thoughts and/or emotions to the addressees and claiming that these would have justificatory or refutatory potential with respect to the problem discussed. Although the revelation argument may not be a paradigm case of resolution- hindering moves, it is an extreme case of flawed reasoning that illustrates plainly the advantages of a communicational perspective on arguing and fallacies.     

The role of symmetry in determining perceived centers within shapes

This study was designed to assess the effects of symmetry and plane of presentation on the determination of the perceptual center of flat figures. Experiment 1 demonstrates the existence of effects in improving center determination, both in the number of sides of the shape and in rotational and reflective symmetry (confounded in the experiment). Experiment 2 shows that the presentation plane has no effect on center determination. In Experiment 3, we divide the effects of the two symmetry types, showing that rotational symmetry alone is as effective as the presence of both symmetry types—that is, the presence of symmetry axes is not very useful in finding perceived centers.     

The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universität Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.