Effect of stimulus intensity on manual and saccadic reaction time

Reaction time (RT) decreases with stimulus intensity. Hughes and Kesley (1984) demonstrated, however, that the effect of stimulus intensity on simple RT is larger for manual than for saccadic responses. We reexamined this relation under various conditions. The dissociation occurred when the task enabled the generation of exogenous saccades. We found, however, no dissociation if endogenous saccades had to be executed. It is hypothesized that the different effects of intensity result from the simplified neuronal processing of exogenous saccades performed in the direct route from the retina to the superior colliculus.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

Approximative truth of fact-statements,laws, and theories

Summary The paper is a sketch of a conception of approximative truth (or verisimilitude). The concepts of relative error, and degree of inadequacy are introduced. By means of them the concept of truth-content of quantitative facts-statements, laws and theories is defined. Laws and theories accepted in science have a high truth-content, i.e. they are approximately true.     

The lattice of strengthenings of a strongly finite consequence operation

First, we prove that the lattice of all structural strengthenings of a given strongly finite consequence operation is both atomic and coatomic, it has finitely many atoms and coatoms, each coatom is strongly finite but atoms are not of this kind — we settle this by constructing a suitable counterexample. Second, we deal with the notions of hereditary: algebraicness, strong finitisticity and finite approximability of a strongly finite consequence operation. Third, we formulate some conditions which tell us when the lattice of all structural strengthenings of a given strongly finite consequence operation is finite, and subsequently we give some applications of them.This paper was read at the Third Autumn School on Strongly Finite Sentential Calculi organized by the Section of Logic, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, in Ustronie (Poland), November 1979.     

Towards a topological philosophy

This article examines the use of mathematical concepts in philosophy, focusing on topology, which may be viewed as a modern supplement to geometry. We show that Plato and Parmenides were already employing geometric ideas in their research, and discuss three examples of the application of topology to philosophical problems: the first concerns the analysis of the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, the second the ontology of possible worlds of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and the third Leibniz's monadology. We also consider the role of topology in mathematical explanations of the sort found in science, arguing that it can perform a role in philosophy that is of comparable importance.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.     

Ingroup and outgroup inferences: when ingroup bias overwhelms outcome bias

Two experiments investigated conditions under which participants drew outcome-biased inferences about ingroups and outgroups. Participants read about ingroup and outgroup targets whose success or failure was influenced by an arbitrary decision rule. In Experiment 1, ingroup and outgroup members experienced two inconsistent outcomes (first success and then failure, or vice versa) despite almost identical performances. After reading about the first performance participants made outcome-biased inferences, but when the role of the decision rule became obvious inferences became group-serving. That is, outcomes continued to influence inferences when they cast the ingroup in a positive light (as when initial failure was followed by success) but failed to affect inferences when they were detrimental to the ingroup (as when initial success was qualified by later failure). In contrast, inferences about outgroups were outcome-biased when failure followed success, but not when success followed failure. The results of Experiment 2 showed that outcome biases influenced inferences when decision rules produced outcomes that promoted the ingroup but not when they produced outcomes that hurt the ingroup. No such benefit occurred for outgroups. The results confirm the impact of motivational concerns such as ingroup bias on the occurrence of outcome biases in inferences. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Functions of Integration and Confrontation in Internal Dialogues

While integrative and confrontational internal dialogues (IDs) are often treated as opposing and numerous positive functions are ascribed to the former, this paper assumes that integration and confrontation are not mutually exclusive but independent processes. When exploring IDs that simulate social relationships and are described by different configurations of integrative and confrontational characteristics, canonical correlation analysis revealed that in competitive dialogue, the strong confrontational attitude of the dialogue's author is accompanied by the weak integrative attitudes of both ID parties. The more the ID is based on a rivalry between the parties, the lower the levels of bond, support, and insight functions are and the higher the level of substitution is. In persuasive dialogue, the confrontational attitude of the dialogue's author is combined with the integrative attitudes of both parties. The more the ID is based on persuasion, the higher the intensity of substitution, insight, bond, support, and self-guiding is. The findings suggest a synergistic effect of co-occurring integrative and confrontational attitudes in one ID.     

Perceptual learning can reverse subliminal priming effects

Masked primes presented prior to a target can result in inverse priming (i.e., benefits on trials in which the prime and the target are mapped onto opposite responses). In five experiments, time-of-task effects on subliminal priming of motor responses were investigated. First, we replicated Klapp and Hinkley's (2002) finding that the priming effect is initially straight (i.e., it benefits congruent trials, in which the prime and targets are mapped onto the same response) or absent, and only later reverses (i.e., faster responses in incongruent than in congruent trials). We show that the presentation of the mask plays a crucial role in this reversal and that the reversal occurs later if the mask pattern is very complex. We suggest that perceptual learning improves the recognition of task-relevant features. Once recognized, these features can trigger the preparation of the alternative response and/or inhibit the prime-activated response. These findings support an active role of the mask in priming.