Guest Editors’ Introduction

In spite of the widespread belief that there is (or at least there was) a clearcut and deep opposition between two forms of philosophizing vaguely characterized as 'continental' and 'analytic', it is not easy to find actual examples of debates between philosophers that clearly belong to the opposed camps. Perhaps the reason is that, on the assumption that the alleged 'divide' is so deep, each side feels that there is no point in arguing against the other, for argumentation would quickly be replaced by invective. In this paper I analyse one of the few recent examples of an across-divide debate m the Searle m Derrida polemic. Using a threefold typology of debates, I try to show that, in spite of the violent and sarcastic tone employed by both contenders, there is enough common ground, questioning of not-argued-for assumptions, and serious argumentation (on both sides) to consider this debate more than just an irrational dispute.     

Allocentric versus idiocentric tendencies: Convergent and discriminant validation

Allocentric tendencies were studied with a multimethod questionnaire and Illinois undergraduates. Nine scales measuring different aspects of allocentrism were shown to have good reliability and to be intercorrelated, thus showing convergent validity. Factor analysis identified three aspects: subordination of personal to group goals, the ingroup as extension of the self, and ingroup identity. The scales also had satisfactory discriminant validity. Those high on idiocentric tendencies used equity and those high in allocentric tendencies used equality and need in distributing rewards. A second study found that those who are allocentric are more likely to emphasize the values of cooperation, equality, and honesty, and those who are idiocentric to emphasize the values of comfortable life, competition, pleasure, and social recognition. Those who were allocentric reported receiving more social support and a better quality of social support; those who were idiocentric were higher in achievement motivation, alienation, anomie, and reported greater loneliness.     

Individual differences in long-range time representation

On the basis of experimental data, long-range time representation has been proposed to follow a highly compressed power function, which has been hypothesized to explain the time inconsistency found in financial discount rate preferences. The aim of this study was to evaluate how well linear and power function models explain empirical data from individual participants tested in different procedural settings. The line paradigm was used in five different procedural variations with 35 adult participants. Data aggregated over the participants showed that fitted linear functions explained more than 98% of the variance in all procedures. A linear regression fit also outperformed a power model fit for the aggregated data. An individual-participant-based analysis showed better fits of a linear model to the data of 14 participants; better fits of a power function with an exponent β?>?1 to the data of 12 participants; and better fits of a power function with β?<?1 to the data of the remaining nine participants. Of the 35 volunteers, the null hypothesis β?=?1 was rejected for 20. The dispersion of the individual β values was approximated well by a normal distribution. These results suggest that, on average, humans perceive long-range time intervals not in a highly compressed, biased manner, but rather in a linear pattern. However, individuals differ considerably in their subjective time scales. This contribution sheds new light on the average and individual psychophysical functions of long-range time representation, and suggests that any attribution of deviation from exponential discount rates in intertemporal choice to the compressed nature of subjective time must entail the characterization of subjective time on an individual-participant basis.     

The Enigma of Extreme Traumatism: Trauma,Exclusion and their Impact on Subjectivity<Superscript>*</Superscript>

My aim is to discuss the immediate effects of extreme trauma and to speculate on its long term effects. The formulations associated with the Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome generate an overly medicalized view of trauma, grossly underestimating its devastating impact. Catastrophic traumatic experience rips a hole in the representational continuity of psychic life; neither representations nor narrations are generated. Instead, a representational emptiness occurs, such that what has taken place cannot be shared or transmitted. The cathartic word becomes a robotic mocking of the interchange between human beings. There is no internalization, no ability to make the experience subjective. The resulting deep splitting in the psyche is characteristic of extreme traumatism, and its balance or perpetual working through is elaborated in this paper.     

Neuroscience and the possibility of locally determined choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias

In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it.     

The relationship between childhood abuse and adult personality disorder symptoms

This study assessed personality disorder symptomatology in a community sample of healthy adults without diagnosable DSM-IV-TR Axis I psychiatric disorders who reported a history of childhood abuse. Twenty-eight subjects with a history of moderate to severe physical, sexual, and/or emotional abuse according to the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire were compared to 33 subjects without an abuse history on symptoms of personality disorders. Subjects in the Abuse group were more likely to report subclinical symptoms of paranoid, narcissistic, borderline, antisocial, obsessive compulsive, passive-aggressive, and depressive personality disorders. These findings link reports of childhood abuse with symptoms of personality disorders in the absence of Axis I psychiatric disorders in a community sample of healthy adults.