A longitudinal study of "intrusion-based reasoning" and posttraumatic stress disorder after exposure to a train disaster

Previously, we found that chronic PTSD relates to “intrusion-based reasoning” (IR), i.e. the tendency to interpret distressing intrusions themselves as evidence that danger is impending, regardless of objective danger information (Engelhard et al., Behav. Res. Ther. 39 (2001) 1139). This study was intended to elucidate the causal status of this relation. Twenty-nine residents of a Belgian town witnessed a train crash and were assessed for IR and PTSD symptoms within 1 month and were re-assessed for PTSD at 3.5 months. Fourteen control residents did not witness the crash and were also tested for IR. The IR paradigm involved rating the danger of brief scenarios in which objective danger and presence of intrusions about the crash were systematically varied. The directly exposed residents showed greater danger ratings to scenarios in which intrusions were included than did the controls. IR was strongly related to both acute and chronic PTSD symptoms. It did not significantly predict chronic PTSD symptoms after controlling for acute symptoms, although the partial correlation (r=0.26, p=0.09) was in the expected direction. The data suggest that IR is involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, but more clarity about causality awaits future larger and experimental studies.     

How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)

T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (see record 2004-15929-012) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.     

The Guilty Knowledge Test and the modified Stroop task in detection of deception: an exploratory study

The current study tested whether a simple Stroop paradigm can be used to detect deceptive behavior. 40 university students (34 women), half of whom committed a mock crime, were administered a Guilty Knowledge Test and modified Stroop task to detect guilt or innocence. The Guilty Knowledge Test is a well-known psychophysiological detection method, which consists of multiple-choice questions about details of the crime while skin conductance is recorded. Subjects possessing guilty knowledge are expected to show enhanced differential responses to the relevant stimuli. The modified Stroop task required color-naming of colored words related to the mock crime or an irrelevant crime. Each version of the Stroop task was presented in story form. Subjects possessing guilty knowledge were expected to produce larger reaction times to the relevant version relative to the irrelevant version. The test correctly identified 100% of innocent participants and 78% of guilty participants. In contrast, Stroop interference. i.e., reaction times for irrelevant crime details subtracted from those for mock crime details, did not differentiate between the two groups, suggesting that the story form of the Stroop paradigm is not suitable for lie detection.     

Effort Invested in Vain: The Impact of Effort on the Intensity of Disappointment and Regret

Two scenario studies investigated the impact of the investment of instrumental and noninstrumental effort on the intensity of disappointment and regret. The role of effort was investigated in the context of other determinants of disappointment and regret: the desirability of the outcome, its likelihood, and the perceived responsibility for (not) obtaining the outcome. Study 1 shows that after failure, disappointment is more intense after an investment of higher levels of instrumental effort, whereas regret is more intense an investment of less instrumental effort. Study 2 shows that both disappointment and regret are more intense after an investment of higher levels of noninstrumental effort. Further analyses suggest that the effect of instrumental effort on disappointment is due to a direct effect of the investment of effort. The effect of instrumental effort on disappointment was mediated by the perceived likelihood of attaining the outcome and also related to the perceived desirability of the outcome. The impact of instrumental effort on regret was found to be due to a direct effect of the investment of effort, and to the perceived responsibility for not attaining the outcome. The effect of the investment of noninstrumental effort on the intensity of both disappointment and regret was found to be due to a direct effect of effort. Desirability also affected disappointment (with increased desirability leading to higher levels of disappointment), whereas only regret was affected by perceived responsibility. Implications of these findings for the study of disappointment and regret are discussed.     

Reducing self-control by weakening belief in free will

Believing in free will may arise from a biological need for control. People induced to disbelieve in free will show impulsive and antisocial tendencies, suggesting a reduction of the willingness to exert self-control. We investigated whether undermining free will affects two aspects of self-control: intentional inhibition and perceived self-control. We exposed participants either to anti-free will or to neutral messages. The two groups (no-free will and control) then performed a task that required self-control to inhibit a prepotent response. No-free will participants showed less intentional inhibitions than controls, suggesting a reduction of self-control. We assessed perceived self-control by asking participants whether the response resulted from a deliberate intention or from an impulsive reaction. Perceived self-control was lower in the no-free will group than in control group. Our findings show that undermining free will can degrade self-control and provide insights into how disbelieving in free will leads to antisocial tendencies.     

A retrospective chart study: the pathway to a diagnosis for adults referred for ASD assessment

Charts of 125 adults (18 to 82 years), referred to an autism expert team for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) assessment, were reviewed to explore the pathway to an adulthood ASD diagnosis. The participants first contacted the mental health care clinic at a median age of 19 years (range 2 to 78 years). Men contacted the clinic slightly earlier than women. The main referral reasons were social problems, feelings of anxiety and mood disturbances. The most common earlier diagnoses were anxiety and mood disorders or psychosis-related disorders. These diagnoses were more common in women than in men. Surprisingly few differences emerged between those who finally received an ASD diagnosis and those who did not. However, those with an ASD diagnosis contacted the clinic a mean of 15 years earlier and less frequently received different former diagnoses, although the type of diagnoses did not differ. The diagnostic criteria that were prevalent during early childhood of these adults did not influence their diagnostic history. A quarter of these clients were known with social problems within the mental health care system, but ASD was not assessed. Hence, the current study shows that the pathways to an adulthood ASD diagnosis are very heterogeneous.