Anxiety sensitivity interacts with marijuana use in the prediction of anxiety symptoms and panic-related catastrophic thinking among daily tobacco users

The present investigation evaluated whether anxiety sensitivity interacted with marijuana use in relation to the prediction of panic-relevant variables among young adult tobacco smokers (n=265). Approximately 73% of the sample was composed of current marijuana smokers, with 78.5% of this sub-sample using marijuana more than once per week. As expected, after covarying cigarettes per day, alcohol use, and negative affectivity, the interaction between marijuana use and anxiety sensitivity predicted anxiety symptoms and agoraphobic cognitions. Partially consistent with prediction, the interaction between frequency of marijuana use and anxiety sensitivity predicted only anxiety symptoms. These results are discussed in relation to better understanding the potential role of regular marijuana use and anxiety sensitivity for panic-relevant emotional vulnerability among regular tobacco smokers.     

A short form of the Autonomy Scale: properties of the Autonomy-Connectedness Scale (ACS-30)

The Autonomy Scale (Bekker, 1993) measures individual differences in gender-linked autonomy, a psychological condition resulting from the process of individuation and separation. The theoretical background of the concept is found in a combination of feminist, neoanalytical object relations theory and attachment theory. The 3 subscales are Self-Awareness, Sensitivity to Others, and Capacity for Managing New Situations. We report the development and properties of the Autonomy-Connectedness Scale (ACS-30), a shortened 30-item version of the Autonomy Scale. We present 2 studies. In the first study, we examined the structure of the scale as well as its validity and reliability. The second study was aimed at further validation by relating the ACS-30 to various indexes of psychopathology. Exploratory as well as confirmatory factor analyses provided support for a 3-factor structure that was identical to that of the original scale. The ACS-30 showed good internal consistency reliability and an expected pattern of convergent validity with personality and mental health variables. The psychometric properties of the ACS-30 suggest it can be used to assess gender-linked autonomy. It also has the advantage of being more economical and simple as compared with the original 50-item version.     

The role of the inferior frontal junction area in cognitive control

Cognitive control processes refer to our ability to coordinate thoughts and actions in accordance with internal goals. In the fronto-lateral cortex such processes have been primarily related to mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC). However, recent brain-imaging and meta-analytic studies suggest that a region located more posterior in the fronto-lateral cortex plays a pivotal role in cognitive control as well. This region has been termed the inferior frontal junction area and can be functionally and structurally distinguished from mid-DLPFC.     

Intensity of positive and negative emotions: Explaining the association between personality and depressive symptoms

The aim was to examine to what extent emotional intensity accounted for associations between the Big Five personality dimensions and depressive symptoms. Study 1 tested the model cross-sectionally, using survey data of 266 Dutch social science students. Study 2 experimentally examined how personality dimensions were related to emotional reactivity after exposure to various emotional stimuli. Dutch psychology students (N = 130) reported on their personality and viewed an amusing or sad film clip, after which the change in intensity of experienced positive and negative emotions was assessed. Individuals scoring higher on neuroticism generally experienced more intense negative emotions, through which they experienced a higher level of depressive symptoms. Individuals who were more agreeable experienced a lower level of depressive symptoms indirectly through higher general intensity of positive emotions. More agreeable individuals showed stronger increase in negative emotions and stronger decrease in positive emotions, though after exposure to the sad stimulus only. Although replication is needed, our results offer empirical support for a more taylor-made approach in decreasing nonclinical depressive symptoms taking into account both personality characteristics and emotion regulation.     

Brain activity for visual judgment of lifted weight

It is well established that humans can recognize high-level aspects from point-light biological motion, such as gender and mood. If the task is to judge the manipulated weight we expected that sensorimotor regions should be recruited in the brain. Moreover, we have recently shown that chronic pain in a limb that is involved in the presented movement disturbs the weight judgment. We therefore hypothesized that some cortical regions usually activated during the processing of pain will also be activated while viewing point-light biological motion with the instruction to judge the manipulated weights. We investigated point-light biological motion of two types of movements performed with different weights in a blocked fMRI experiment in healthy subjects. In line with our a priori hypothesis, we found strong activity in the regions known as the neuromatrix of pain, such as the anterior cingulate (ACC), insula, as well as primary and secondary somatosensory regions. We also found activation in the occipital and temporal regions that are typical for biological motion, as well as regions in the cerebellum and prefrontal cortex. The activation of the somatosensory regions probably serves the judgment of the biological motion stimuli. Activation of the anterior cingulate and the insula might be explained by their role in the integration of behaviorally relevant information. Alternatively, these structures are known to be involved in the processing of nociceptive information and pain. So it seems possible that the interference between judgment of weights and perception of pain in chronic pain patients occurs in the somatosensory areas, anterior cingulate and/or insula. This finding provides important information as to the underlying mechanisms used for the weight judgment task, but also why chronic pain interferes with this task.     

On EMDR: Eye movements during retrieval reduce subjective vividness and objective memory accessibility during future recall

In eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), a treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), patients make eye movements (EM) during trauma recall. Earlier experimental studies found that EM during recall reduces memory vividness during future recalls, and this was taken as laboratory support for the underlying mechanism of EMDR. However, reduced vividness was assessed with self-reports that may be affected by demand characteristics. We tested whether recall+EM also reduces memory vividness on a behavioural reaction time (RT) task. Undergraduates (N=32) encoded two pictures, recalled them, and rated their vividness. In the EM group, one of the pictures was recalled again while making EM. In the no-EM group one of the pictures was recalled without EM. Then fragments from both the recalled and non-recalled pictures, and new fragments were presented and participants rated whether these were (or were not) seen before. Both pictures were rated again for vividness. In the EM group, self-rated vividness of the recalled+EM picture decreased, relative to the non-recalled picture. In the no-EM group there was no difference between the recalled versus non-recalled picture. The RT task showed the same pattern. Reduction of memory vividness due to recall+EM is also evident from non-self-report data.     

Blurring of emotional and non-emotional memories by taxing working memory during recall

Memories that are recalled while working memory (WM) is taxed, e.g., by making eye movements (EM), become blurred during the recall + EM and later recall, without EM. This may help to explain the effects of Eye Movement and Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) in the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in which patients make EM during trauma recall. Earlier experimental studies on recall + EM have focused on emotional memories. WM theory suggests that recall + EM is superior to recall only but is silent about effects of memory emotionality. Based on the emotion and memory literature, we examined whether recall + EM has superior effects in blurring emotional memories relative to neutral memories. Healthy volunteers recalled negative or neutral memories, matched for vividness, while visually tracking a dot that moved horizontally (“recall + EM”) or remained stationary (“recall only”). Compared to a pre-test, a post-test (without concentrating on the dot) replicated earlier findings: negative memories are rated as less vivid after “recall + EM” but not after “recall only”. This was not found for neutral memories. Emotional memories are more taxing than neutral memories, which may explain the findings. Alternatively, transient arousal induced by recall of aversive memories may promote reconsolidation of the blurred memory image that is provoked by EM.     

Brain correlates of subjective freedom of choice

The subjective feeling of free choice is an important feature of human experience. Experimental tasks have typically studied free choice by contrasting free and instructed selection of response alternatives. These tasks have been criticised, and it remains unclear how they relate to the subjective feeling of freely choosing. We replicated previous findings of the fMRI correlates of free choice, defined objectively. We introduced a novel task in which participants could experience and report a graded sense of free choice. BOLD responses for conditions subjectively experienced as free identified a postcentral area distinct from the areas typically considered to be involved in free action. Thus, the brain correlates of subjective feeling of free action were not directly related to any established brain correlates of objectively-defined free action. Our results call into question traditional assumptions about the relation between subjective experience of choosing and activity in the brain’s so-called voluntary motor areas.