Trained interpretive bias and anxiety

The relationship between anxiety and interpretive bias has been studied extensively, but the causal direction of this relationship remains largely unexplored. Do negative interpretations cause anxiety or is anxiety the cause of negative interpretations? Or are the two mutually reinforcing? The present study addressed this issue by experimentally inducing either a negative or a positive interpretive bias using Mathews and Mackintosh' [(2002). Induced emotional interpretation bias and anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 604-615] training paradigm and then examining its impact on state anxiety and anxiety vulnerability. In addition, it was investigated as to whether the interpretive bias was trained implicitly. Results indicated that style of interpreting could be manipulated. That is, when confronted with ambiguous information after the training, participants (n=118) interpreted this information congruent with their (positive or negative) training condition. Data on the issue of implicitness showed that participants tended to be explicitly aware of the valence of their training stimuli. Effects of trained interpretive bias on anxiety were only marginal and absent on anxiety vulnerability. It appears that interpretive bias can be trained reliably, but its effects on mood and vulnerability require further explanation.     

When curiosity killed regret: Avoiding or seeking the unknown in decision-making under uncertainty

In two experimental studies we investigated how curiosity and regret aversion affect decision-making under uncertainty. Building on insights derived from information-gap theory [Loewenstein, G. (1994). The psychology of curiosity: a review and reinterpretation. Psychological Bulletin, 116, 75-98], we demonstrate that curiosity may overcome regret aversion. In Experiment 1, we concentrate on the reluctance to opt for alternatives with uncertain outcomes and demonstrate that curiosity about the uncertain outcomes may override regret aversion. In Experiment 2, we focus on reluctance to expose oneself to potential regret-inducing information and demonstrate that curiosity may overcome this reluctance.     

Work–Family Conflict and Turnover Intentions Among Scientists and Engineers Working in R&D

Purpose  In this study we evaluate competing models of the direct and indirect effects of work interference with family (WIF) and family interference with work (FIW) on two turnover intentions relevant to scientists and engineers: (i) leaving R&D for non-R&D work within the same organization and (ii) leaving one’s organization for another one. Design/methodology/approach  A cross-sectional design was used. Our sample consists of almost 500 scientists and engineers in dual-earner families and with dependent care responsibilities. Findings  We find some support for the domain-specific predictors-to-outcomes model: FIW indirectly (but not directly) increases intentions to change organization through work dissatisfaction. Contrary to expectations from the stress management model we find neither direct nor indirect relationships between WIF and turnover intentions. Implications  Our findings suggest that organizations that help employees manage the effects of FIW on work dissatisfaction may be able to reduce the turnover among their technical workforce. Originality/value  The study examines an overlooked outcome of work-family conflict: turnover intentions. In addition, it provides much needed attention to the implications of workfamily conflict for scientists and engineers, who have received little attention in the work-family conflict literature despite longstanding efforts to understand the relationship between marriage, parenthood, and productivity in these fields.

Retrospective construction of the judgement of free choice

The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. Some authors propose that actions are unconsciously initiated and awareness of intention is referred retrospectively to the action after it has been performed [e.g. Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Wegner, D. M. (2005). On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. Consciousness & Cognition, 14, 439-458]. This contrasts with the common impression that our intentions cause those actions. By combining a stop signal paradigm and an intentional action paradigm we show that participants sometimes indicate to have intentionally initiated an action while reaction time data strongly suggest that they in fact failed to stop the action. In a second experiment we demonstrate that the number of trials in which participants misattributed their awareness of intention varied with the intentional involvement during action planning. Our data support the retrospective account of intentional action. Furthermore, we introduce an experimental approach that objectifies introspective judgments of awareness of intention.     

Take it or leave it for something better? Responses to fair offers in ultimatum bargaining

We investigated if responders accept a 50–50 split in a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which rejection yields a higher payoff (€7) than accepting the equal offer (€5). Therefore, the decision to accept the 50–50 split in this modified ultimatum game cannot be perceived as a self-interest act, as opposed to the standard game, in which acceptance may reflect resignation in the knowledge that the equal split is the best one can expect. A substantial proportion of responders accepts the equal split in this modified game (Study 1), which clearly establishes egalitarian preferences. Further studies show that the willingness to accept is not an artifact of indifference towards the extra payoff (Study 2), but reflects true concerns for proposers’ outcomes (Study 3).     

Repeated checking causes distrust in memory but not in attention and perception

Repeated checking to reduce memory distrust seems to be counterproductive: it increases memory distrust. Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients tend to be uncertain about other cognitive domains as well, like attention and perception. In an experiment with 70 healthy participants, we tested whether perseverative checking induces distrust not only in memory, but also in attention and perception. Participants were administered a computer task in which they had to activate, deactivate, and check threat-irrelevant stimuli, and rate their confidence in memory, attention, and perception in a pre-test and post-test. In between these tests, the relevant checking group performed 20 checks of the same stimuli used in the pre- and post-test. The irrelevant checking group performed 20 checks of different stimuli. Although memory accuracy improved in both groups, repeated checking reduced confidence in memory, vividness, and detail in the relevant checking group, but not in the irrelevant checking group. A trend was found towards a decline in attentional confidence in the relevant checking group only. Perception was not affected by repetitive checking. A replication study revealed similar results of relevant checking on meta-memory, however, the trend for attentional distrust was not confirmed. The results suggest that perseveration may be domain specific, i.e., only the cognitive processes that are subject to perseveration are affected.     

The Neural Bases of Strategy and Skill in Sentence–Picture Verification

This experiment used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to examine the relation between individual differences in cognitive skill and the amount of cortical activation engendered by two strategies (linguistic vs. visual–spatial) in a sentence–picture verification task. The verbal strategy produced more activation in language-related cortical regions (e.g., Broca's area), whereas the visual–spatial strategy produced more activation in regions that have been implicated in visual–spatial reasoning (e.g., parietal cortex). These relations were also modulated by individual differences in cognitive skill: Individuals with better verbal skills (as measured by the reading span test) had less activation in Broca's area when they used the verbal strategy. Similarly, individuals with better visual–spatial skills (as measured by the Vandenberg, 1971, mental rotation test) had less activation in the left parietal cortex when they used the visual-spatial strategy. These results indicate that language and visual–spatial processing are supported by partially separable networks of cortical regions and suggests one basis for strategy selection: the minimization of cognitive workload.     

Cognitive Bias for Pictorial and Linguistic Threat Cues in Children

The present study was designed to test the conditions under which threat-related cognitive bias can be observed in anxious children. Measures of cognitive bias for threatening words and pictures were obtained from spider fearful children (N = 55) and non-fearful children (N = 58) aged 8–11 in the first experiment, and from spider fearful children (N = 44), and two control groups (N = 41; N = 36) aged 8 in the second experiment. Cognitive bias was assessed by the emotional Stroop task. In line with our previous findings, all children aged 8 showed a bias for spider words, but not for spider pictures. However, a relation between spider fear and bias was observed when age was taken into account: bias for spider words decreased with age in the non-fearful children whereas this bias maintained in the fearful group. This differential age effect too replicated earlier findings (Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1997). It is suggested that a bias for threat words is a normal characteristic in children aged 8. During development, normal children learn to inhibit this processing bias, whilst fearful children fail to learn this ability.