Well-being in major depression and social phobia with and without comorbidity

Background/Objective: Lower levels in well-being have been observed in individuals with Major Depression (MDD) and Social Phobia (SP), but well-planned direct comparisons with control individuals, not suffering from a mental disorder, are lacking. Furthermore, MDD is highly comorbid with anxiety disorders, and SP with depressive disorders. This study is among the first to examine differences in well-being in individuals with a clinical diagnosis of MDD or SP compared to individuals with no such diagnosis and to test differences in well-being within the combined diagnostic categories respective with and without anxiety-depressive comorbidity. Method: Participants were 119 individuals with a diagnosis of MDD, 47 SP and 118 controls. Results: Results revealed that overall well-being as well as emotional, psychological, and social well-being were lower in the MDD and SP group compared to the control group. Individuals with comorbidity reported lower well-being than individuals without comorbidity. Conclusions: These findings have clinical implications as presence of comorbidity may require a different therapeutic approach than with no comorbidity.     

Left-handedness and male-male competition: Insights from fighting and hormonal data

Male-male competition can shape some behavioral or morphological traits of males. Here we investigate if this competition could play a role in the persistence of the polymorphism of handedness in human populations. A negative frequency-dependent selection mechanism has been hypothesized, based on the fact that left-handed men may benefit from a "surprise" advantage during fighting interactions because they are rare in human populations. This advantage may thereby enhance the probability of survival of left- handed men and/or their reproductive success through an increase in social status. In this study, we first explored the association between hand preference and lifetime fighting behavior in a population of 1,161 French men. No effect of hand preference on the probability of fighting was detected, suggesting that the innate propensity to fight does not differ between left- and right-handers. However, among men who had been involved in at least one fight during their lifetime, left-handers reported significantly more fights than right-handers. To explore the biological basis of this behavior, we also investigated the testosterone concentration in saliva samples from 64 French university students. Consistent with frequencies of fights, we found a significantly higher average testosterone concentration in left-handers than in right-handers. We suggest that these behavioral and hormonal differences may be acquired throughout life due to previous experiences in a social context and may favor the persistence of left-handers in humans.     

The effects of self-focused attention, performance demand, and dispositional sexual self-consciousness on sexual arousal of sexually functional and dysfunctional men

Sexually functional (N=26) and sexually dysfunctional heterosexual men with psychogenic erectile disorder (N=23) viewed two sexually explicit videos. Performance demand was manipulated through verbal instruction that a substantial genital response was to be expected from the videos. Self-focused attention was manipulated by introducing a camera pointed at the participant. Dispositional self-consciousness was assessed by questionnaire. Performance demand was found to independently inhibit the genital response. No main effect of self-focus was found. Self-focus inhibited genital response in men scoring high on general and sexual self-consciousness traits, whereas it enhanced penile tumescence in low self-conscious men. Inhibition effects were found in both volunteers and patients. No interaction effects of performance demand and self-focus were found. Subjective sexual arousal in sexually functional men was highest in the self-focus condition. In sexually dysfunctional men, subjective sexual response proved dependent on locus of attention as well as presentation order.     

Relations between Big Five personality characteristics and perceived support in adolescents' families

The authors investigated the longitudinal relations between family members' Big Five personality factors and perceived support. Members of 285 two-parent families with 2 adolescent children judged their own and other family members' Big Five factors and the support perceived from the other members on 3 occasions at 12-month intervals. The Big Five factor Agreeableness was particularly related to perceived support. Changes in individuals' Big Five factors were linked to changes in the support they perceived themselves but even more to changes in the support that other family members perceived from them. Results are consistent with the parallel continuities hypothesis: Individual characteristics will be stable when there is stability in the supportive environment, but when the environment is changing, personality tends to change in the same direction, and vice versa.     

Ideal mate personality concepts and compatibility in close relationships: a longitudinal analysis

How 2 personalities may be best combined in a couple has often been answered in terms of similarity in partner's personality characteristics. However, results have been inconsistent. The present study proposed that relationship outcomes should depend more on the similarity between individuals' ideal mate personality concepts (IMPCs) and their partner's personality as both perceived by the self and self-reported by the partner. Study 1 introduces a new Q-sort to assess IMPCs and provides evidence for the interindividual variability and the short-term consistency of IMPC. By following nonmarried couples over a 9-month period, Study 2 replicated findings from Study 1 and demonstrated that, overall, the current concept of congruence predicts relationship outcomes better than both personality similarity and the partner's individual personality traits.     

Dissociation and memory fragmentation: experimental effects on meta-memory but not on actual memory performance

The relation between state dissociation and fragmentary memory was investigated by assessing both actual memory performance and meta-memory. From a sample of 330 normal subjects, two subsamples were selected on basis of trait dissociation, as measured by the Dissociative Experience Scale. Twenty subjects scoring above 30 and 20 subjects scoring below 10 were selected. Subjects watched an extremely aversive film, after which state dissociation was measured by the Peri-traumatic Dissociative Experience Scale. Four hours later memory fragmentation was assessed in two ways. Actual fragmentation was measured by a sequential memory task, and perceived fragmentation (meta-memory) was measured using a visual analogue scale. Subjects who tended to dissociate during the film judged their recollections of the film as more fragmentary. Although this finding is in line with clinical reports given by trauma victims, it was not sustained by objective evidence. That is, no effect was observed of state dissociation on the sequential memory task. The present findings suggest that the claim that dissociation induces memory fragmentation may have to be confined to meta-memory. Implications of this divergence between actual memory and meta-memory are discussed.     

Repeated checking causes memory distrust

This paper attempts to explain why in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) checkers distrust in memory persists despite extensive checking. It is argued that: (1) repeated checking increases familiarity with the issues checked; (2) increased familiarity promotes conceptual processing which inhibits perceptual processing; (3) inhibited perceptual processing makes recollections less vivid and detailed and finally; (4) reduction in vividness and detail promotes distrust in memory. An interactive computer animation was developed in which participants had to perform checking rituals on a virtual gas stove. Two separate experiments were carried out with n=39 (Experiment I) and n=40 (Experiment II) healthy participants. In both studies, the control group and the experimental group were given the same pre-test and post-test on the virtual gas stove. In between, the experimental group engaged in 'relevant checking', i.e. checking the gas stove, while the control group engaged in 'irrelevant checking', i.e. checking virtual light bulbs. In both experiments there were powerful effects of repeated 'relevant checking': while actual memory accuracy remained unaffected, the vividness and detail of the recollections were greatly reduced. Most pertinently, in both experiments relevant checking undermined confidence in memory. No such effects were observed in the control group. One might argue that the pre-test/post-test design may have made the control group anticipate a memory assessment at the post-test and that this artifact made them relatively alert producing memory confidence at post test that was artificially high. A third experiment was carried out (n=2 x 20) in which no pre-test was given while, other than that, Experiment III was identical to the first two experiments. Results confirmed earlier findings: compared to the irrelevant checking control group, recollections in the relevant checking group were non-vivid, non-detailed while confidence in memory was low. The theory and data suggest an answer to the question 'why memory distrust persists despite repetitive checking'. In people who check extensively, memory distrust may persist as a result of repetitive checking. OCD checking may be motivated by the wish to reduce uncertainty, but checking appears to be a counter-productive safety strategy. Rather than reducing doubt, checking fosters doubt and ironically increases meta-memory problems.     

Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction

In earlier experiments using interactive computer animation with healthy subjects, it was found that displaying compulsive-like repeated checking behavior affects memory. That is, checking does not alter actual memory accuracy, but it does affect 'meta-memory': as checking continues, recollections are experienced as less vivid and less detailed while confidence in memory is undermined. This procedure provides a model of OCD checking and suggests that checking is a counterproductive strategy to reduce memory distrust. The present experiment was carried out to specify the phenomenological quality of memory distrust after checking and to see if repeated checking produces a shift in the memory source that is used to decide about the outcome of checking: from 'remembering' to 'knowing' (Tulving, 1985). Using the same interactive computer-animation, the earlier findings on vividness, detail and confidence were replicated. In addition, it was found that checking made participants endorse quotations from OCD patients (Reed, 1985) expressing a specific ambivalence about memory: 'It is as though the memory is there, but is isn't definite enough', 'I remember doing it in a way, but it's all fuzzy....' And 'I can remember that I've done it. But the memory isn't clear somehow'. This finding adds to the validity of the experimental model. Furthermore, after checking subjects' beliefs about the outcome of checking became based on (general) knowing instead of (specific) remembering. It is suggested that OCD checkers feel a general and relatively strong need to be certain about the veracity of recollections and that they have high standards for memory performance. This may explain earlier findings that OCD checkers have a general tendency to distrust their episodic memory. A need for certainty and a critical attitude towards memory performance may not be problematic or abnormal. It is suggested that clinical problems arise when the patient tries to fight memory distrust by repeated checking. The latter does not reduce distrust but rather increases distrust and the patient may get trapped in a spiral of mutually reinforcing checking behavior and memory distrust.     

The role of cognitive variables in psychological functioning after the death of a first degree relative

The present study sought to explore the relationship between negative cognitions and emotional problems after bereavement, with a group of 329 adults who had suffered the loss of a first degree relative. The following cognitions were assessed: global negative beliefs, cognitions about self-blame, negative cognitions about other people's responses after the loss, and negative cognitions about one's own grief reactions. Results showed that each of these cognitive variables was significantly related to the severity of symptoms of traumatic grief, depression and anxiety, even when background and loss-related variables that were initially found to influence symptom severity, were statistically controlled. When the shared variance between the cognitive variables was controlled, it was found that global negative beliefs about life, the world, and the future, and threatening interpretations of grief reactions each explained a unique proportion of variance in traumatic grief symptom severity. Global negative beliefs about life, the self and the future, and threatening interpretations of grief explained most variance in depression, while negative beliefs about the self and threatening interpretations of grief explained most variance in anxiety. Overall, the findings are in support of cognitive theories of grief, and suggest that effective treatment of problematic grief will need to address negative cognitions.