Negative cognitions and avoidance in emotional problems after bereavement: a prospective study

Cognitive behavioural conceptualisations of grief propose that negative cognitions and avoidance strategies play a key role in emotional problems after bereavement. In the current study, this assumption was examined. Ninety-seven individuals who had lost a relative less than 5 months ago completed questionnaires tapping background and loss-related variables, negative cognitions (about the self, life, the future, and one's own grief reactions), avoidance, and symptoms of complicated grief (CG) and depression. Of these mourners, 70 people (72%) completed symptom measures again 6 months later at T2 (7-10 months after the loss), and 60 (62%) completed symptoms measures still 9 months later at T3 (16-19 months after the loss). Among other things, results showed that all four cognitive variables and the avoidance variable were strongly associated with concurrent and prospective symptom levels, even when the influence of relevant background/loss-related variables was controlled. In addition, independent of initial symptom levels, most of the cognitive variables predicted later CG and depression. The avoidance variable only predicted additional variance in depression at T3 beyond T1 symptom levels. Findings indicate that negative cognitions are important in emotional problems after bereavement and that the role of avoidance in the development of these problems needs further scrutiny.     

Development and Validation of a Dutch Translation of the Big Five Inventory (BFI)

The MMPI profiles of 74 low back pain patients who had previously been classified as "functional," "organic," or "mixed" were sorted into six profile groups. The six profile groups were those used by Pichot, Perse, Lekeous, Dureau, Perez, and Rychewaert (1972); denial, "conversion V" without defensiveness, "conversion V" with defensiveness, depressed/anxious, psychotic and normal. Results indicate that all six profile types are welt represented in the low back pain group. Evidence is also presented which shows that each of the pathological MMPI profile types examined across "functional," "organic," and "mixed" classification is significantly more elevated than a normal profile group on two scales (Lb, DOR) designed to measure functional aspects of pain. Pathological MMPI profile groups did not differ significantly from each other on the "functional," pain scales. The data presented in this study point to the relationship of various forms of psychopathology with "functional pain." The findings of this stud v would not support a homogeneous "pain personality" for low back pain patients. However, combined "conversion V" profiles accounted for 58% of the "functional" group, 45% of the "mixed" group and 35% of the "organic" group.     

How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)

T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (see record 2004-15929-012) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.     

Effort Invested in Vain: The Impact of Effort on the Intensity of Disappointment and Regret

Two scenario studies investigated the impact of the investment of instrumental and noninstrumental effort on the intensity of disappointment and regret. The role of effort was investigated in the context of other determinants of disappointment and regret: the desirability of the outcome, its likelihood, and the perceived responsibility for (not) obtaining the outcome. Study 1 shows that after failure, disappointment is more intense after an investment of higher levels of instrumental effort, whereas regret is more intense an investment of less instrumental effort. Study 2 shows that both disappointment and regret are more intense after an investment of higher levels of noninstrumental effort. Further analyses suggest that the effect of instrumental effort on disappointment is due to a direct effect of the investment of effort. The effect of instrumental effort on disappointment was mediated by the perceived likelihood of attaining the outcome and also related to the perceived desirability of the outcome. The impact of instrumental effort on regret was found to be due to a direct effect of the investment of effort, and to the perceived responsibility for not attaining the outcome. The effect of the investment of noninstrumental effort on the intensity of both disappointment and regret was found to be due to a direct effect of effort. Desirability also affected disappointment (with increased desirability leading to higher levels of disappointment), whereas only regret was affected by perceived responsibility. Implications of these findings for the study of disappointment and regret are discussed.     

Author Correction: Social Job Stressors can Foster Employee Well-Being: Introducing the Concept of Social Challenge Stressors

Journal of Business and Psychology - In the published article “Social Job Stressors Can Foster Employee Well-Being: Introducing the Concept of Social Challenge Stressors”, there was an...     

Effects of speaking upon the rate and variability of concurrent finger tapping in children

Tapping rate and variability were measured as 73 normal, right-handed children in Grades 1–4 engaged in speeded unimanual finger tapping with and without concurrent recitation. Speaking reduced the rate of tapping and increased its variability to a greater extent in younger children than in older children. Developmental changes in variability but not rate were attributable to a greater number of lengthy (>500 ms) pauses in the tapping of younger children. Speaking slowed the right hand more than the left, and the degree of this asymmetry was constant across grade levels. The right-hand effect for tapping rate was not attributable to lengthy pauses. In contrast, asymmetric increases in tapping variability occurred only among children in Grade 1 and only when lengthy pauses were included in the data. The results implicate three mechanisms of intertask interference: one involving capacity limitations, a second involving cross-talk between motor control mechanisms for speech and finger movement, respectively, and a third factor involving occasional diversion of attention from tapping to speaking. These mechanisms are discussed in relation to developmental changes in mental capacity.     

Uncertainty about perception and dissociation after compulsive-like staring: Time course of effects

Repeated and compulsive-like checking reduces confidence in memory for the last check. Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients are not only uncertain about memory, but may also be uncertain about perception, while this perceptual uncertainty may be associated with prolonged visual fixation on the object of uncertainty. It was reported earlier that, among healthy participants, prolonged staring at light bulbs or gas rings induces OC-like uncertainty about perception and feelings of dissociation [van den Hout, M. A., Engelhard, I. M., de Boer, C., du Bois, A., & Dek, E. (2008). Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 1300–1304]. In that study, staring continued for 10 min. For patients, however, staring intervals seem to be considerably shorter. To test the clinical credibility of the paradigm as a model of the maintenance of OC perceptual uncertainty, we investigated whether the effects of staring materialize long before 10 min. Five groups of 16 undergraduates participated: one group did not stare at a gas stove while the others stared for 7.5, 15, 30 or 300 s. In the absence of staring, no pre-to-post increase in dissociation/uncertainty was reported, but after staring it was. The larger part of the observed dissociation/uncertainty after 5 min had occurred within 30 s, and around 50% of this maximal increase was reported between 7.5 and 15 s. Thus, even relatively short intervals of staring induce uncertainty about perception and dissociative experiences. Perseverative looking at objects may be a counter-productive OC strategy, which increases uncertainty about perception and may serve to maintain the disorder.