How young children represent sentences: Evidence from the superiority of noun recall from action as compared to stative sequences

Children of the ages of 4 and 7 years recalled nouns from subject-verb-object sentences more efficiently than from noun pairs. Verbs were either stative or active. Preschoolers recalled more nouns from active than stative phrases, whereas the older children showed no such difference, either in a blocked (Experiment 1) or mixed list (Experiment 2) design. Whereas interaction rather than action seems critical for older children, younger children seem better able to retrieve words from action than from stative representations.     

The effects of incorrect pain expectations on acquired fear and pain responses

Previous experimental research on the effects of incorrect intensity expectations of aversive events can be criticized because intensity expectations were not manipulated independently from changes in objective intensity. The present study aims at investigating the effects of incorrect intensity expectations on the immediate and later responses to a painful stimulus, and on the acquisition of anticipatory responses, with proper experimental control. Subjects (n = 62) received 20 painful stimuli of varying intensity. In the control group intensities were correctly signalled on all trials by an analogue signal. On 3 trials the signal was too large in the overprediction condition, and too small in the underestimation condition. Underpredicted painful experiences were related to subsequent higher pain responses on the physiological level, but not on the subjective level; and to increased anticipatory responses (increased pain expectations, uncertainty, subjective fear, skin conductance responses). Skin conductance level also indicated increased fear after underpredicted experiences. Overpredicted painful experiences were related to a faster decrease in subjective fear compared to the control group, but did not influence other variables. The findings support the notion that underpredictions contribute to the acquistion of fear and disrupt habituation processes. The asymmetrical processing of the two kinds of incorrectly predicted experiences is discussed.     

Some notes on the nature of methodological indeterminacy

This paper is an attempt to extend the meaning of the concept of indeterminacy for the human sciences. The authors do this by coining the term methodological indeterminacy and arguing that indeterminacy is better understood when linked to specific methodological techniques. Paradoxically, while specific research techniques demonstrate that the issue of indeterminacy is complex, yielding the possibility of types and degrees, it does not eliminate the problem of translation first raised by Quine. However, the authors go on to argue that, from a research perspective, indeterminacy can and must be approached in such a way that it is possible to reduce cases of it, even though never completely eliminating it in the human sciences.     

Simplified Models Establishing some of Né:zondet's Results on Erdös–Woods Conjecture

The first step of the construction of Nézondet's models of finite arithmetics which are counter-models to Erdös–Woods conjecture is to add to the natural numbers the non-standard numbers generated by one of them, using addition, multiplication and divisions by a natural factor allowed in an ultrapower construction. After a review of some properties of such a structure, we show that the choice of the ultrafilter can be managed, using just the Chinese remainder's theorem, so that a model as desired is obtained as early as at the first time.     

Inaction inertia in retirement saving

In retirement saving, many people miss out on early opportunities to save and subsequently fail to take adequate actions for a long time thereafter. We examined whether these two observations—the initial failure to act and the subsequent inertia—could be related through the phenomenon of inaction inertia. In Experiment 1 (N = 180), participants were less likely to save for retirement when the difference in annual return between the current opportunity and the missed opportunity was large versus small. In Experiment 2 (N = 180), participants were less likely to start saving for retirement when reminded of a missed opportunity 10 years ago versus 1 year ago. These data constitute the first demonstration of inaction inertia in retirement saving: People's reluctance to act on attractive saving opportunities may be induced by their previous inaction. In Experiment 3 (N = 340) and Experiment 4 (N = 628), we find that the observed inertia is the product of a tendency to underestimate exponential growth combined with a focus on past opportunities. Building on this mechanism, Experiment 5 (N = 916) provided evidence for a potential remedy; the inaction inertia effect completely disappeared when focus was shifted from required contributions to future outcomes.     

Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: a theoretical framework

Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.     

Blatant and subtle prejudice: dimensions,determinants, and consequences; some comments on Pettigrew and Meertens

Although it has become common to suggest a conceptual distinction between traditional and contemporary forms of prejudice, Pettigrew and Meertens have actually attempted to distinguish the two empirically and developed measures to gauge each. Replication of their study, on the distinction between blatant and subtle prejudice, discloses a number of methodological flaws that have led to debatable substantial conclusions. We found two distinct measures, however, substantially different from the ones proposed by Pettigrew and Meertens. Our model shows, by all available indices, a better fit to the data: a first broad factor labelled general prejudice, and a small second factor labelled perceived cultural differences. The first factor is well explained by a number of social characteristics; the second is rather poorly explained and has a rather poor discriminatory power. The first one has strong effects on some consequential variables whereas the second has hardly any effects. Other evidence, considered to be crucial by Pettigrew and Meertens, contains other methodological flaws, i.e. the neglect of interdependent items. After this correction, their piece of evidence turns out to be artificial. As a benefit to future research, we try to clarify conditions for distinguishing empirically and conceptually between traditional and contemporary prejudice. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decoupling the past from the present attenuates inaction inertia

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act upon an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. We investigated the boundary conditions of this inaction inertia effect. Based on the mental accounting literature and the transaction decoupling literature we predicted and found in three experiments that tight coupling of the forgone to the current opportunity is a necessary condition for inaction inertia to occur. Inaction inertia decreased when information about the missed opportunity was ambiguous (Experiment 1), when the past opportunity required an extra step to obtain (Experiment 2) and when the past and present opportunity decreased in comparability (Experiment 3). The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed in view of the literature on inaction inertia and on judgment and decision-making. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feeling guilty as a source of information about threat and performance

OCD patients experience increased feelings of guilt, threat and uncertainty about harm prevention. As to the relation between these phenomena, it was hypothesised that the experience of guilt acts as "information" that increases the sense of threat and decreases the sense that preventive action is effective. We tested whether state guilt is used as information about risk and prevention effects and whether people high in trait guilt do so more than others. Participants high and low in trait guilt were included. Three types of affect were experimentally induced: guilt, anxiety and a neutral affect. Then, participants estimated the likelihood and severity of a negative outcome, and the dissatisfaction with preventive performances in two OCD relevant scenarios. Relative to low-trait guilt participants, people high in trait guilt had higher ratings of risk after induction of state guilt. With regards to dissatisfaction with preventive performance, there was only a trend for high-trait guilt participants to respond stronger to state guilt. The results suggest that people with a general inclination to feel guilty use temporary feelings of guilt as information about the threat content of a situation and do so even if the source of state guilt is unrelated to the situation. Implications for the understanding of OCD are discussed.