Changes in natural language use as an indicator of psychotherapeutic change in personality disorders

Word use has been shown to reflect various psychological processes and psychological change. This study examines the self-view in personality disorders (PDs) and its change over the course of therapy using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count analysis procedure. A sample of 299 participants with PDs and 108 community control participants wrote short essays about their lives. Patients repeated the assignment three times over two years and completed assessments of PD-pathology, general psychopathology, PD-beliefs, and quality of life. Results show that as hypothesized the use of words in the 1st Person Singular Pronouns, Negative Emotion, Causation, Past and Future Tense Verbs categories significantly declines over the course of treatment, while the use of Present Tense Verbs and Positive Emotion increases. These categories tend to distinguish patients from non-patients prior to treatment. We also found 12 additional word categories changing over time, including Word Count and Negations. Change in word use statistically predicts better treatment outcome on all outcome measures (p < .001). Reductions in the use of Negative Emotion Words and Negations are the strongest predictors of outcome. The non-hypothesized role of Negations was explored and seemed to reflect that PD-patients miss a lot in their lives. Reduction of what they miss seems central to recovery. This issue seems relatively neglected in theoretical and treatment models of PDs. An increased focus on what patients miss in their lives might improve our understanding and treatment of PDs. In sum, Negative Emotion and Negation word categories appear to reflect key treatment targets.     

Integration of pragmatic and phonetic cues in spoken word recognition

Although previous research has established that multiple top-down factors guide the identification of words during speech processing, the ultimate range of information sources that listeners integrate from different levels of linguistic structure is still unknown. In a set of experiments, we investigate whether comprehenders can integrate information from the 2 most disparate domains: pragmatic inference and phonetic perception. Using contexts that trigger pragmatic expectations regarding upcoming coreference (expectations for either he or she), we test listeners' identification of phonetic category boundaries (using acoustically ambiguous words on the /hi/～/∫i/ continuum). The results indicate that, in addition to phonetic cues, word recognition also reflects pragmatic inference. These findings are consistent with evidence for top-down contextual effects from lexical, syntactic, and semantic cues, but they extend this previous work by testing cues at the pragmatic level and by eliminating a statistical-frequency confound that might otherwise explain the previously reported results. We conclude by exploring the time course of this interaction and discussing how different models of cue integration could be adapted to account for our results.     

Able but unintelligent: including positively stereotyped black subgroups in the stereotype content model

The stereotype content model (SCM) posits that warmth and competence are the key components underlying judgments about social groups. Because competence can encompass different components (e.g., intelligence, talent) different group members may be perceived to be competent for different reasons. Therefore, we believe it may be important to specify the type of competence being assessed when examining perceptions of groups that are positively stereotyped (i.e., Black athletes and musical Blacks). Consistent with the SCM, these subgroups were perceived as high in competence-talent but not in competence-intelligence and low in warmth. Both the intelligence and talent frame of competence fit in the SCM's social structural hypothesis.     

The role of the executive functions in school achievement at the end of Grade 1

The aim of this study was to determine the role of executive functions (EFs) in early school achievement when a variety of potential confounding factors were controlled. Measures of EF (inhibition, flexibility, and working memory) and school readiness were administered to a sample of 85 kindergartners (39 boys and 46 girls, 5-6 years old). School achievement was then assessed at the end of Grade 1. Results show math and reading/writing skills at the end of Grade 1 to be associated with kindergarten EFs. Only working memory contributed uniquely to the variance in school achievement after all covariates (preacademic abilities, affective variables, and family variables) were controlled and, even then, only with respect to math skills. On the other hand, working memory and inhibition had an indirect effect on reading/writing skills via anger-aggression. EF implication in school achievement is discussed in terms of task demands and child age.     

Manipulations of start and food locations affect navigation on a foraging task

Rats were able to search multiple food cups in a foraging task and successfully return to a fixed, but not a variable, start location. Reducing the number of food cups to be searched resulted in an improvement in performance in the variable start condition. Performance was better when only one or two food cups had to be visited but was still impaired if the food was not found in the first cup searched. Variable start locations impaired performance when only one food cup had to be searched, if that cup was moved over the table. These findings suggest that there is an interaction between memory processes and the navigational processes that allows an animal to return to its start location after a foraging trip. It appears that a fixed location for the food or the start point of a foraging trip is a necessary precondition for accurate performance.     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

Category rating is based on prototypes and not instances: evidence from feedback-dependent context effects

Context effects in category rating on a 7-point scale are shown to reverse direction depending on feedback. Context (skewed stimulus frequencies) was manipulated between and feedback within subjects in two experiments. The diverging predictions of prototype- and exemplar-based scaling theories were tested using two representative models: ANCHOR and INST. To gain coverage on one side of the continuum, a prototype-based category must lose on the opposite side. ANCHOR can exhibit both assimilative and compensatory context effects depending on feedback. INST always exhibits assimilative effects. The human data show a significant context-by-feedback interaction. The main context effect is assimilative in one data set and compensatory in the other. This pattern is consistent with ANCHOR but rules out INST, which fails to account for the compensatory effect and the interaction. This suggests that human category rating is based on unitary representations.     

Young infants' eye movements over "natural" scenes and "experimental" scenes

Eye movements of 30 4-month-olds were tracked as infants viewed animals and vehicles in “natural” scenes and, for comparison, in homogeneous “experimental” scenes. Infants showed equivalent looking time preferences for natural and experimental scenes overall, but fixated natural scenes and objects in natural scenes more than experimental scenes and objects in experimental scenes and shifted fixations between objects and contexts more in natural than in experimental scenes. The findings show how infants treat objects and contexts in natural scenes and suggest that they treat more commonly used experimental scenes differently.     

Emotional speech processing: disentangling the effects of prosody and semantic cues

To inform how emotions in speech are implicitly processed and registered in memory, we compared how emotional prosody, emotional semantics, and both cues in tandem prime decisions about conjoined emotional faces. Fifty-two participants rendered facial affect decisions (Pell, 2005a), indicating whether a target face represented an emotion (happiness or sadness) or not (a facial grimace), after passively listening to happy, sad, or neutral prime utterances. Emotional information from primes was conveyed by: (1) prosody only; (2) semantic cues only; or (3) combined prosody and semantic cues. Results indicated that prosody, semantics, and combined prosody-semantic cues facilitate emotional decisions about target faces in an emotion-congruent manner. However, the magnitude of priming did not vary across tasks. Our findings highlight that emotional meanings of prosody and semantic cues are systematically registered during speech processing, but with similar effects on associative knowledge about emotions, which is presumably shared by prosody, semantics, and faces.