Memory search: When does semantic analysis occur?

This study was addressed to the determination of the stage at which semantic analysis occurs during a STM recognition task. A list of exemplars (memory set), drawn from 13 different categories, was presented at a rate of 11/2 sec/item, followed by a category name probe. Ss then indicated whether any of the exemplars in the memory set belonged to that category. List length was varied from 5 to 7, with each memory set containing items from either two or three categories. It was found that RT was independent of list length, but did increase by 60 msec as the number of categories represented in the list increased from two to three. From this, it was concluded that activation of a superordinate category representation occurred upon presentation of each memory-set item, and that the memory scan was done on these superordinate categories.     

Religiosity, Personality, and Happiness: A Study among Israeli Male Undergraduates

A sample of 203 male Hebrew speaking undergraduate students completed the Hebrew translation of the Oxford Happiness Inventory together with the Katz–Francis Scale of Attitude toward Judaism and the short form of the Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. The data demonstrate that Eysenck's dimensional model of personality provides significant prediction of individual differences in both attitude toward Judaism and happiness. After taking personality into account there is a small but statistically significant positive correlation between religiosity and happiness.     

Local pragmatics in a Gricean framework

The pragmatic framework developed by H.P. Grice in “Logic and Conversation” explains how a speaker can mean something more than, or different from, the conventional meaning of the sentence she utters. But it has been argued that the framework cannot give a similar explanation for cases where these pragmatic effects impact the understood content of an embedded clause, such as the antecedent of a conditional, a clausal disjunct, or the clausal complement of a verb. In this paper, I show that such an explanation is available. One of the central arguments of the paper (Section 2) is that in a significant subset of cases, local pragmatic effects are a consequence of a global (utterance-level) pragmatic requirement. In these cases, local pragmatic effects are a consequence of ‘acting locally’ to resolve a potential global pragmatic violation. These cases do not require us to posit application of pragmatic principles (Maxims of Conversation) to the contents of embedded clauses. The account does, though, require the assumption that interpreters can identify and reason about the contents of unasserted sub-parts of sentences, an assumption that I motivate in section 3. Building on this, in section 4 of the paper, I argue that once we have recognized that interpreters can, and do, reason independently about the contents of non-asserted clauses, it becomes unproblematic to assume that in some cases, Gricean conversational principles do apply directly to these contents, providing an alternative route to account for local pragmatic effects. In revisiting the ideas of this paper in my response to the commentaries, I consider in more detail the revisions to Grice’s broader program that are necessitated by these moves, in particular acknowledging the problematicity of Grice’s notion of what is said. I argue that the starting point for Gricean reconstructions should instead be merely what is expressed, which carries no pragmatic commitments regarding what is speaker meant.