Thinking through uncertainty: nonconsequential reasoning and choice.

When thinking under uncertainty, people often do not consider appropriately each of the relevant branches of a decision tree, as required by consequentialism. As a result they sometimes violate Savage's sure-thing principle. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, for example, many subjects compete when they know that the opponent has competed and when they know that the opponent has cooperated, but cooperate when they do not know the opponent's response. Newcomb's Problem and Wason's selection task are also interpreted as manifestations of nonconsequential decision making and reasoning. The causes and implications of such behavior, and the notion of quasi-magical thinking, are discussed.     

Inaccurate reporting and inappropriate variables: a reply to Vecchio's (1990) examination of cognitive resource theory.

In an article in the Journal of Applied Psychology, Vecchio (1990) purported to test cognitive resource theory (Fiedler, 1986; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). We present evidence that Vecchio's article seriously misrepresented previous work on cognitive resource theory and also contained several flaws in methodology that call into question his conclusions regarding the validity of cognitive resource theory.     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

The Effect of Contextual Factors on Individuals' Job Performance

The intent of this study is to apply a cross-level design to examine the influence of contextual factors upon individuals' performance. The results support the hypothesis that peer group characteristics predict individual performance beyond individual characteristics. The implications for using a cross-level approach to study the effects of contextual variables on individual-level phenomena are discussed.     

Stability/Instability of Cognitive Strategies Across Tasks Determine Whether Stress Will Affect Judgmental Processes'

Previous research indicates that individuals employ various cognitive heuristics and decision modes in making decisions and judgmental tasks that do not follow an expected value model. It further indicates that several cognitive faculties are affected by stress. The purpose of this study was twofold: first, to examine whether individual differences exist in the use of cognitive heuristics and risk-assessment decision modes; second, to examine whether stress would affect the use of these cognitive strategies. Three versions of a questionnaire measuring the representativeness and availability heuristics, and risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes were administered to three different groups of subjects. Consistent individual differences were only observed in the subscales measuring risk-seeking and risk-aversion modes, but not in the use of the heuristics. In a different group of subjects, exposure to noise and task overload stress increased the use of the representativeness heuristic, but did not alter the use of risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes. These results indicate that the existence of individual differences in cognitive strategies may determine, in part, whether stress will modify judgmental processes.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

Handgun Ownership and the Religion Factor

This article addresses the relationship between religious affiliation and a very specific form of firearms ownership, that is, handgun ownership. Literature is reviewed relative to explanations of gun ownership. A test of the hypothesized relationship between religious affiliation and handgun ownership demonstrated a statistically significant ( p < 0.03) association. Protestants were found to have a disproportionately high level of handgun ownership compared to other religious groups. Speculation for this finding is reviewed relative to other recent research on this topic.     

On the special status of "ego threats".

This article comments on a recent article by Heatherton, Herman, and Polivy (1991) in which they suggest that ego threats are a prerequisite to affectively induced disinhibition of food intake in restrained eaters and current dieters. In contrast, the present review suggests that mood induction procedures that involve no apparent threat (e.g., viewing a frightening film) can also prompt disinhibition in restrained eaters. Thus, any mood induction procedure that does not directly physically threaten the S may disinhibit restrained eaters. It is concluded that recommendations to focus future research on ego threats are premature and may serve to obscure the mechanisms by which changes in affective state influence food intake in dieters.