Developing Pairwise Preference-Based Personality Test and Experimental Investigation of Its Resistance to Faking Effect by Item Response Model

Recent years have shown increased awareness of the importance of personality tests in educational, clinical, and occupational settings, and developing faking-resistant personality tests is a very pragmatic issue for achieving more precise measurement. Inspired by Stark (2002) and Stark, Chernyshenko, and Drasgow (2005), we develop a pairwise preference-based personality test that aims to measure multidimensional personality traits using a large-scale statement bank. An experiment compares the resistance of the developed personality test to faking with that of rating scale-based personality tests in the item response theory model framework. Results show that latent traits estimated from the personality test based on the rating scale method are severely biased, and that faking effect can be pragmatically ignored in the personality test developed based on the pairwise preference method.     

Evaluation of a Web-based introductory psychology course: II. Contingency management to increase use of on-line study aids

In a Web-based general psychology course, students were observed to postpone use of on-line study aids until 2 days prior to examinations, thus negating any influence of advance organizers (Taraban, Maki, & Rynearson, 1999). We attempted to modify this behavior by providing course credit in the form of short quizzes as rewards for using on-line study aids to preview each chapter. Some students received quizzes after previewing frequently asked questions (FAQ); other students received quizzes after previewing chapter outlines. Students who received quizzes for previewing FAQ pages accessed those pages more frequently than did students who received quizzes for previewing outline pages. Increased access to FAQs was associated with higher scores on FAQ-related midterm examination questions. However, the advantage on examination items was not apparent on a cumulative final examination. Navigational structures and reward values need to be considered when one is managing contingencies in Web courses.     

Branding ‘Canadian Experience’ in Immigration Policy: Nation Building in a Neoliberal Era

This paper examines the branding of ‘Canadian experience’ in Canadian immigration policy as a rhetorical strategy for neoliberal nation-building. Since 2008, the Canadian government has introduced an unprecedented number of changes to immigration policy. While the bulk of these policies produce more temporary and precarious forms of migration, the Canadian government has mobilized the rhetoric of ‘Canadian experience’ as a means to identify immigrants who carry the promise of economic and social integration. Through a critical discourse analysis of Canadian print media and political discourse, we trace how the brand of Canadian experience taps into the affective value of national identity in an era of global economic insecurity. We also illustrate how the discourse of Canadian experience (CE) remains ideologically deracialized, such that the government’s embrace of CE as an immigrant selection criterion dismisses the discriminatory effects that this discourse is shown to have for racialized immigrants in Canada.     

Putting the psychology back into psychological models: Mechanistic versus rational approaches

Two basic approaches to explaining the nature of the mind are the rational and the mechanistic approaches. Rational analyses attempt to characterize the environment and the behavioral outcomes that humans seek to optimize, whereas mechanistic models attempt to simulate human behavior using processes and representations analogous to those used by humans. We compared these approaches with regard to their accounts of how humans learn the variability of categories. The mechanistic model departs in subtle ways from rational principles. In particular, the mechanistic model incrementally updates its estimates of category means and variances through error-driven learning, based on discrepancies between new category members and the current representation of each category. The model yields a prediction, which we verify, regarding the effects of order manipulations that the rational approach does not anticipate. Although both rational and mechanistic models can successfully postdict known findings, we suggest that psychological advances are driven primarily by consideration of process and representation and that rational accounts trail these breakthroughs.     

Egocentric spatial framework effects from single and multiple points of view

In three experiments, we tested the one-place, one-perspective rule formulated by Franklin, Tversky, and Coon (1992). This rule proposes that subjects take a neutral, external perspective when they must use multiple viewpoints to make decisions about the locations of objects in memorized scenes. We compared responding from a single viewpoint with responding from two viewpoints. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a sentence verification procedure, and in Experiment 3, we compared a true-false verification procedure with a six-alternative forced-choice procedure. Under these various conditions, we observed egocentric spatial framework effects in that above-below judgments were faster than front-back judgments and front-back judgments were faster than right-left judgments. When responding from two points of view in a single place, our subjects took multiple intrinsic perspectives rather than one neutral external perspective as proposed by the one-place, one-perspective rule.     

Metamemory for narrative text

In this experiment, we investigated metamemory for narrative text passages. Subjects read two stories and made memory predictions for the idea units in one and rated the importance of ideas in the other. Half of the subjects were asked to recall the story immediately after reading the passages and half were asked to recall 1 week later; half received passages with single inconsistent idea units and half received passages with corresponding consistent idea units. All subjects made confidence judgments about the accuracy of their recall. Subjects’ prediction ratings were related to recall, as shown by significant prediction accuracy quotients. Importance ratings were related to recall on the delayed test but not on the immediate test. Memory prediction ratings predicted recall better than did importance ratings. The absolute level of memory predictions did not differ with delay, but subjects did give higher confidence judgments on an immediate than on a delayed test. Subjects recalled the inconsistent idea better than the consistent idea for one story but not for the other. For both stories, subjects predicted that they would remember the inconsistent ideas better, suggesting that they have avon Restorff-type view, rather than a schema view, of memory. We conclude that subjects can predict their memory for the idea units in narrative text.