Confidence in memory and other cognitive processes in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Previous studies have implicated beliefs about one's memory (i.e., meta-memory), in maintaining the symptoms of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD), particularly with respect to checking rituals. However, most research has focused on task- or situation-specific perceptions about memory performance. Expanding on this research, we undertook two studies with analogue and clinical cohorts to examine the relationship between general ‘trait’ beliefs about memory and related processes and OCD symptoms. Trait meta-memory as measured in the current study was conceptualised as a multi-dimensional construct encompassing a range of beliefs about memory and related processes including confidence in one's general memory abilities, decision-making abilities, concentration and attention, as well as perfectionistic standards regarding one's memory. Meta-memory factors were associated with OCD symptoms, predicting OCD symptoms over-and-above mood and other OCD-relevant cognitions. Meta-memory factors were found to be particularly relevant to checking symptoms. Implications for theory and research are discussed.     

Toward mindful social comparison: When subjective and objective selves are mutually exclusive

Although mindless evaluations typically accompany social comparisons, they are not necessary, and may be costly. We describe how mindlessness enters the social comparison process at two points. First, during the social comparison both self and other are mindlessly de-contextualized, through (1) biased selection of relevant behaviors, (2) biased selection of criteria along which behaviors are compared, (3) lack of knowledge of intent behind behavior, (4) lack of knowledge about representativeness of behavior, (5) lack of knowledge about typicality of future behavior as moderated by learning, (6) improper understanding of the meaning of behavior, and (7) lack of knowledge about motivations generating the comparisons. Second, the affective results of the social comparison are often mindlessly generalized to the global self, while the breadth and complexity of the network of attributes that constitute to the ‘self’ is ignored. Global-self-evaluative social comparisons forfeit the potential of gaining accurate and usable information about personal attributes.     

Adaptive processing of fractions — Evidence from eye-tracking

Recent evidence indicated that fraction pair type determined whether a particular fraction is processed holistically, componentially or in a hybrid manner. Going beyond previous studies, we investigated how participants adapt their processing of fractions not only to fraction type, but also to experimental context. To examine adaptation in fraction processing, we recorded participants' eye-fixation behaviour in a fraction magnitude comparison task.     

Postgraduate Clinical Psychology Placements in Victoria: The Experience of Students and Supervisors

In a recent study conducted at Swinburne University of Technology, researchers examined the challenges involved in coordinating, undertaking, and supervising clinical psychology placements within Victoria. The aim of the investigation was to develop and improve strategies ensuring the sustainable provision of university‐based postgraduate psychology programmes. Results provide detailed information about the components involved in this multifaceted problem. Findings indicate that those involved in clinical placements within university training programmes in Victoria are experiencing major difficulties and that these difficulties raise serious concerns regarding the future provision of clinical placements within the postgraduate system. This article focuses on student and supervisor experiences and perspectives. Implications are discussed.     

Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation

This paper explores in detail an argument for epistemic expressivism, what we call the Argument from Motivation. While the Argument from Motivation has sometimes been anticipated, it has never been set out in detail. The argument has three premises, roughly, that certain judgments expressed in attributions of knowledge are intrinsically motivating in a distinct way (P1); that motivation for action requires desire-like states or conative attitudes (HTM); and that the semantic content of knowledge attributions cannot be specified without reference to the intrinsically motivating judgments that such attributions express (P2). We argue that these premises entail a version of ecumenical expressivism. Since the argument from motivation has not been explicitly stated before, there is no current discussion of the argument. In this paper we therefore consider and reject various objections that one might propose to the argument, including some that stem from the idea that knowledge is factive, or that knowledge involves evidence that rules out relevant alternatives. Other objections to (P1) specifically might be derived from cases of apparent lack of epistemic motivation considered in in Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003) and Brown (Nous 42(2):167–189, 2008), as well as from general forms of externalism about epistemic motivation. We consider these and find them wanting. Finally, the paper offers some critical remarks about the prospect of denying (P2).     

Scarcity,engagement, and value

Scarcity has been found to intensify value, positive or negative, rather than simply enhancing it. Some researchers have proposed that scarcity affects value by increasing how much attention is paid to a stimulus. We conceptualized sustained attention as stronger engagement and operationalized a situation of scarcity by telling participants who were choosing between two objects that the object that was chosen would then be replaced (Replenish) or not replaced (Scarce). To distinguish sustained attention-stronger engagement in a situation of scarcity from grabbing attention (salience from distinctiveness), the choice was between one option with a single instance (solitary-high salience) and a second option with several duplicates (abundant-low salience). We predicted that stronger engagement from a situation of scarcity would, first, intensify the value of the chosen item regardless of whether it was solitary or abundant, with positive items becoming more positive and negative items becoming more negative, and second, the stronger engagement from the situation of scarcity would transfer intensification to another separate object in the same setting. The results of Studies 1 and 2 supported both of these predictions. Study 3 tested a boundary condition for these scarcity–engagement effects in terms of how real participants experienced the choice items to be, where ‘realness’ is another source of engagement strength. As expected, the scarcity–engagement effect on intensifying value was replicated for participants who experienced the activity as real but was eliminated for those who did not.     

Auditory distractor processing in sequential selection tasks

In this review, we analyze the cognitive processes contributing to selection in audition. In particular, we focus on the processing of auditory distractors in sequential selection paradigms in which target stimuli are accompanied by distractors. We review the evidence from two established tasks, namely the auditory negative priming and the auditory distractor–response binding task, and discuss the cognitive mechanisms contributing to the results typically observed in these tasks. In fact, several processes have been suggested as to explain how distractors are processed and handled in audition; that is, auditory distractors can be inhibited, encoded with a do-not-respond-tag, integrated into a stimulus–response episode containing the response to the target, or upheld in working memory and matched/mismatched with the following distractor. In addition, variables possibly modulating these cognitive processes are discussed. Finally, auditory distractor processing is compared with distractor processing in vision.     

Attention meets binding: Only attended distractors are used for the retrieval of event files

Response-irrelevant stimuli can be encoded with, and later on retrieve, a response given to a relevant stimulus, an effect that is called distractor–response binding. In three experiments using a prime–probe design, we investigated whether the allocation of attention modulates the processes contributing to distractor–response binding. Participants identified letters via keypresses while attending to one of two sets of simultaneously presented but response-irrelevant number stimuli. In different experiments, both spatial attention and feature-based attention were allocated to the response-irrelevant stimuli. The results showed that only attended response-irrelevant stimuli elicited effects of distractor–response binding. In particular, while the encoding of response-irrelevant stimuli and responses was not particularly affected by attention during prime processing, only attended response-irrelevant stimuli in the probe retrieved previous responses. Hence, we show that attention affects action regulation due to modulating the influence of stimulus–response binding on behavior.