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171.
Object Exploration and a Problem with Reductionism 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
The purpose of this paper is to use neuroscientific evidence to address the philosophical issue of intertheoretic reduction.
In particular, we present a literature review and a new experiment to show that the reduction of cognitive psychology to neuroscience
is implausible. To make this case, we look at research using object exploration, an important experimental paradigm in neuroscience,
behavioral genetics and psychopharmacology. We show that a good deal of object exploration research is potentially confounded
precisely because it assumes that psychological generalizations can be reduced to neuroscientific ones. 相似文献
172.
173.
In this paper we present the syntax and semantics of a temporal action language named Alan, which was designed to model interactive multimedia presentations where the Markov property does not always hold. In general,
Alan allows the specification of systems where the future state of the world depends not only on the current state, but also on
the past states of the world. To the best of our knowledge, Alan is the first action language which incorporates causality with temporal formulas. In the process of defining the effect of
actions we define the closure with respect to a path rather than to a state, and show that the non-Markovian model is an extension
of the traditional Markovian model. Finally, we establish relationship between theories of Alan and logic programs. 相似文献
174.
The fixed point combinator (Y) is an important non-proper combinator, which is defhable from a combinatorially complete base. This combinator guarantees
that recursive equations have a solution. Structurally free logics (LC) turn combinators into formulas and replace structural rules by combinatory ones. This paper introduces the fixed point and
the dual fixed point combinator into structurally free logics. The admissibility of (multiple) cut in the resulting calculus is not provable by a simple adaptation of the similar proof for LC with proper combinators. The novelty of our proof—beyond proving the cut for a newly extended calculus–is that we add a fourth induction to the by-and-large Gentzen-style proof.
Presented by Robert Goldblatt 相似文献
175.
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177.
The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted
propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues
for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for
a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial
language and (ii) provides a logical calculus of rationally accepted formulas that preserves rational acceptance under consequence.
The essay explores the merit and scope of the structural view by observing that some limitations to a recent framework advanced
James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens are traced to their framework satisfying the first of these two conditions but not the second. 相似文献
178.
179.
The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself
is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source
of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while
denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the
subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation).
On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different
worlds.
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
180.
Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account. 相似文献