Book reviews

New Religious Movements in the United States and Canada. A Critical Assessment and Annotated Bibliography Compiled by Diane Choquette Greenwood Press, London, 1985 £39.95 pp.235

Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy. B. Hallen and J.O. Spdipo. Ethnographica, London, 1986. Pp 1–38

Sectes Nouvelles. Un regard neuf.. Jean‐Francois Mayer. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1985. ISBN 2–204–02458–9. 130 pp.

Restoring die Kingdom: The Radical Christianity of the House Church Movement. Andrew Walker Hodder and Stoughton, London, Sydney, Aukland, Toronto, 1985 298 pages (P/B) £5.95

Bhagwan: The God that failed . Hugh Milne. London: Caliban Books. ISBN 1 85066 0069. £12, 316pp.

Is There a New Imbalance in the Jewish‐Christian Relation?. Antonio Barboso da Silva Uppsala University, Uppsala 1985. 220 pages

Sociological Theory, Religion and Collective Action. Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce The Queen's University Press, Belfast, 1986 i‐xi, 395 pp. Hdbk.

The Way of the Heart: The Rajneesh Movement. Judith Thompson & Paul Heelas Aquarian Press, Wellingborough, pp. 142, £5.99     

Learning artificial orthographies: Further evidence of a nonanalytic acquisition procedure

Previous research (Byrne, 1984) showed that adults who learned to read an orthography representing phonetic features (voicing, place of articulation) did not readily obtain usable knowledge of the mapping of phonetic features onto orthographic elements, as evidenced by failure to generalize to partially new stimuli. The present Experiment 1 used a different method of detecting learning savings during acquisition. Subjects learned a set of complex symbols standing for phones, with the elements representing voicing and place. In a second acquisition set, the signs for voicing were reversed. Learning speed was not affected, which was consistent with the claim that feature-element links went unnoticed in initial acquisition. In Experiment 2, some subjects were instructed to "find the rule" embodied in the orthography. None did, and acquisition rates were no different from those of uninstructed subjects. In Experiment 3, subjects had 4 h of training on the orthography, with consistent feature-symbol mapping for half of the subjects and arbitrary pairings for the remainder. No reaction time advantage emerged in the consistent condition, which is further evidence of nonanalytic acquisition. The results are related to data from children learning to read.     

Causal conditionals and counterfactuals

Causal counterfactuals e.g., 'if the ignition key had been turned then the car would have started' and causal conditionals e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' are understood by thinking about multiple possibilities of different sorts, as shown in six experiments using converging evidence from three different types of measures. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that conditionals that comprise enabling causes, e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' primed people to read quickly conjunctions referring to the possibility of the enabler occurring without the outcome, e.g., 'the ignition key was turned and the car did not start'. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that people paraphrased causal conditionals by using causal or temporal connectives (because, when), whereas they paraphrased causal counterfactuals by using subjunctive constructions (had…would have). Experiments 3a and 3b showed that people made different inferences from counterfactuals presented with enabling conditions compared to none. The implications of the results for alternative theories of conditionals are discussed.     

Individual prediction of dyslexia by single versus multiple deficit models

The overall goals of this study were to test single versus multiple cognitive deficit models of dyslexia (reading disability) at the level of individual cases and to determine the clinical utility of these models for prediction and diagnosis of dyslexia. To accomplish these goals, we tested five cognitive models of dyslexia--two single-deficit models, two multiple-deficit models, and one hybrid model--in two large population-based samples, one cross-sectional (Colorado Learning Disability Research Center) and one longitudinal (International longitudinal Twin Study). The cognitive deficits included in these cognitive models were in phonological awareness, language skill, and processing speed and/or naming speed. To determine whether an individual case fit one of these models, we used two methods: 1) the presence or absence of the predicted cognitive deficits, and 2) whether the individual's level of reading skill best fit the regression equation with the relevant cognitive predictors (i.e., whether their reading skill was proportional to those cognitive predictors.) We found that roughly equal proportions of cases met both tests of model fit for the multiple deficit models (30-36%) and single deficit models (24-28%); hence, the hybrid model provided the best overall fit to the data. The remaining roughly 40% of cases in each sample lacked the deficit or deficits that corresponded with their best-fitting regression model. We discuss the clinical implications of these results for both diagnosis of school-age children and preschool prediction of children at risk for dyslexia.     

The De‐biasing Effect of Incidental Anger on Other‐provided Anchors

The current research investigates the effect of incidental anger on anchoring bias. We hypothesized that feeling angry will make people less influenced by other‐provided anchors because of the moving against action tendency associated with anger. That is, individuals in an angry state will be likely to perceive a given anchor as a viable target for their desire to attack and actively seek out anchor‐inconsistent information, thereby committing less anchoring bias. To examine our hypothesis, in Study 1, we manipulated emotions using film clips and administered a general knowledge task with other‐provided anchors. As predicted, participants in the anger condition showed less anchoring bias to the other‐provided anchors than those in the sad or neutral condition. Study 2 replicated the finding with a different emotion manipulation technique and different anchoring questions. More important, consistent with the moving against action tendency explanation, we also found that people in an angry state committed more anchoring bias for self‐generated anchors, compared with people in a sad or neutral state. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.