Evidence of System Justification in Young Children

The near ubiquity of ingroup preference is consistent with the view that it is an automatic consequence of social categorization, possibly a basic foundation of intergroup relations. However, research with adults has demonstrated that automatic ingroup preference is notably absent among less dominant, less advantaged groups, an outcome predicted by System Justification Theory ( Jost & Banaji, 1994 ). How basic is this tendency to justify existing social arrangements? Data from young children are crucial in addressing whether such an opposing orientation is itself a fundamental feature of intergroup social cognition. The developmental data summarized here suggest that knowledge about the relative status of one’s ingroup is absorbed and internalized sufficiently early in life, revealing system‐justifying tendencies by age 5, the earliest age such questions have been examined to date. Across several studies summarized here young children from non‐dominant groups failed to show an implicit ingroup preference, similar to their adult counterparts. We conclude that from an early age intergroup preferences are constrained by knowledge, implicit or explicit, about the relative status differences among groups and may suggest an orientation toward supporting existing social and political structures. The possibility that system‐justifying tendencies may exist in even younger children remains open for future tests.     

Citizenship’s tangled web: Associations,gaps and tensions in formulations of European youth active citizenship across disciplines

Abstract

How does academic literature across various disciplines conceptualize and empirically address active citizenship? What are the potential benefits and dangers of dominant epistemological and ideological perspectives on ‘good citizenship’? Our paper engages with these questions by drawing on literature across 12 disciplines. We used textual analysis software T-LAB to quantify and visualize co-occurrences, word associations and thematic clusters in the abstracts of 770 texts gathered by eight country teams and original in-depth qualitative analyses of ideological positions and discourses taken up in a selection of key texts across the corpus. Our paper elaborates the findings: that many of the key themes surrounding young people and citizenship in the literature share little or no connection with European citizenship; that there is a significant gap in the literature on young European citizens; and that studies connected to internal, status-based factors connected to citizenship are far more prevalent than those examining external, practice-based factors or dissidence and dissent. Our conclusions examine the potential normative implications of the disjuncture between dominant conceptions and critical accounts of youth active citizenship.     

Mood and heuristics: the influence of happy and sad states on sensitivity and bias in stereotyping

The influence of mood states on the propensity to use heuristics as expressed in stereotypes was examined using signal detection statistics. Participants experienced happy, neutral, or sad moods and "remembered" whether names connoting race (African American, European American) belonged to social categories (criminal, politician, basketball player). Positive mood increased reliance on heuristics, indexed by higher false identification of members of stereotyped groups. Positive mood lowered sensitivity (d'), even among relative experts, and shifted bias (beta) or criterion to be more lenient for stereotypical names. In contrast, sad mood did not disrupt sensitivity and, in fact, revealed the use of a stricter criterion compared with baseline mood. Results support theories that characterize happy mood as a mental state that predisposes reliance on heuristics and sad mood as dampening such reliance.     

The development of implicit attitudes. Evidence of race evaluations from ages 6 and 10 and adulthood

To understand the origin and development of implicit attitudes, we measured race attitudes in White American 6-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults by first developing a child-oriented version of the Implicit Association Test (Child IAT). Remarkably, implicit pro-White/anti-Black bias was evident even in the youngest group, with self-reported attitudes revealing bias in the same direction. In 10-year-olds and adults, the same magnitude of implicit race bias was observed, although self-reported race attitudes became substantially less biased in older children and vanished entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable attitudes toward Whites and Blacks. These data are the first to show an asymmetry in the development of implicit and explicit race attitudes, with explicit attitudes becoming more egalitarian and implicit attitudes remaining stable and favoring the in-group across development. We offer a tentative suggestion that mean levels of implicit and explicit attitudes diverge around age 10.     

Implicit and explicit ethnocentrism: revisiting the ideologies of prejudice

Two studies investigated relationships among individual differences in implicit and explicit prejudice, right-wing ideology, and rigidity in thinking. The first study examined these relationships focusing on White Americans' prejudice toward Black Americans. The second study provided the first test of implicit ethnocentrism and its relationship to explicit ethnocentrism by studying the relationship between attitudes toward five social groups. Factor analyses found support for both implicit and explicit ethnocentrism. In both studies, mean explicit attitudes toward out groups were positive, whereas implicit attitudes were negative, suggesting that implicit and explicit prejudices are distinct; however, in both studies, implicit and explicit attitudes were related (r = .37, .47). Latent variable modeling indicates a simple structure within this ethnocentric system, with variables organized in order of specificity. These results lead to the conclusion that (a) implicit ethnocentrism exists and (b) it is related to and distinct from explicit ethnocentrism.     

Group entitativity and group perception: associations between physical features and psychological judgment

Two experiments tested whether the perceived entitativity of groups (i.e., cohesiveness) influences judgments about those groups, in terms of both their observable physical properties and underlying psychological traits. Entitativity was manipulated with groups whose members were similar or dissimilar in skin color. Experiment 1 demonstrated that beliefs about entitativity elicited more accurate judgments of skin color for entitative than nonentitative social groups, although memory for individual members of entitative groups was relatively impoverished. Experiment 2 revealed that entitative groups were viewed as not only physically similar but also psychologically homogeneous and elicited strong negative trait and behavioral judgments. Together, these findings suggest that physical properties (e.g., similarity) can create perceptions of psychological "groupness" that have important consequences for group perception.     

Easier done than undone: asymmetry in the malleability of implicit preferences

Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported counterparts; the relevant empirical record, however, is mixed. To advance the debate, the authors conducted 4 experiments investigating how readily automatic preferences for one imagined social group over another could be induced or reversed. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that automatic preferences, like self-reported ones, could be readily induced by both abstract supposition and concrete learning. In contrast, Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that newly formed automatic preferences, unlike self-reported ones, could not be readily reversed by either abstract supposition or concrete learning. Thus, the relative inflexibility of implicit attitudes appears to entail, not immunity to sophisticated cognition, nor resistance to swift formation, but insensitivity to modification once formed.     

Math = male,me = female,therefore math not = me

College students, especially women, demonstrated negativity toward math and science relative to arts and language on implicit measures. Group membership (being female), group identity (self = female), and gender stereotypes (math = male) were related to attitudes and identification with mathematics. Stronger implicit math = male stereotypes corresponded with more negative implicit and explicit math attitudes for women but more positive attitudes for men. Associating the self with female and math with male made it difficult for women, even women who had selected math-intensive majors, to associate math with the self. These results point to the opportunities and constraints on personal preferences that derive from membership in social groups.