Evolutionary Constraints on Human Object Perception

Language and culture endow humans with access to conceptual information that far exceeds any which could be accessed by a non‐human animal. Yet, it is possible that, even without language or specific experiences, non‐human animals represent and infer some aspects of similarity relations between objects in the same way as humans. Here, we show that monkeys’ discrimination sensitivity when identifying images of animals is predicted by established measures of semantic similarity derived from human conceptual judgments. We used metrics from computer vision and computational neuroscience to show that monkeys’ and humans’ performance cannot be explained by low‐level visual similarity alone. The results demonstrate that at least some of the underlying structure of object representations in humans is shared with non‐human primates, at an abstract level that extends beyond low‐level visual similarity. Because the monkeys had no experience with the objects we tested, the results suggest that monkeys and humans share a primitive representation of object similarity that is independent of formal knowledge and cultural experience, and likely derived from common evolutionary constraints on object representation.     

Lexical selection is not by competition: a reinterpretation of semantic interference and facilitation effects in the picture-word interference paradigm

The dominant view in the field of lexical access in speech production maintains that selection of a word becomes more difficult as the levels of activation of nontarget words increase--selection by competition. The authors tested this prediction in two sets of experiments. First, the authors show that participants are faster to name pictures of objects (e.g., "bed") in the context of semantically related verb distractors (e.g., sleep) compared with unrelated verb distractors (e.g., shoot). In the second set of experiments, the authors show that target naming latencies (e.g., "horse") are, if anything, faster for within--category semantically close distractor words (e.g., zebra) than for within--category semantically far distractor words (e.g., whale). In the context of previous research, these data ground a new empirical generalization: As distractor words become semantically closer to the target concepts--all else being equal--target naming is facilitated. This fact means that lexical selection does not involve competition, and consequently, that the semantic interference effect does not reflect a lexical level process. This conclusion has important implications for models of lexical access and interpretations of Stroop-like interference effects.     

HRTEM study of the {252}γ austenite–martensite interface in an Fe—8Cr–1C alloy

Abstract

High-resolution transmission electron microscopy has been used to image the atomic structure of the (2S2)_γ austenite-martensite interface. By imaging along [101]_γ ∥[111]_α, the interface was viewed edge-on and seen to consist of facets on the close-packed (111)_γ, planes. From the correspondence of atoms in the close-packed planes across the austenite-martensite interface, the magnitude of the shear can be analysed as (a/24)<112> on every close-packed plane in the plane of projection. Comparison with theory indicates that this is an (a/12)<112> Burgers vector out of the plane of projection. Hence, each atomic facet can be viewed as a structural ledge containing an (a/12)<112> transformation dislocation.     

Affect of the unconscious: Visually suppressed angry faces modulate our decisions

Emotional and affective processing imposes itself over cognitive processes and modulates our perception of the surrounding environment. In two experiments, we addressed the issue of whether nonconscious processing of affect can take place even under deep states of unawareness, such as those induced by interocular suppression techniques, and can elicit an affective response that can influence our understanding of the surrounding environment. In Experiment 1, participants judged the likeability of an unfamiliar item—a Chinese character—that was preceded by a face expressing a particular emotion (either happy or angry). The face was rendered invisible through an interocular suppression technique (continuous flash suppression; CFS). In Experiment 2, backward masking (BM), a less robust masking technique, was used to render the facial expressions invisible. We found that despite equivalent phenomenological suppression of the visual primes under CFS and BM, different patterns of affective processing were obtained with the two masking techniques. Under BM, nonconscious affective priming was obtained for both happy and angry invisible facial expressions. However, under CFS, nonconscious affective priming was obtained only for angry facial expressions. We discuss an interpretation of this dissociation between affective processing and visual masking techniques in terms of distinct routes from the retina to the amygdala.     

What is in a tool concept? Dissociating manipulation knowledge from function knowledge

Research on patients with apraxia, a deficit in skilled action, has shown that the ability to use objects may be differentially impaired relative to knowledge about object function. Here we show, using a modified neuropsychological test, that similar dissociations can be observed in response times in healthy adults. Participants were asked to decide which two of three presented objects shared the same manipulation or the same function; triads were presented in picture and word format, and responses were made manually (button press) or with a basic-level naming response (verbally). For manual responses (Experiment 1), participants were slower to make manipulation judgments for word stimuli than for picture stimuli, while there was no difference between word and picture stimuli for function judgments. For verbal-naming responses (Experiment 2), participants were again slower for manipulation judgments over word stimuli, as compared with picture stimuli; however, and in contrast to Experiment 1, function judgments over word stimuli were faster than function judgments over picture stimuli. These data support the hypotheses that knowledge of object function and knowledge of object manipulation correspond to dissociable types of object knowledge and that simulation over motor information is not necessary in order to retrieve knowledge of object function.     

The origins of the psychological 'interior'--evidence from imperial Roman literary practices and related issues

The pervasiveness in psychological literature of the assumption that mental events and psychology in general occur within the person-henceforth the psychological 'interior'- is introduced and the received view of its historical origin is presented. This account is challenged and classical historical source material from the period 100 to 400 CE is interpreted in relation to factors of literary practice and related issues (mode of reading, authority and format of text, mode of writing, and author's motivation). It is concluded that the 'interior' that emerges in the reflexive discourse of Imperial Rome develops in tandem with changes in literary practices and that there is consequently substantial evidence for positing an intimate relationship between these practices, subjective experience, and reflexive discourse.     

The organization of conceptual knowledge: the evidence from category-specific semantic deficits

Questions about the organization of conceptual knowledge in the human brain can be addressed by studying patients with category-specific semantic deficits: disproportionate and even selective impairment of conceptual knowledge of one category of objects compared with other categories. Recently, consensus has emerged regarding the basic facts of category-specific semantic deficits: (1) the categories that can be disproportionately impaired or spared are 'animals', 'fruit/vegetables', and 'artifacts'; and (2) category-specific semantic deficits are not associated with disproportionate deficits for a type or modality of knowledge. Together with findings in functional neuroimaging, these data indicate a complex organization of conceptual knowledge characterized by several independent dimensions of organization.     

To repress: a note on an ambiguity of meaning

An analysand used the word repress in a dream in an unusual way. In the dream, a record had been re-pressed: it was not the original disc but a copy. This manifest meaning of the word led associatively to more latent meanings. A kind of dialectical process ensued whereby, whenever the concept of repression came up, several meanings had to be considered to set the record straight. The classical way of thinking about repression had been augmented a little by this novel meaning that the analysand had stumbled on in his dream. Psychoanalytic process was enriched by this ongoing scrutiny of repression in theory and practice.     

Arguments about the nature of concepts: Symbols,embodiment, and beyond

How are the meanings of words, events, and objects represented and organized in the brain? This question, perhaps more than any other in the field, probes some of the deepest and most foundational puzzles regarding the structure of the mind and brain. Accordingly, it has spawned a field of inquiry that is diverse and multidisciplinary, has led to the discovery of numerous empirical phenomena, and has spurred the development of a wide range of theoretical positions. This special issue brings together the most recent theoretical developments from the leaders in the field, representing a range of viewpoints on issues of fundamental significance to a theory of meaning representation. Here we introduce the special issue by way of pulling out some key themes that cut across the contributions that form this issue and situating those themes in the broader literature. The core issues around which research on conceptual representation can be organized are representational format, representational content, the organization of concepts in the brain, and the processing dynamics that govern interactions between the conceptual system and sensorimotor representations. We highlight areas in which consensus has formed; for those areas in which opinion is divided, we seek to clarify the relation of theory and evidence and to set in relief the bridging assumptions that undergird current discussions.