Comparison of fundus autofluorescence and minimum-motion measurements of macular pigment distribution profiles derived from identical retinal areas

The optical density of macular pigment was measured at twelve retinal locations in ten subjects by minimum motion photometry, comparing 460 nm with 580 nm or 550 nm. Fundus autofluorescence images were obtained for the same subjects with a scanning laser ophthalmoscope. Optical density was computed from mean calibrated grey-scale values for a central circular field and for annular segments, identical to areas tested psychophysically, and for complete annuli. Psychophysical assessments of optical density were similar irrespective of whether 550 nm or 580 nm was used. Optical density values derived psychophysically showed a linear correlation with assessments based on identical sampled areas of annular segments (slope = 0.98, r2 = 0.97) or complete annuli (slope = 0.89, r2 = 0.96) in autofluorescence images.     

Recognizing people from their movement

Human observers demonstrate impressive visual sensitivity to human movement. What defines this sensitivity? If motor experience influences the visual analysis of action, then observers should be most sensitive to their own movements. If view-dependent visual experience determines visual sensitivity to human movement, then observers should be most sensitive to the movements of their friends. To test these predictions, participants viewed sagittal displays of point-light depictions of themselves, their friends, and strangers performing various actions. In actor identification and discrimination tasks, sensitivity to one's own motion was highest. Visual sensitivity to friends', but not strangers', actions was above chance. Performance was action dependent. Control studies yielded chance performance with inverted and static displays, suggesting that form and low-motion cues did not define performance. These results suggest that both motor and visual experience define visual sensitivity to human action.     

Intrusive memories and depression in cancer patients

Matched samples of depressed and nondepressed cancer patients were interviewed about past life events, particularly experiences of death and illness. They identified and described any spontaneous intrusive visual memories they had experienced in the past week corresponding to these events. About one quarter reported such memories and, as predicted, the majority of intrusive memories concerned illness, injury and death. The mean levels of intrusion and avoidance were equivalent to patients with post-traumatic stress disorder. Consistent with prediction, depressed patients reported significantly more intrusive memories than controls, and described the memories as typically beginning with or being exacerbated by the onset of depression. Greater numbers of intrusive memories were associated with more maladaptive coping, and greater avoidance with deficits in autobiographical memory functioning.     

Intimacy and computer communication

The relationship between intimacy and communication which uses computer technology is addressed. Definitions of intimacy are considered, and the nature of intimate conversations which use computers as a communications medium are discussed. Implications for counselling are examined.     

Globalising counselling: humanistic counselling in Kenya

This paper explores the application of a Western, psychologically-based model of counselling and counselling training in contexts where the social and cultural conditions differ from mainstream Western societies. A group of Kenyan trainee counsellors following such a course are interviewed about their experience of training. The interview data are analysed to provide a tentative answer to the question of the appropriateness in a Kenyan cultural milieu of a humanistic counselling training model developed in the UK. It is concluded that such application is possible and desirable, if it is undertaken as shared and respectful learning between trainers and trainees.     

Providing a Transcultural Genetic Counseling Service in the UK

This paper uses a broad definition of culture to explore the practice of transcultural genetic counseling through three case studies. The first case involves a White genetic counselor seeing an Asian family, the second, an Asian genetic counselor seeing an Asian family and the third, a hearing genetic counselor seeing a culturally Deaf client. Boundaries, transference and countertransference reactions are considered within each transcultural encounter and the author of each case reflects in detail on their role in the client interaction and their impact on the transcultural dynamic. The cases are used to illustrate some cultural beliefs or characteristics that may challenge the genetic counselor’s expectations. The value of identifying and interpreting these differences to facilitate useful clinical work is considered. The paper debates, where possible, whether it is helpful to culturally match genetic counselor and client.     

Lifeline in der Narrativen Expositionstherapie

The biographical memory of patients with trauma spectrum disorders is often shattered. Survivors cannot voluntarily access memories. Sometimes in survivors of severe and complex trauma whole life periods seem lost, avoidance sets in, the autobiography is sketchy, seems strange and ego-alien. The lifeline tool in Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET) is an effective first step towards discussing the traumatic material. The lifeline in NET displays the emotional highlights of the person’s life in a symbolic way. Looking at one’s autobiography from an allocentric perspective can serve as a controlled contact to the fragmented memories. This is then followed by a well-directed imaginal exposure from which a chronological narrative emerges. Laying out the lifeline at the end of the NET treatment enables the person to perceive the gestalt of the course of life.     

Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation

Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an important non‐epistemic norm of belief formation. In this article I present an objection to unusability pessimism and argue that Robert Hopkins, the view's most prominent defender, fails to motivate adequately the claim that there are such non‐epistemic belief norms. The cases which putatively legitimize usability norms can be explained by appeal to more familiar norm types: epistemic norms of belief formation, and non‐epistemic norms which govern action other than belief formation. The intent of this article is not primarily negative, however, and I will also argue that understanding why the unusability position fails helps us to identify a promising new direction for the pessimist's opponents who wish to defend the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony.