A review of the H-reflex and M-wave in the human triceps surae

The soleus is the most commonly used muscle for H-reflex studies in humans, while limited comparable data have been produced from the gastrocnemii muscles. This article reviews the fundamental differences between the structure and function of the human soleus and gastrocnemii muscles, including recent data published about their complex innervation zones. Protocols for eliciting, recording, and assessing the H-reflex and M-wave magnitude in the human triceps surae are also discussed.     

Differences in Individual Approaches: Communication in the Familial Breast Cancer Consultation and the Effect on Patient Outcomes

This multicenter study aimed to assess (i) whether individual clinical geneticists and genetic counselors vary in their communication skills and (ii) whether this variation in communication impacts on patient outcomes, such as anxiety, depression, genetics knowledge, and satisfaction. One hundred and fifty women from high-risk breast cancer families attending their first genetic counseling consultation completed pre and post-consultation self-report questionnaires. The consultations were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. Univariate analyses showed highly significant differences between individual clinical geneticists and genetic counselors in: facilitating understanding (p 0.001); facilitating active involvement (p 0.001); facilitating partnership building (p = 0.003); addressing emotional concerns (p 0.001); and discussing prophylactic mastectomy (p = 0.017). Multivariate linear regressions showed that this variation in communication resulted in a greater change in patients depression 4 weeks after the counseling session (p = 0.017). These findings suggest clinical geneticists and genetic counselors have achieved some standardization in communicating information, but showed diversity in their facilitation skills. Communication skills may be a useful area to explore further in this field.     

Sustained attention and visual processing speed in children and adolescents with bipolar disorder and other psychiatric disorders

To investigate the cognitive functioning of children and adolescents with bipolar illness, 112 child and adolescent psychiatric inpatients and day-hospital patients at a state psychiatric hospital were administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III (WISC-III) as part of an admission psychological assessment. There were 22 patients with Bipolar Disorder and 90 with other psychiatric disorders; all were between 8 and 17 years of age. The patients with Bipolar Disorder had a mean age of 14 yr., a mean Verbal IQ of 78, a mean Performance IQ of 76, and a mean Full Scale IQ of 75. When their WISC-III scores were compared with those who had Schizophrenia Spectrum disorders (Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder), Psychosis Not Otherwise Specified, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder, there were no significant between-group mean differences for Verbal IQ, but patients with Bipolar Disorder had a significantly lower mean Performance IQ than those with ADHD and those with Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Contrary to the expectation that the patients with Bipolar Disorder might have better sustained attention (higher Digit Span scores) than those with Schizophrenia Spectrum disorders and worse visual processing speed (lower Coding scores) than the other diagnostic groups, the bipolar patients' Digit Span and Coding scores did not differ significantly from those of the other groups. The patients with Psychosis, Not Otherwise Specified had significantly lower mean Performance IQ, Full Scale IQ, and Coding than the ADHD and the Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Disorder groups.     

Psychological Safety and Appreciation of Differences in Counselor Training Programs: Examining Religion,Spirituality, and Political Beliefs

This study focused on the extent to which religion, spirituality, and political beliefs predicted counseling students' perceptions of psychological safety and appreciation of differences in their programs. The authors used hierarchical regression models to analyze data from 264 students from 4 different institutions. Results indicated that student age, political conservatism, extrinsic religiosity, and intrinsic spirituality were significant predictors of perceived psychological safety and appreciation of differences. The authors discuss implications of these findings.     

Movin’ on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification.     

On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism

We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. In Sects. 3–5, I subject reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of evidential support to various counterexamples. In Sect. 6, I show that the most promising ways to address these counterexamples aren’t very promising.     

Young Children's ability to Discriminate between Antisocial and Prosocial Teases

The present study was designed to (a) examine 5- to 8-year-old children's ability to discriminate between antisocial and prosocial teases and (b) determine whether their age and experiences within the home are associated with their ability to recognize these two types of teases. Results revealed that the 5- to 8-year-old children were able to discriminate between antisocial and prosocial teases. Although the children's parents or legal guardians indicated that the children had more frequent experience with prosocial than antisocial teases in the home, (a) the children were better able to correctly identify the intent of antisocial teasers than prosocial teasers and (b) the parents or legal guardians (correctly) indicated that their child would be better able to recognize an antisocial tease than a prosocial tease. Despite the finding that the children's comprehension of antisocial teasing tended to exceed their comprehension of prosocial teasing, the findings indicate that being relatively young (i.e., 5–6 years old vs. 7–8 years old) and having relatively frequent experience with antisocial teasing in the home may be associated with some children's difficulty in recognizing the intent behind antisocial teases.