Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals

Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.

Detecting random, partially random, and nonrandom Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 protocols

The ability of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; J. N. Butcher et al., 2001) validity scales to detect random, partially random, and nonrandom MMPI-2 protocols was investigated. Investigations included the Variable Response Inconsistency scale (VRIN), F, several potentially useful new F and VRIN subscales, and Fb- F>or=30 and Fb>or=90. Protocols completed by 150 adults participating in custody evaluations at a juvenile court setting, screened for randomness with a matched-pair Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (T. Millon, R. Davis, & C. Millon, 1997), were compared with 500 computer-generated all-random protocols and with three levels of partially random protocols. VRIN was the most effective scale in detecting uninterpretable random protocols; however, VRIN >or= 80 failed to identify 37% of them. Fb- F>or=30 and Fb>or=90 misidentified 41% of the 50%-65% random protocols as partially interpretable. Using the new scales, a decision algorithm was described that correctly classified 97%-100% of the protocols as interpretable, partially interpretable, or uninterpretable.     

The validity and reliability of the Violence Risk Scale-Sexual Offender version: assessing sex offender risk and evaluating therapeutic change

The Violence Risk Scale-Sexual Offender version (VRS-SO) is a rating scale designed to assess risk and predict sexual recidivism, to measure and link treatment changes to sexual recidivism, and to inform the delivery of sexual offender treatment. The VRS-SO comprises 7 static and 17 dynamic items empirically or conceptually linked to sexual recidivism. Dynamic items with higher ratings identify treatment targets linked to sexual offending. A modified stages of change model assesses the offender's treatment readiness and change. File-based VRS-SO ratings were completed on 321 sex offenders followed up an average of 10 years post-release. VRS-SO scores predicted sexual and nonsexual violent recidivism post-release and demonstrated acceptable interrater reliability and concurrent validity. A factor analysis of the dynamic items generated 3 factors labeled Sexual Deviance, Criminality, and Treatment Responsivity, all of which predicted sexual recidivism and were differentially associated with different sex offender types. The dynamic items together made incremental contributions to sexual recidivism prediction after static risk was controlled for. Positive changes in the dynamic items, measured at pre- and posttreatment, were significantly related to reductions in sexual recidivism after risk and follow-up time were controlled for, suggesting that dynamic items are indeed dynamic or changeable in nature.     

Looking before you leap: A theory of motivated control of action

The acquisition of volitional control depends, in part, on developing the ability to countermand a planned action. Many tasks have been used to tap the efficiency of this process, but few studies have investigated how it may be modulated by participants’ motivation. Multiple mechanisms may be involved in the deliberate exercise of caution when incentives are provided. For example, control may involve modulation of the efficiency of the countermanding process, and/or inhibitory modulation of the impulse to go. One of the most commonly used paradigms to assess control of action is the Stop Signal Task, in which a primary Go stimulus is occasionally followed by a countermanding Stop signal, allowing a Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) to be inferred as the outcome of a “horse race” between the go and countermanding processes. Here, we present a computational model in which high task motivation modulates proactive pre-stimulus inhibition of the go response. This allows responses to be calibrated so as to fall within a time-window that maximizes the probability of success, regardless of trial type, but does not decrease the observed SSRT. We report empirical support for the model from a sample of typically developing children, and discuss the broader implications for operationalizing measures of volitional control.     

The role of motor simulation in action perception: a neuropsychological case study

Research on embodied cognition stresses that bodily and motor processes constrain how we perceive others. Regarding action perception the most prominent hypothesis is that observed actions are matched to the observer’s own motor representations. Previous findings demonstrate that the motor laws that constrain one’s performance also constrain one’s perception of others’ actions. The present neuropsychological case study asked whether neurological impairments affect a person’s performance and action perception in the same way. The results showed that patient DS, who suffers from a frontal brain lesion, not only ignored target size when performing movements but also when asked to judge whether others can perform the same movements. In other words DS showed the same violation of Fitts’s law when performing and observing actions. These results further support the assumption of close perception action links and the assumption that these links recruit predictive mechanisms residing in the motor system.     

Cardiac modulation of startle: Effects on eye blink and higher cognitive processing

Cardiac cycle time has been shown to affect pre-attentive brainstem startle processes, such as the magnitude of acoustically evoked reflexive startle eye blinks. These effects were attributed to baro-afferent feedback mechanisms. However, it remains unclear whether cardiac cycle time plays a role in higher startle-related cognitive processes, as well. Twenty-five volunteers responded first by ’fast as possible’ button pushes (reaction time, RT), and second, rated perceived intensity of 60 acoustic startle stimuli (85, 95, or 105 dB; 50 ms duration; binaural; instantaneous rise time), which were presented either 230 or 530 ms after the R-wave, and eye blink responses were measured by EMG. RT was divided into evaluation and motor response time according to previous research. Increasing stimulus intensity enhanced startle eye blink, intensity ratings, and RT components. Eye blinks and intensity judgments were lower when startle was elicited at a latency of R + 230 ms, but RT components were differentially affected: the evaluative component was attenuated, and the motor component was accelerated when stimuli were presented 230 ms after the R-wave. We conclude that the cardiac cycle affects the attentive processing of acoustic startle stimuli.