The Work Process as Spatial Situation: A Sketch

Interacting with the work of art entails a spatial situation, which is double. On a mental plane it is encapsulated reverie, on a physical plane it is production and consumption. These two are woven together as an orthogonal text or texture. The space of the work of art thus contains both the process of its making and its viewing. Seen as a dimensional space it is non linear. It is characterized by oscillations, discepancies, misalignements, multiplicity and recurrence. There is a correspondance between the studio and the exhibition area, as well as a dialogue between privileged and unprivileged spaces. The situation has something in common with oneiric space, where weightlessness and gravity oscillate.     

Cognitive reappraisal and secondary control coping: associations with working memory,positive and negative affect,and symptoms of anxiety/depression

Abstract

The current study examined the relations of measures of cognitive reappraisal and secondary control coping with working memory abilities, positive and negative affect, and symptoms of anxiety and depression in young adults (N=124). Results indicate significant relations between working memory abilities and reports of secondary control coping and between reports of secondary control coping and cognitive reappraisal. Associations were also found between measures of secondary control coping and cognitive reappraisal and positive and negative affect and symptoms of depression and anxiety. Further, the findings suggest that reports of cognitive reappraisal may be more strongly predictive of positive affect whereas secondary control coping may be more strongly predictive of negative affect and symptoms of depression and anxiety. Overall, the results suggest that current measures of secondary control coping and cognitive reappraisal capture related but distinct constructs and suggest that the assessment of working memory may be more strongly related to secondary control coping in predicting individual differences in distress.     

The effects of co‐occurring ADHD symptoms on electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control in young people with Tourette syndrome

Efficient cognitive control is implicated in tic control in young people with Tourette syndrome (TS). Attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) frequently co‐occurs with TS and is associated with impaired cognitive control. Young people with TS and ADHD (TS+ADHD) show poorer cognitive control performance than those with TS, but how co‐occurring ADHD affects underlying neural activity is unknown. We investigated this issue by examining behavioural and event‐related potential (ERP) correlates of cognitive control in young people with these conditions. Participants aged 9–17 with TS (n = 17), TS+ADHD (n = 17), ADHD (n = 11), and unaffected controls (n = 20) performed a visual Go/Nogo task during electroencephalography (EEG) recording. Behavioural performance measures (D‐prime, RT, reaction time variability, post‐error slowing) and ERP measures (N2, P3, error‐related negativity (ERN), error positivity (Pe)) were analysed in a 2 (TS‐yes, TS‐no) × 2 (ADHD‐yes, ADHD‐no) factorial analysis to investigate the effects of TS, ADHD, and their interaction. The results of these analyses showed that ADHD was associated with poorer performance and reduced amplitude of all ERPs, reflecting widespread cognitive control impairments. Tourette syndrome was associated with slowed RTs, which might reflect a compensatory slowing of motor output to facilitate tic control. There was no interaction between the TS and ADHD factors for any behavioural or ERP measure, indicating the impairing effects of ADHD on behaviour and electrophysiological markers of cognitive control were present in TS+ADHD and that RT slowing associated with TS was unaffected by co‐occurring ADHD symptoms.     

Cognitive predictors of parent-rated inattention in very preterm children: The role of working memory and processing speed

Inattention is one of the most common neurobehavioral problems following very preterm birth. Attention problems can persist into adulthood and are associated with negative socio-emotional and educational outcomes. This study aimed to determine whether the cognitive processes associated with inattention differ between term-born and very preterm children. Sixty-five children born very preterm (<33+0 weeks’ gestation) aged 8–11 years were recruited alongside 48 term-born controls (?37 20 +0 weeks’ gestation). Both groups included children with a wide spectrum of parent-rated inattention (above average attention to severe inattention) measured as a continuous dimension using the Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD and Normal-Behavior (SWAN) scale. The children completed tests to assess basic cognitive processes and executive function. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was implemented to assess which neurocognitive processes explained variance in parent-rated inattention and whether these differed between preterm and term-born children. In both groups, poorer verbal and visuospatial short-term memory and poorer visuospatial working memory independently explained variance in parent-rated inattention. Slower motor processing speed explained variance in inattention among very preterm children only. The cognitive mechanisms associated with parent-rated inattention were predominantly overlapping between groups, but relationships between motor processing speed and inattention were unique to very preterm children. These associations may reflect risk factors for inattention in term and very preterm children. Future research should assess the efficacy of these cognitive processes as potential targets for intervention     

Implicit sequence learning in young people with Tourette syndrome with and without co-occurring attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

Impaired habit-learning has been proposed to underlie the tic symptoms of Tourette syndrome (TS). However, accounts differ in terms of how habit-learning is altered in TS, with some authors proposing habit formation is impaired due to a deficient ‘chunking’ mechanism, and others proposing habit-learning is overactive and tics reflect hyperlearned behaviours. Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) frequently co-occurs with TS and is known to affect cognitive function in young people with co-occurring TS and ADHD (TS + ADHD). It is unclear, however, how co-occurring ADHD symptoms affect habit-learning in TS. In this study, we investigated whether young people with TS would show deficient or hyperactive habit-learning, and assessed the effects of co-occurring ADHD symptoms on habit-learning in TS. Participants aged 9–17 years with TS (n = 18), TS + ADHD (n = 17), ADHD (n = 13), and typical development (n = 20) completed a motor sequence learning task to assess habit-learning. We used a 2 (TS-yes, TS-no) × 2 (ADHD-yes, ADHD-no) factorial analysis to test the effects of TS, ADHD, and their interaction on accuracy and reaction time indices of sequence learning. TS was associated with intact sequence learning, but a tendency for difficulty transitioning from sequenced to non-sequenced performance was suggestive of hyper-learning. ADHD was associated with significantly poorer accuracy during acquisition of the sequence, indicative of impaired habit-learning. There were no interactions between the TS and ADHD factors, indicating young people with TS + ADHD showed both TS- and ADHD-related atypicalities in habit-learning.     

TOWARD A MENTALISTIC ACCOUNT OF EARLY PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONING

Recent investigations of early psychological understanding have revealed three key findings. First, young infants attribute goals and dispositions to any entity they perceive as an agent, whether human or non-human. Second, when interpreting an agent's actions in a scene, young infants take into account the agent's representation of the scene, even if this representation is less complete than their own. Third, at least by the second year of life, infants recognize that agents can hold false beliefs about a scene. Together, these findings support a system-based, mentalistic account of early psychological reasoning.     

Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.     

Infants' reasoning about others' false perceptions

Prior research suggests that children younger than age 3 or 4 do not understand that an agent may be deceived by an object's misleading appearance. The authors asked whether 14.5-month-olds would give evidence in a violation-of-expectation task that they understand that agents may form false perceptions. Infants first watched events in which an agent faced a stuffed skunk and a doll with blue pigtails; the agent consistently reached for the doll, suggesting that she preferred it over the skunk. Next, while the agent was absent, the doll was hidden in a plain box, and the skunk was hidden in a box with a tuft of blue hair protruding from under its lid. Infants expected the agent to be misled by the tuft's resemblance to the doll's hair and to falsely perceive it as belonging to the doll. These and other results indicate that 14.5-month-old infants can already reason about agents' false perceptions.     

Detecting impossible changes in infancy: a three-system account

Can infants detect that an object has magically disappeared, broken apart or changed color while briefly hidden? Recent research suggests that infants detect some but not other 'impossible' changes; and that various contextual manipulations can induce infants to detect changes they would not otherwise detect. We present an account that includes three systems: a physical-reasoning, an object-tracking, and an object-representation system. What impossible changes infants detect depends on what object information is included in the physical-reasoning system; this information becomes subject to a principle of persistence, which states that objects can undergo no spontaneous or uncaused change. What contextual manipulations induce infants to detect impossible changes depends on complex interplays between the physical-reasoning system and the object-tracking and object-representation systems.