Emotional responses to intergroup apology mediate intergroup forgiveness and retribution

According to intergroup emotion theory, the impact of many intergroup events on intergroup outcomes is mediated by group-directed emotions. We demonstrate that the ability of apology to reduce retribution against and increase forgiveness of a transgressing outgroup is contributed to by discrete intergroup emotions. We examined both negative (anger and fear) and positive (respect and satisfaction) emotions directed toward the transgressing outgroup. Apology reduced the desire for retribution whereas lack of apology increased it, and outgroup-directed anger uniquely mediated this effect. In contrast, apology increased and lack of apology decreased forgiveness, particularly when the ingroup responded to the transgression, and only outgroup-directed respect mediated this effect. These results provide the first evidence that intergroup emotions can mediate the impact of apology on intergroup relations outcomes.     

Identity salience moderates processing of group-relevant information

When an individual is categorized as a member of a group, the individual’s social identity becomes his or her frame for perceiving the world. This research investigates how information can be perceived and processed differently when relevant social identities are salient. In two studies, participants’ individual, student, or American identities were made salient before they read strong or weak arguments in favor of the institution of comprehensive exams at their university in 10 years time. In both studies, student-salient participants analytically processed the message whereas self-salient (Study 1) and American-salient (Study 2) participants failed to agree differentially with strong and weak messages. These data suggest that social-identity salience changes the information that individuals consider relevant, providing clear support for the contention that social identities have a profound impact on the way individuals perceive and interact with the world around them.     

“We” are familiar but “It” is not: Ingroup pronouns trigger feelings of familiarity

The notion that language can shape social perception has a long history in psychology. The current work adds to this literature by investigating the relationship between ingroup-designating pronouns and perceptions of familiarity. In two experiments, participants were exposed to nonsense syllables that were primed with ingroup (e.g., we) and control (e.g., it) pronouns before perceptions of the syllables’ familiarity (Experiments 1 and 2) and positivity (Experiment 2) were assessed. Because previous work has shown that ingroup pronouns are perceived positively (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), and that positivity can trigger familiarity (e.g., [Garcia-Marques et al., 2004] and [Monin, 2003]), we predicted that syllables primed with ingroup-designating pronouns would be perceived as more familiar and positive than would syllables primed with control pronouns. These predictions were confirmed. Additionally, Experiment 2 provided suggestive evidence that the effect of ingroup pronouns on perceived familiarity is mediated by positivity. Implications of these results for the literatures on how language shapes intergroup biases and on how positivity triggers feelings of familiarity are discussed.     

Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations

Intergroup emotions theory seeks to understand and improve intergroup relations by focusing on the emotions engendered by belonging to, and by deriving identity from, a social group (processes called self‐categorization and identification). Intergroup emotions are shaped by the very different ways in which members of different groups see group‐relevant objects and events. These emotions come, with time and repetition, to be part and parcel of group membership itself. Once evoked, specific intergroup emotions direct and regulate specific intergroup behaviors. This approach has implications for theories of emotion as well as of intergroup relations. Because intergroup emotions derive from self‐categorization and identification and because they strongly influence intergroup behavior, intergroup emotions theory provides an innovative framework for attempts to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations.     

Knowing how they feel: Perceiving emotions felt by outgroups

Individuals can often accurately perceive others’ emotions in a purely interpersonal context. However, when people identify with an important ingroup, they experience distinctive patterns of emotion [Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group-level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 431-446]. Thus, in three studies using a variety of meaningful groups, we examine how a salient distinction between groups might influence people’s ability to estimate the emotions of outgroup members. Participants demonstrated substantial though imperfect accuracy in estimating the emotions reported by outgroups. Specific biases affected their estimates, especially the overlap of perceived emotions of the outgroup with the ingroup’s own emotions. Furthermore, there was a general overprediction of outgroups’ negative emotions and underprediction of their positive emotions. Because of the importance of an outgroup’s emotions as potential causes of their behavior, accuracy and biases in group emotion estimation may be consequential for intergroup relations.     

The effects of hemispheric differences on feature perturbations

Summary Hemispheric differences for feature perturbations were investigated in two experiments. Stimulus displays consisting of five small squares arranged in a single row were presented tachistoscopically, with the subject instructed to state in which square a horizontal tick mark was located. Ticks could occur in any of the three middle squares, with half of the ticks presented on the inside and half presented on the outside of the square in relation to the fovea. Experiment 1 presented each array of five squares to the right or left of fixation at one of three distances from the fovea. Experiment 2 manipulated the distance between the squares and kept foveal distance constant. In each experiment, fewer errors were made when stimuli were presented to the left visual field/right hemisphere than when they were presented to the right visual field/left hemisphere, when ticks migrated toward the fovea. Experiment 1 found that increasing the distance from the fovea increased the error rate, but did not change the hemispheric differences. Experiment 2 found that increasing the distance between the squares did not change hemispheric effects reliably. The data imply that hemispheric differences for perceptual processing begin very early during sensory analysis.     

Video Games and Aggression in Children1

This study examined the effect of playing an aggressive or nonaggressive video game on fifth-graders' free play. Twenty-two pairs of boys and 20 pairs of girls were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. One of the children in each pair played a video game rated by peers as aggressive, a video game with little aggression, or a non-video maze-solving game for 8 minutes. The other child watched. Each child was then left individually to engage in free play in a separate room for 8 minutes, and also given the opportunity to deliver rewards and punishments to another child. The results were similar for both players and observers. Girls evidenced significantly more general activity and aggressive free play after playing the aggressive video game. Girls' activity decreased and their quiet play slightly increased after playing the low aggressive game compared to the control group. Neither video game had any significant effect on boys' free play. Neither girls nor boys gave significantly more punishments or rewards after playing any of the games.     

Of two minds: forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes

Because different processes underlie implicit and explicit attitudes, we hypothesized that they are differentially sensitive to different kinds of information. We measured implicit and explicit attitudes over time, as different types of attitude-relevant information about a single attitude object were presented. As expected, explicit attitudes formed and changed in response to the valence of consciously accessible, verbally presented behavioral information about the target. In contrast, implicit attitudes formed and changed in response to the valence of subliminally presented primes, reflecting the progressive accretion of attitude object-evaluation pairings. As a consequence, when subliminal primes and behavioral information were of opposite valence, people formed implicit and explicit attitudes of conflicting valence.     

Stereotypes: static abstractions or dynamic knowledge structures?

Stereotypes have been assumed to be long-lasting knowledge structures that persist even in the face of contrary evidence. However, there is almost no within-participant research relevant to this assumption. The authors describe 4 studies (N=267), the first 3 of which assessed within-participant stereotype stability over a few weeks with measures of stereotypic trait verification, typicality ratings of exemplar sets, and exemplar retrieval. In the 4th study, the authors manipulated context stability. Overall, results showed only low-to-moderate stereotype stability. The stability obtained was a function of the perceived centrality of traits or exemplars and of context constancy. The authors discuss the implications of these results for abstractionist, exemplar, mixed, and connectionist models and identify possible mechanisms that underlie within-participant stereotype instability.