How people cope with uncertainty due to chance or deception

In making social judgments people process effects caused by humans differently from effects caused by non-human agencies. We assume that when they have to predict outcomes that are attributed to non-human causes, people acknowledge their ignorance and try to focus on what is most diagnostic. However, when events are attributed to human agency, they believe that nothing is arbitrary and that one can understand the decision situation well enough to eliminate error. If so, then people should behave differently when an uncertainty is attributed to chance (a non-human agency) or to deception (a human agency). We tested this prediction using the probability-matching paradigm and found reasonable support for our analysis in four experiments. Individuals who attributed uncertainty to deception were less likely to adopt the optimal rule-based strategy than those who attributed it to chance. Indeed, only when the former were prevented from thinking about and elaborating the outcomes (the high-interference condition in Experiment 3) was their performance comparable to the level of individuals in the chance condition.     

Atypical long-latency auditory event-related potentials in a subset of children with specific language impairment

It has been proposed that specific language impairment (SLI) is the consequence of low-level abnormalities in auditory perception. However, studies of long-latency auditory ERPs in children with SLI have generated inconsistent findings. A possible reason for this inconsistency is the heterogeneity of SLI. The intraclass correlation (ICC) has been proposed as a useful statistic for evaluating heterogeneity because it allows one to compare an individual's auditory ERP with the grand average waveform from a typically developing reference group. We used this method to reanalyse auditory ERPs from a sample previously described by Uwer, Albrecht and von Suchodoletz (2002). In a subset of children with receptive SLI, there was less correspondence (i.e. lower ICC) with the normative waveform (based on the control grand average) than for typically developing children. This poorer correspondence was seen in responses to both tone and speech stimuli for the period 100-228 ms post stimulus onset. The effect was lateralized and seen at right- but not left-sided electrodes.     

Temporal and causal order effects in thinking about what might have been

When people think counterfactually about what might have been different for a sequence of events, they are influenced by the order in which the events occurred. They tend to mentally undo the most recent event in a temporal sequence of two events. But they tend to mentally undo the first event in a causal sequence of four events. We report the results of two experiments that show that the temporal and causal order effects are not dependent on the number of events in the sequence. Our first experiment, with 300 participants, shows that the temporal order effect occurs for sequences with four events as well as for sequences with two events. Our second experiment, with 372 participants, shows that the causal order effect occurs for sequences with two events as well as for sequences with four events. We discuss the results in terms of the mental representations that people construct of temporal and causal sequences.     

Post-September 11th Perspectives on Religion, Spirituality, and Philosophy in the Personal and Professional Lives of Selected REBT Cognoscenti

The purpose of this article was for selected Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) cognoscenti to examine the impact of the events of September 11th, 2001, on their beliefs about religion, spirituality, and their personal philosophy—including the role of evil in the universe and the implications of these issues on their use of REBT. The degree of consistency of the author’s views with classical REBT theory and philosophy was examined. The authors are current or former members of the Albert Ellis Institute’s International Training Standards and Policy Review Committee, of which Albert Ellis, REBT’s founder, is also a member. Reprinted from Journal of Counseling & Development, Fall 2004, Volume 82. ACA. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction authorized without written permission from the American Counseling Association. We regret to inform readers that Stephen G. Weinrach died in April 2004. Stephen G. Weinrach expressed gratitude to Jacqueline Mirabile, Laura Hutelmyer, and Phylis Wright of Villanova University’s Falvey Memorial Library for valuable research assistance. Jesse Clancy and Bethany Coover provided deeply appreciated and important editorial support.     

Perceptual integrality of componential and configural information in faces

The relative contribution of componential and configural information to face perception is controversial. We addressed this issue in the present study by examining how componential information and configural information interact during face processing, using Garner’s (1974) speeded classification paradigm. When classifying upright faces varying in components (eyes, nose, and mouth) and configural information (intereyes and nose-mouth spacing), observers could not selectively attend to components without being influenced by irrelevant variation in configural information, and vice versa, indicating that componential information and configural information are integral in upright face processing. Performance with inverted faces showed selective attention to components but not to configural information, implying dominance of componential information in processing inverted faces. When faces varied only in components, selective attention to different components was observed in upright and inverted faces, indicating that facial components are perceptually separable. These results provide strong evidence that integrality of componential and configural information, rather than the relative dominance of either, is the hallmark of upright face perception.