Consequences of socially sharing emotions: testing the emotion-response congruency hypothesis

We test the emotion-response congruency hypothesis, which predicts that the consequences of socially sharing one's negative emotions depend on the congruency between the shared emotion and the response that is obtained from the interaction partner. Experiment 1a shows that the response that people prefer is dependent on the specific emotion shared. Experiment 1b, however, reveals that the responses that interaction partners provide do not differ across emotions. Yet, and crucially, Experiment 2 shows that the outcomes of sharing are affected by the congruency between the response that people receive and the emotion they share, thus supporting the emotion-response congruency hypothesis. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential effects of prime-probe duration on positive and negative location priming: Evidence for opponent facilitatory and inhibitory influences in priming tasks

A series of four spatial localization experiments is reported that examined the effects of display duration and presentation mode on positive and negative priming using an attended-repetition and an ignored-repetition paradigm, respectively. Experiment 1 showed larger positive priming with response-dependent than with 150 ms display durations while negative priming remained unaffected. Experiments 2-4 were performed to further elucidate the effects of prime-probe durations. Data suggest largely independent effects of prime and probe duration on priming effects. Manipulation of prime duration affected facilitation due to repetition of the prime distractor location as well as inhibitory effects associated with ignored repetition. Furthermore, anticipated probe duration modulated the effectiveness of inhibition of return. Findings are discussed within a framework proposing two major components of priming effects—a stimulus-driven or automatic component, and a strategic component related to the participant's expectations towards the probe.     

The Structure of Creativity in Primary Education: An Empirical Confirmation of the Amusement Park Theory

In this study, we explored the structure of pupils’ creativity in primary education following the Amusement Park Theory, by investigating undiscovered linkages between the domains of writing, mathematics, and drawing. More specifically, we examined: (a) whether some domains and general thematic areas are more closely related to each other than to others, (b) whether literacy and mathematical ability are specific underlying traits of creativity in writing and mathematics, respectively, and (c) whether intelligence and divergent thinking are related to creativity in all domains. The sample consisted of 331 Dutch 4th grade pupils. For each research question, a model was analyzed using structural equation modeling. We found creativity in mathematics and creativity in writing to be most similar, followed by creativity in mathematics and creativity in drawing, with creativity in writing and creativity in drawing being least similar. Additionally, we found evidence for several underlying traits (i.e., literacy ability and mathematical ability) and initial requirements of creativity (i.e., intelligence and divergent thinking), none of which were important for creativity in only one domain, and of which only intelligence was important for creativity in all domains. Herewith, our study provides insights regarding the complexity of the structure of creativity in primary education.     

The role of illness uncertainty on coping with fibromyalgia symptoms.

This study examined the role of illness uncertainty in pain coping among women with fibromyalgia (FM), a chronic pain condition of unknown origin. Fifty-one FM participants completed initial demographic and illness uncertainty questionnaires and underwent 10-12 weekly interviews regarding pain, coping difficulty, and coping efficacy. Main outcome measures included weekly levels of difficulty coping with FM symptoms and coping efficacy. Multilevel analyses indicated that pain elevations for those high in illness uncertainty predicted increases in coping difficulty. Furthermore, when participants had more difficulty coping, they reported lower levels of coping efficacy. Results were consistent with hypothesized effects. Illness uncertainty accompanied by episodic pain negatively influenced coping efficacy, an important resource in adaptation to FM.     

Perceived racism and cardiovascular reactivity and recovery to personally relevant stress.

This study evaluated cardiovascular responses (CVR) to an active speech task with blatantly discriminatory (BRC) versus neutral (NRC) stimuli and an anger recall task in a sample of Black men (N = 73; age 18 to 47). Diastolic blood pressure scores were higher for NRC versus BRC stimuli during anger recall (p = .05). Moreover, persons in the NRC group who perceived high levels of racism (vs. no racism or BRC group) during active speech showed larger increases in blood pressure across postspeech rest, anger recall, and subsequent rest (p = .03). The notable elevation in CVR in response to an ambiguous event extends current models of racism suggesting that subtle racism is a psychosocial stressor that erodes health through chronically elevated CVR.     

On Making and Keeping Promises

Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise-keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary for either valid or justified promise-making. In the second place, promises need not meet such conditions in order to create moral obligations. In general, such analyses of promising fail because they suffer from a confusion between promise-making and promise-keeping. Philosophers have wrongly supposed that obligations to keep promises are dependent upon, or derivable from, the quality of the promises themselves, at the time they are made, instead of focusing on conditions that must be satisfied at the time when promises are supposed to be kept. It is not the quality of a promise that determines an obligation to keep it but the rightness or wrongness of performing the promised act.