Internal-external locus of control and response to influence attempts

It was hypothesized that subjects having external locus of control orientations (E's) would conform to both subtle and overt influence attempts, whereas internals (I's) would react against such attempts 144 undergraduate students (72 of each sex) rated a proposed grading procedure pre- and postinfluence Data were analyzed in a completely crossed and balanced 3-way factorial design, which included 3 levels of locus of control (I's, middles, and E's), 3 levels of influence (no, low, and high), and 2 levels of sex (male and female) Results showed that E's conformed to both levels of influence and I's reacted against high influence I's were not responsive to low influence     

Vulnerability to depression,mild depression,and degree of self-schema consolidation

The present study investigated the degree of consolidation of self-schema content in mildly depressed individuals, individuals cognitively vulnerable to depression (but currently nondepressed), and nonvulnerable-nondepressed controls. All three groups of subjects were presented with pairs of adjectives involving one depressed and one nondepressed content adjective, and were asked to decide which of the two adjectives described them the best (or least). Following this, subjects rated each adjective on a 9-point degree of self-reference scale. On the basis of these two types of self-referent judgments, a measure of decision inconsistency was computed for each subject. In accord with predictions generated from a self-schema model of depression, similar decision inconsistency scores were found for mildly depressed and vulnerable-nondepressed individuals. In turn, both of these groups revealed greater decision inconsistencies than normal controls (the nonvulnerable-nondepressed group). Using the inconsistency measure as an index of the degree of consolidation of self-schema content, these findings suggest that relatively poor consolidation of depressed and nondepressed self-schema content may relate to both the etiology and maintenance of depression.     

Amnesics Have a Disproportionately Severe Memopry Deficit for Interactive Context

Two experiments were used to compare the recognition memory of amnesic and normal subjects for intentionally encoded words (targets) and for incidentally encoded words that were meaningfully related to the targets and presented at the same time (interactive context). In both experiments the target recognition of the two groups was matched at a high level by presenting the amnesics with much shorter lists of words to remember. Experiment 1 compared 20 amnesics and their matched controls and showed that whereas the amnesics' recognition of the target words did not benefit significantly when they were presented together with their interactive context words (relative to their recognition when the target words were presented alone), that of the controls did. Experiment 2 compared 14 amnesics and their matched controls and showed that when patients and their controls were matched on their target word recognition in isolation, then the patients still showed worse recognition for the interactive context words. These effects were not found only in Korsakoff patients, and their size did not correlate with behavioural measures of frontal-lobe damage. It is concluded that amnesics may be more impaired at recognizing incidentally encoded interactive context than they are at recognizing target material, and this deficit may be an essential feature of the syndrome.     

Do People Really Have Insights in the Shower? The When,Where and Who of the Aha! Moment

While there are well‐known anecdotes and documented insight cases by renowned scientists and inventors, little is known about the experiences of insight in the general population. The present study aimed to determine peoples' self‐reported experience of insight in their daily lives. Using an online questionnaire, responses were obtained from 1,114 respondents. Eighty‐percent reported having insights. These respondents reported demographic information and answered three open‐ended questions on where their insights occur, what insights are and other thoughts on insight. A greater percentage of those who have insights are, female, younger, highly educated, and involved in occupations including, management, sciences, arts and service professions. The qualitative results uncovered eight major themes, reflecting on the places people have insights: At night, work, shower, home, when it is quiet, transport, while exercising, and in nature. Two major themes emerged on what insights are: Something from the subconscious, and a result of (not) thinking. Finally, three major themes emerged from the third question on thoughts they would like to share on insight: The improvement of insight with age, the importance of analyzing the details of the problem, and the unexpectedness of the solution. Results are discussed in the context of the current experimental research on insight.     

Assessing Safety Behaviors in Fear of Storms: Validation of the Storm-Related Safety Behavior Scale

With the exception of one self-report questionnaire assessing storm fear severity (Nelson et al. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 36(1), 105–114, 2014), there are few brief published assessment tools to measure the cognitive, behavioral, and physical manifestations of storm fear. A principal feature of phobic disorders is the use of safety behaviors to alleviate distress. Safety behaviors are believed to perpetuate anxiety by preventing the disconfirmation of feared outcomes (Salkovskis Behavioural Psychotherapy, 19(1), 6–19, 1991). To date, no studies have examined the use of safety behaviors in storm fear. The purpose of the current research was to develop and validate the Storm-Related Safety Behavior Scale (SRSBS; Vorstenbosch and Antony 2017), a 24-item self-report scale that measures safety behavior use in adults with a fear of storms. Two studies examined the (1) factor structure, internal consistency, validity, and test-retest reliability of the SRSBS, as well as the frequency with which specific safety behaviors were endorsed; and (2) ability of the SRSBS to differentiate between a group of adults with low and high fear of storms after exposure to a virtual thunderstorm. Factor analysis revealed that the SRSBS is best captured by one factor. Results provided preliminary evidence of convergent and discriminant validity, as well as test-retest reliability. Finally, significant group differences were found between participants with high versus low fear of storms following a virtual thunderstorm. These findings demonstrate the value of the SRSBS for assessing safety behavior use.     

Pigeons play the percentages: computation of probability in a bird

The ability to compute probability, previously shown in nonverbal infants, apes, and monkeys, was examined in three experiments with pigeons. After responding to individually presented keys in an operant chamber that delivered reinforcement with varying probabilities, pigeons chose between these keys on probe trials. Pigeons strongly preferred a 75% reinforced key over a 25% reinforced key, even when the total number of reinforcers obtained on each key was equated. When both keys delivered 50% reinforcement, pigeons showed indifference between them, even though three times more reinforcers were obtained on one key than on the other. It is suggested that computation of probability may be common to many classes of animals and may be driven by the need to forage successfully for nutritional food items, mates, and areas with a low density of predators.     

Instructional cues modify performance on the Iowa Gambling Task

The current study investigated whether acute alcohol intoxication produces impaired decision-making on tasks assessing ventromedial prefrontal (VMF) cortex functioning and impulsive responding. Participants completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a decision-making test targeting the VMF, and the Newman Perseveration Task (NT), a measure of impulsivity. Personality measures of impulsivity were assessed using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). To encourage natural responding on both tasks, participants were falsely informed that the study was examining the effects of alcohol on memory; the impulsivity tasks were presented as 'distractor' tasks. Advantageous performance on the IGT was related to specific instructional cues as well as to knowledge about the experimental purpose. Performance of intoxicated and sober participants did not differ. A subsequent study in which the true purpose of the experiment was revealed confirmed that alcohol does not affect IGT performance. Most importantly, the instruction-sensitivity of the IGT emphasizes the importance of salient cues for decision-making.     

Levels of abstraction in orangutan (Pongo abelii) categorization

Levels of abstraction have rarely been manipulated in studies of natural concept formation in nonhumans. Isolated examples have indicated that animals, relative to humans, may learn concepts at varying levels of abstraction with differential ease. The ability of 6 orangutans (Pongo abelii) of various ages to make natural concept discriminations at 3 levels of abstraction was therefore investigated. The orangutans were rewarded for selecting photos of orangutans instead of humans and other primates (concrete level), primates instead of other animals (intermediate level), and animals instead of nonanimals (abstract level) in a 2-choice touch screen procedure. The results suggest that, like a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) tested previously (Vonk & MacDonald, 2002), orangutans can learn concepts at each level of abstraction, and unlike other nonhumans, most of these subjects rapidly learned the intermediate level discrimination.     

Performance variability is related to change in cognition: evidence from the Victoria Longitudinal Study

Performance variability across repeated task administrations may be an important indicator of age-related cognitive functioning. In the present investigation, the authors examined whether age differences and change in inconsistency were related to 6-year (3 occasion) cognitive change. Inconsistency scores were computed from 4 reaction time tasks performed by 446 older adults (54-89 years). Replicating previous cross-sectional results, greater inconsistency was observed for older participants even after controlling for differences in response speed. New longitudinal results demonstrated (a) associations between inconsistency at baseline measurement and 6-year change in cognitive performance; (b) longitudinal change in inconsistency; and (c) intraindividual covariation between 6-year change in inconsistency and 6-year change in level of cognitive function. These findings support the view that performance variability serves as a marker of cognitive aging.