According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity of the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief. According to an alternative but yet unrecognised version of doxastic pragmatism, practical factors affect credence rather than the threshold on credence. Let’s call this alternative view credal pragmatism. In this paper, I argue that credal pragmatism is more plausible than threshold pragmatism. I show that the former view better accommodates a cluster of intuitive and empirical data. I conclude by considering the issue of whether our doxastic attitudes’ sensitivity to practical factors can be considered rational, and if yes, in what sense.
Studia Logica - An endomorphism on an algebra $${\mathcal {A}}$$ is said to be strong if it is compatible with every congruence on $${\mathcal {A}}$$ ; and $${\mathcal {A}}$$ is said to have the... 相似文献
Studies have shown that attention prioritizes stimuli associated with the in‐group. However, the extent to which this so‐called in‐group favoritism is driven by relevance is not clear. Here, we investigated this issue in a group of university rowers using a novel perceptual matching task based on the team label–color associations. Across three experiments, participants showed enhanced performance for the in‐group stimulus regardless of its familiarity level. These findings confirmed the role of relevance in in‐group favoritism. In a further control study, the advantage for certain stimuli was not found in an independent sample of participants who were not identified with the teams but were familiar with the label–color associations, indicating that in‐group relevance was necessary for the in‐group favoritism. Together, these findings suggest that in‐group relevance facilitates learning across existing and new associations. The consequences of these findings for understanding in‐group effects on perceptual processing are discussed. 相似文献
Undetected lies of prospective or current employees cost business billions of dollars annually. The ability to detect these lies would be of immense benefit. Several recent reports have called for research on new, theoretically based methods of lie detection. In response, we tested the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of lying ( Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphreys, 2003 ) according to which response time is a cue to deception. Participants were tested person-to-person. In Experiment 1, half lied to questions probing recent episodic memories. The other half answered honestly. Liar-truth teller response time differences were observed between subjects. Discriminant analyses demonstrated the value of response time for uncovering deceit. Those highest in social skills were the quickest liars. In Experiment 2, lying was shown to take longer than truth telling within subjects, and within-subject response time standard deviations were shown to be converging cues to deception. Based on these data and the ADCM, a Time-Restricted Integrity Confirmation (Tri-Con) framework for lie detection is proposed that might one day provide cost effective lie detection for business. 相似文献