Self‐Supervisor Agreement: The Influence of Feedback Seeking on the Relationship Between Self and Supervisor Ratings of Performance1

Self‐assessment research has continued to search for those factors that increase self‐other rating agreement. The current field study investigated the feedback‐seeking strategies (i. e., monitoring and inquiry) used by 125 employees to obtain performance information, as well as the relationship between feedback‐seeking strategy use and self‐supervisor performance‐rating agreement. Results indicate that the frequency of monitoring reported by employees significantly moderated the relationship between self and supervisor ratings of performance. Individuals who reported higher levels of feedback seeking through monitoring were more likely to have self‐assessments that were congruent with their supervisors' ratings of performance.     

CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN RELATIONSHIPS OF WORK DEMANDS, JOB SATISFACTION, AND TURNOVER INTENTIONS WITH WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT

A study of work interference with family (WIF) among managers is described, contrasting four clusters of countries, one of which is individualistic (Anglo) and three of which are collectivistic (Asia, East Europe, and Latin America). Country cluster (Anglo vs. each of the others) moderated the relation of work demands with strain-based WIF, with the Anglo country cluster having the strongest relationships. Country cluster moderated some of the relationships of strain-based WIF with both job satisfaction and turnover intentions, with Anglos showing the strongest relationships. Cluster differences in domestic help were ruled out as the possible explanation for these moderator results.     

AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF A MODEL OF RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION

This investigation synthesized research from several related areas to produce a model of resistance to persuasion based upon variables not considered by earlier congruity and inoculation models. Support was found for the prediction that the kind of critical response set induced and the target of the criticism are mediators of resistance to persuasion. The more critical acts are focused on arguments presented in a persuasive message, the more likely that the critical act will not be distracting and therefore promote counterarguing which will lead people to be resistant to subsequent persuasive messages arguing on the same side of given attitudinal issue. When criticism is less central to message variables and focuses on speaker and/or delivery characteristics, distraction occurs which decreases the probability of counterarguing and induces people to be vulnerable to forthcoming persuasive messages. This is especially true when negative criticism of speaker characteristics reduces threat to present attitudes and reduces motivation to counterargue to protect privately held beliefs. A completely counterbalanced design employing several manipulation checks was created to rule out competing explanations for differential resistance to persuasion.     

BLURRED VISION AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF EXPERIENCE

Abstract:  This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the "transparency of experience", a doctrine that has been the basis for the central argument in favor of intentionalism.     

DISENABLING LEVY'S FRANKFURT‐STYLE ENABLING CASES

Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom‐relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt‐style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails.