Speaking about the Unspeakable: genocide and philosophy

ABSTRACT  Genocide is a political catastrophe. Yet it has not received much academic attention. A few social scientists have studied it. Philosophers have largely ignored it. There is a large literature on the Holocaust, but there is little agreement as to how this should be related to other genocides. Some have argued that the Holocaust represented a crisis of Western culture, but that Western culture has not responded adequately for the lack of the appropriate self-understanding. This crisis has been attributed to the predominance of scientistic models of rationality in our culture. Social-scientific approaches to genocide have been criticised because of their commitment to logical empiricism, which is held to be epistemologically and ethically inadequate. Ethical approaches based on liberal humanism have been criticised by post-Nietzschean philosophers for their attachment to allegedly outworn metaphysical assumptions. However, the deconstruction of social science and liberal ethics leads in the direction of relativism and nihilism, which are either useless or dangerous in the face of evils such as genocide. The arguments against conventional social science and ethics are examined, and a counter-critique made of post-modern philosophy in order to clear the ground for constructive thinking about genocide.     

Tonkens on the Irrationality of the Suicidally Mentally Ill

abstract   Ryan Tonkens proposes that my Kantian approach to suicide intervention with respect to the mentally ill (2002) wrongly assumes that the suicidally mentally ill are rational and are therefore rational agents to whom Kantian moral constraints ought to apply. Here I indicate how the empirical evidence concerning the suicidally mentally ill does not support Tonkens' criticism that the suicidally mentally ill are irrational. In particular, that evidence does not support the conclusion that such individuals are systemically practically irrational so as to undermine the attribution of at least minimal rational autonomy to them. A Kantian moral framework, albeit one developed in a non-ideal direction, remains applicable to such individuals.     

Group Members’ Decision Rule Orientations and Consensus

Recent speculation and research concerning the achievement of unanimous agreement in small groups underscores the importance of consensus, implicit or explicit, regarding the criteria for selecting an option from the pool of alternative decisions. Moreover, an emerging stream of research indicates that individuals vary in their tendency to make choices that are indicative of specific decision rule orientations. Although many individuals do not demonstrate consistent orientations, many others display tendencies to select options congruent with assumptions underlying maximax, maximin, and maximum expected utility decision rules. In the present study, participants were assigned to groups composed of members who were either identical (matched) or different (mixed) with respect to decision rule orientation. The results indicated that, for interacting groups, consensus was more likely in matched than in mixed groups. However, the hypothesis did not hold for noninteracting groups. Implications for group consensus and the decision rule orientation construct arc discussed.